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The coup should alert India
The
developing situation in Pakistan will require very
significant watching, says K.S.
Bajwa.
THE latest military coup in
Pakistan on October 12 should not come as a surprise.
Ever since February, 1997 when Nawaz Sharif became Prime
Minister with a massive mandate from the people, he has
been busy trying to dismantle the ruling troika of which
the army was the most powerful centre. After downgrading
the judiciary and repealing the Eighth Amendment, which
made the President powerless, he had been trying to make
the generals subservient. In October,1998, he virtually
sacked Gen Jehangir Karamat and launched manoeuvres to
undermine the cohesion of the corps commanders and the
Army Chief. He plugged Lt Gen Zia-ud-din to succeed Gen
Karamat but the corps commander wanted Lt Gen Ali Quli
Khan, the next in line. A compromise brought up Lt Gen
Pervez Musharraf as the Chief and Zia-ud-din became the
head of the ISI. The resignation of the superseded Ali
Quli Khan added to the grievances of the all-powerful
generals. Peace parleys with India and the talk of a
possibility of converting the Line of Control in Kashmir
into an international border had further alarmed the
generals. Gen Musharraf with the full backing of the
corps commanders became the architect of the
strategically brilliant intrusion into Kargil to sabotage
the Lahore accord. Notwithstanding the tactical success
of India, the generals and much of the army considered
the order to withdraw from Kargil as the ultimate
humiliation. Sharifs attempts to blame the army for
this debacle had further deepened the resentment inside
the army. A tension had built up between the civil
government and the army ruling structure.
Pakistans shaky
foundation on an untenable two-nation theory has been
rocked from the very inception by its failure to
develop a stable political structure. The opening of a
military confrontation with India in Kashmir within two
months of its inauguration had created the genesis
of legitimacy for the military to gradually become the
arbiter of the countrys governance. Over the years,
the soldiers have become symbols of national unity,
patriotism and stability. The army had acquired a unique
focus in the ideology of nation- building as well
its survival and integrity. To question the
dominance of the army on the affairs of state had become
risky. From August 14, 1947 to October 1958, when the
first military coup took place, seven politically-led
governments had transited through Islamabad without any
one of them completing their full term. In the initial
years of military rule, the discipline and order imposed
by soldier-rulers created a measure of stability in the
country. Into this scenario, the injection of massive
doses of military and economic aid from the western
counties led by the USA as well as support from some of
the oil-rich Arab countries helped foster a sense of
national well-being. As a consequence, any initiatives to
develop a self-reliant national economy were pushed onto
the back- burner. It also led to military expansion far
beyond the real needs for the security of the state.
Moreover, the army, in order to safeguard its
bloated size and dominant status, had also acquired a
vested interest to keep alive an active hostility with
India, of which Kashmir became an easily exploited
emotional focus. In the next 13 years, when the country
remained under the jackboot, the arrogant military rulers
precipitated two disastrous wars against India. A
decisive military defeat in December 1971, led to the
separation of the eastern wing into an independent
Bangladesh. While the generals went into purdah to escape
the stigma of failure, a government led by Z.A. Bhutto
failed to establish a democracy which could satisfy the
expectations of the people. Back came the jackboot and 11
years of military rule followed. Hostility with India and
the Kashmir case acquired a more intense focus. Gen Zia
failed to fully grasp that with the winding down of the
Cold War, the strategic value of Pakistan had declined.
External patronage and economic aid had also
significantly dwindled.
Decades of neglect of
the domestic economy and development had created
considerable disaffection against military rule. General
elections in November,1988 installed an elected
government. Following it, five governments were sacked by
the President and one was dismissed by the Supreme Court.
By the time Sharif came to power in February 1997,
mismanagement and monumental corruption had depleted the
economy. As much as 30 per cent of the budget was
committed to defence, 36 per cent to debt servicing and
30 per cent was reserved for maintenance of the
government establishment. It left only 4 per cent for
education, health, social welfare and development.
Pakistan had, in fact, been virtually pushed to the brink
of bankruptcy.
In May 1998, under
domestic compulsions, nuclear tests to match those
conducted by India invited sanctions which pushed the
economy further into bankruptcy. It was equally apparent
that Pakistan could not expect to be bailed out by global
financial institutions without accepting stringent
conditions to reduce non-developmental expenditure, one
of which would inevitably be the outlay on defence. With
a low industrial and export base, there was hardly any
room for manoeuvre in the economy. Nawaz Sharif was well
aware of the imperative to reduce tensions with India so
that the defence expenditure could be made more
manageable as also mutually beneficial trade links
promoted. For instance, Pakistan was importing
much-needed goods manufactured in India through the West
Asian ports at three times the cost as compared to a
direct trade. There was also an inclination to consider
acceptance of the Line of Control in Kashmir as a border.
