M A I L B A G | Tuesday, July 27, 1999 |
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Tiger Hill and Bofors This is in response to Lt-Col Shivinder Singhs letter, Walking along Tiger Hill (July 22), commenting on my article, Living with reality in Kargil (July 14). It is quite obvious that Colonel Singh has neither read my article properly nor does he appear to be very conversant with the geography of Kargil. I had written that one had walked along much of the LoC, along side Tiger Hill-Pt 13620 Shangruti Heights and Chorbatla, indicating, for the information of my readers, a line from one end to the other from Tiger Hill (in the Dras sector) to Pt 13620 (in the Kargil sector), and going across to the Shangruti Heights (in the Batalik sector). One is, of course, fully aware that at that time Pt 13620 was in Pakistani hands, and who should know it better than the Principal Staff Officer of the Kargil Brigade, who along with Brigade Commander then had planned the capture of Pt 13620 in the Indo-Pak 1971 war. Pt 13620 has been since in Indian hands, very ably captured by 2/11 GR in the 1971 war. Colonel Singh would also possibly note that my article has been written on July 14, 1999, with Pt 13620 having been in our hands for the last 28 years! He has also clearly missed out the operative words used by me, along and alongside when one had traversed, obviously on own side, the areas along the LoC. The Indian forces in 1971, before the start of the war, had continued to move and operate effectively in the areas opposite Kargil, in between Pt 13620 and our Kargil defences. Incidentally the letter writer should also know that what I had written (already quoted verbatim earlier) is not the same thing as Tiger Hill at Pt 13620, (this is what he has written), because Tiger Hill and Pt 13620 lie scores of kilometres apart, in two different subsectors! While considering it quite unnecessary to comment any further on the induction of the Bofors gun, (one has said what one had to say), one is happy to be informed that in 1971 there was no intelligence failure. Yet the PAF did suddenly bomb Amritsar, (one did not say whether it was the city or the airfield, and in any case how does it make any difference and then made good their return to their bases, without any appreciable damage. HIMMAT SINGH
GILL Factual position: The article written by Maj-Gen Himmat Singh Gill (retd) Living with reality in Kargil (July 14) is a factual statement by the then Brigade Major of the Kargil Brigade and not merely based on imagination. I have commanded a battalion in that sector at the same time as General Gill did and during the 1971 operations. Very aggressive patrolling was carried out all along the LoC. Since Pt 13620 was held by Pakistani troops, it was all the more important that in spite of the advantage that it gave to the troops manning it, a show of strength was given to the enemy by physical movements. The Brigade Major not only coordinated the overall patrolling but also moved physically to confirm the facts. I do confirm the failure of intelligence and in providing information to our troops throughout the operations in 1962, 1965, 1971 and 1999, as only on the basis of correct and timely intelligence can proper plans be made out. BRIG GURINDARJIT
SINGH (retd) * * * * Legal services This refers to the letter by Mr Tara Chand , "Judicial reforms" , published on May 12. It has been wrongly mentioned that the District Legal Services Authority has no funds at its disposal to pay TA and DA to its non-official members. When non-official members attend a meeting of the District Legal Services Authority they are paid travelling allowance and daily allowance as is their due. Its meetings are held as and when these are required to be held. |
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