The world’s second oldest profession
By Bimal Bhatia

INTELLIGENCE is an emotive word and instantly brings to mind images of glamorous spies, internationally renowned hotels, the Orient Express, credit cards, and other trappings that thrill. Actually intelligence involves more than such frills and is a deeply misunderstood and neglected subject.

Knowledge about enemy, neutral or even friendly countries, constitutes intelligence which provides various parameters for the conduct of foreign policy or waging war, if required.

For the United States, Pearl Harbour and the Bay of Pigs fiasco will forever remain grim reminders of the neglect of intelligence reports and gross underestimation of enemy capabilities.You will notice how all intelligence failures that eventually get exposed relate to military debacles, although intelligence activities at the macro level are intended to support national concerns ranging from foreign relations to economic and trade issues.

In India you don’t have to search for ‘intelligence failures’ which began in 1962 when the Chinese routed us in NEFA.Operation Pawan in Sri Lanka was initially intended as a peace-keeping mission which turned bloody beyond expectations. Operation Bluestar in 1984 where the Army did not get the time to gather intelligence resulted in terrible consequences. A prime minister and a former army chief were assassinated and Punjab was virtually rent with militancy. Post-Kargil the spotlight was focused on intelligence.

Norman Dixon’s on the Psychology of Military Incompetence lists a series of factors that lead to military incompetence. Of the 14 listed factors, seven related directly or obliquely to intelligence: A tendency to reject or ignore information which is unpalatable or which conflicts with preconceptions, a tendency to underestimate the enemy and overestimate the capabilities of one’s own side, a failure to make reconnaissance, a belief in brute force rather than clever ruse, a failure to make use of surprise or deception, an undue readiness to find scapegoats for military setbacks, a suppression or distortion of news from the front, usually rationalised as necessary for morale or security.

In 1962 it was not the lack of information but the failure to analyse and process available inputs into usable intelligence. In Sri Lanka it was our inability to gauge the LTTE’s capabilities and intentions. In Kargil we failed to take note of certain indicators and were led into a classical deception at the political and military levels.

To decide whether intelligence is good or bad, it has to be judged by two criteria. One is its accuracy, because 100 per cent accuracy is seldom possible and the gaps must be filled by reasonable assessments. The other is its quality compared with the opponents’. It is therefore possible for both sides to have good or bad intelligence about the other. You will notice that India’s lack of inputs (strategic and tactical) about the intrusions in Kargil matched Pakistan’s lack of appreciation about India’s response and the type of support it expected from other countries, mainly the USA and China.

Since military plans form part of an overall political framework, much of the strategic element of military intelligence (MI) is derived from the National Intelligence Estimate (NIE). Recall how Defence Minister George Fernandes, donning a camouflage parachute jacket, remarked in Srinagar: "Hamne to socha hi nahin tha ki padosi desh aisa kar sakega." (we never imagined the neighbouring country could do this). Indicated here is the deep sense of complacency which percolated down the channel in the wake of normalcy in the Valley and the Lahore Declaration. It even affected routine surveillance which is essentially an operational function, but which contributes to intelligence by the prevention of surprise. The top leaders’ thinking thus greatly influences NIEs. On the Indo-Pak canvas were four events, not entirely unrelated: The overt nuclearisation of India and Pakistan; the return of normalcy in the valley; enhanced firing across the LoC; and the Lahore Declaration.

Producing a national estimate would begin with certain questions; I’m concerned about the situation in Kashmir. Let’s have a national estimate on Pakistan. What’s happening in Pakistan army now, and what can be expected in a year from now? These questions pose problems of a different order of magnitude from the question, "What is the nuclear, biological and chemical capability of Pakistan"?

After defining the terms of reference the problem itself is defined and assigned to appropriate agencies. The military problem going to the MI and the political aspects to any research division. RAW would be given suitable tasks, as would the IB for information through interrogation of militants.

Prior to the Cuban missile crisis in 1962, a USNIE predicted that Soviet Union was not likely to apply a policy of such enormous risks as placing nuclear-tipped missiles in Cuba. Luckily the world escaped from the consequences of such a bad guess. And in the beginning of that 1962 crisis an estimate was hurriedly produced which warned the Soviet Union might risk nuclear war rather than give in to President Kennedy’s demand that the missiles be removed. Even more fortunate was the inaccuracy of that estimate.

Errors of NIE are to be expected, because it involves an element of prediction of human intentions. Disagreements with regard to interpretations will also crop up. There are obvious pitfalls in intelligence estimates which Churchill described as a "form of collective wisdom".

But not attempting a NIE because of preconceived ideas and fixations will cause the intelligence agencies and their intelligence acquisition efforts to remain directionless, and a proliferation of grey areas will match the ad-hocism in assessments.

Affecting the quality of assessments and ability to fill gaps to build the big picture is the capability to obtain information through different sources and agencies. Satellite imagery provides near-real-time inputs but also has its limitations in the human skill at photo-interpretation even though it is greatly assisted by complex programmes for image enhancement and target/object recognition. Moreover, the camera eye can capture what is there to be seen, not what is concealed or does not yet exist. A third limiting factor is of continuous surveillance for which an array of surveillance platforms — drones, aircraft and low orbiting satellites with at least one meter resolution — need to be employed, depending upon the sensitivity and nature of target and the type of air defence activity.

Signal intelligence (Sigint) is more instantaneous and a useful means to supplement available inputs. Sigint has two components — communication intelligence (Comint) and electronic intelligence (Elint). Comint is derived from intercepting communication links and breaking the codes which are now sophisticated and have pronounced secrecy arrangements. Elint involves the interception and analysis of the enemy’s non-communication emissions like radars, whose signatures can also be fingerprinted. If a particular radar is seen as having moved from the Sialkot sector to the Lahore sector, an intelligence analyst will be able to interpret it in the light of the developing situation and synthesise all available inputs.

Notice how high technology has rendered the battlefield virtually transparent. But the more you can see the more you can be deceived.

Thus while the advances of technological means of gathering information have influenced intelligence functioning, the human source (Humint) has many redeeming features. Despite his drawbacks, the human being has many advantages over other technical sources, and these make his presence somewhere in the information producing loop, essential. The most obvious of these is his brain, for which no substitute has yet been invented.

A human source as a spy or informant has the ability to think, to use initiative and to make decisions, taking previous experience and many other factors simultaneously into account. In addition, a man, a woman is inventive, communicative, manipulative, dexterous, self-perpetuating and has universal employment.

Espionage is the second oldest profession in the world. Every nation in the world has a secret service and all countries spy on each other. A French commentator wrote that "The ablest ambassador can do nothing without spies and he would achieve even less if he chose them from the gutter. Taken from the higher ranks of society they are necessarily more expensive. To fulfil his mission worthily, an ambassador must be ready to buy anyone from the secretary to the valet, from the serving-maid of the favourite mistress to the lady-in-waiting of the Queen."

Espionage also requires sophisticated gadgets and nations are prepared to pay huge sums to establish productive espionage networks because there is no substitute for a classical espionage agent who can penetrate the highest echelons of the target country.

Humint is particularly valuable in counter-insurgency which has imposed heavy demands on the MI. Two Intelligence Corps units in J&K have been awarded the army chief’s citation. In the North-East intelligence units have performed with equal inspiration. However, since MI operates within the atmospherics of a national intelligence culture it inherits corresponding strengths and weaknesses. But the abiding truth is that in the world of intelligence, failures get highlighted while the people behind successful operations remain unsung heroes with only a rewarded conscience.