These measures would have in the long run led to
reduction in the defence establishment and significantly
lower the clout of the army which was not to the liking
of the generals. To effectively sabotage the peace
process launched at Lahore, the Kargil intrusions were
planned and launched. Though India was initially taken by
surprise, the Pakistan military establishment had not
counted upon the decisive Indian response and the
unequivocal global condemnation. Apart from the tactical
defeat inflicted by India, Pakistans economy was on
the brink of disaster and could not survive without
regular inputs of loans and financial accommodation from
international financial institutions. Nawaz Sharif had
little choice but to agree to order the withdrawal of
Pakistan forces from Kargil. The military felt betrayed
and humiliated. However, a large cross-section of people
in Pakistan felt that after their defeat in 1971,
Musharraf, the author of Kargil, was the only Pakistani
general who had put the Indians on the defensive. His
prestige and standing had gone up which helped in
creating a part of the legitimacy for the October 12
coup.
In accepting Musharraf
as the successor to Karamat, Sharif had apparently
calculated that Musharraf, being a mohajir amongst a
largely Punjabi and Pathan higher command structure of
the army, would be easier to handle. By the time he
realised that he had miscalculated, the resentment
generated by the order to withdraw from Kargil had made
the generals close ranks and their cohesion had been
strengthened. It is reported that after July this year,
Sharif made a number of unsuccessful attempts to secure
the resignation of Musharraf. After weeks of mutual
suspicion, Sharif had finally decided to sack Musharraf.
In the mean time, the army, too, was alive to this
possibility and had decided to defend its turf.
According to the Pakistani daily, The News, the
all-powerful corps commanders met on September 18 and put
into place a contingency plan to frustrate Sharifs
design to sack Musharraf. On September 24, this plan was
approved by the chiefs of the three services. Commanders
of X Corps, stationed at Chaklala, who had orchestrated
the Kargil operation, and IV Corps at Lahore were the key
players in this plan. Lt Gen Abdul Aziz, the Chief of the
General Staff, was the coordinating link. The 111
Brigade, located at Rawalpindi, was charged with the
takeover at Islamabad. It is reported that this brigade
even carried out a well- disguised rehearsal of its
task some time in the first week of October. On the other
hand, Sharif was overconfident with his majority in
Parliament. He may have also felt that the warning given
by the US Administration against any attempt to change
the government by force would keep the generals in check.
Eventually his actions were divorced from an awareness of
the ground realities and were amateurish and inept. He
seems to have relied totally on the assurance of
Zia-ud-din, his choice to succeed Musharraf, that he
would be able to contain any adverse reaction from the
army top brass. No indepth study of the possible reaction
from the army seems to have been made. Neither any
contingency plans were prepared, nor any preventive
measures launched. No attempt was made to ensure the
cooperation of the crucial X and IV Corps. The omnipotent
ISI also seems to have failed to gauge the mood in the
army hierarchy and to accordingly warn Sharif. Even
though on October 12 the decision to sack Musharraf that
very day while he was out side the country had become
known to the army early in the morning, the actual
announcement was made only at 4 p.m. In hindsight it
appears that an open invitation was held out to the
generals to walk in to power without any hindrance.
What are the
implications of the coup internally to Pakistan and to
India ? Undoubtedly, Sharifs autocratic rule and
the poor economic and law and order conditions in the
country have once again created the legitimacy for
intervention by the army. Humiliation of the army by the
order of withdrawal from Kargil has also created
antipathy to Sharif and sympathy for the army. Therefore,
there would generally be an acceptance of the army rule.
How long would it last would depend on how much and how
soon the basics of life for the common man are improved.
The army rule may succeed in showing some immediate
results, especially in recovery of loans, in putting a
lid on blatant corruption and in the performance of some
of the public utilities. Global experience has shown that
the turnaround of the economies so deeply afflicted is
generally beyond the capabilities of rather rigid
military rulers to manage. Moreover, some very tough
decisions regarding running down governmental
expenditure, a large chunk of which is committed to
defence and the establishment, are needed. An essential
prerequisite for achieving these goals is to improve
relations with India. It is very doubtful if the
Pakistans military establishment, or any civilian
facade manipulated by it, has the selfless commitment and
the will to take these tough decisions which would run
counter to the army interests. Besides, the heavy inputs
from international financial institutions, including
rescheduling of the existing foreign debt of $ 32
billion, would largely depend on the attitude of USA and
its allies which is at present condemnatory of
military rule.
In the light of these
contradictory pulls, it is highly likely that the vicious
cycle of military domination under its own rule, or
that manipulated by it, would continue. There is a
genuine fear that armed wings of fundamental
organisations and the Taliban with which the army has had
a close nexus may acquire a greater presence in the
country. India should expect a stepping up of the proxy
violence in Kashmir as also a greater penetration to
cause disaffection amongst the Indian Muslims. The
developing situation will require India to be very
vigilant.
This feature was published on
October 24, 1999
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