The military
command system
By K.S.
Bajwa
THE military command system, and
exercise of leadership, is structured to meet the vital
requirements of economy and concentration of force. There
is a well-defined executive leader at each level of the
organisational pyramid. The sphere of command of each
leader and the scope for exercise of authority, is well
delineated. Similar executive structures do exist in
spheres of organised activity outside the armed forces,
but in one very important respect the military system is
different from them.
In the military system,
the authority of the executive leader on the
organisational levels below him is practically absolute.
Moreover, authority and responsibility are not always
coterminous. While, authority is nearly always delegated,
the primary onus of responsibility rests at the level of
the eventual decision making. This creates a special
environment for exercise of executive leadership. While
the system is tailored to meet the particular command
needs of battle, it has inherent to it, considerable
potential for ‘noise’ inhibition and
frustration.
Economy and concentration
of force are complementary. In a war situation, armed
forces can never hope to have a surfeit of resources.
Adequate resources have, therefore, to be concentrated at
the critical points of decision. Desired concentrations
are easier to achieve in the opening round by the side,
which has the initiative to start hostilities.
To a considerable extent,
this initiative related advantage continues to be
operative even during the course of the battle. The side
which lacks initiative at the outset or has lost the
initiative in the course of a battle faces many problems
in exploiting its resources to the maximum. Time to react
to the opponents’ initiative, assess the situation
command the resources needed and to take decisions is
invariably limited.
Time, space, resources and
decision making become critical. Consequently, there is a
need for rapid centralisation of decision making in an
ascending order till a level of resources and command
capability of a matching response is reached. To ensure
the desired result and prevent divergence of effort, the
leader’s authority over all levels subordinate to
him, has to be practically absolute. This is well
recognised. Exercise of such dominant authority is backed
by a legal code.
The system must,
therefore, permit flexibility in command. This would
enable timely employment of resources available at each
level or a concentration of larger resources consistent
with the requirement. Changing situations must be met
with a mounting intensity of res-ponse, till a status of
matching effectiveness is reached or the situation
contained without being allowed to escalate. In the event
the situation is contained or could be foreseen at the
outset, superior resources can be concentrated in time.
It is evident that military commanders must act on their
own, with the resources at their command as well as be
prepared to subordinate themselves to superior levels of
command when the situation demands. Under these
requirements and parameters, institutional delineation of
where one responsibility ends and the other starts is
neither feasible nor practicable.
In trade and industry,
authority and responsibility go hand in hand. The fall
out of success or failure emanating from decision making
is correlated. This is not so in the military system.
Authority and responsibility tend to be centralised at a
fairly high level. However, execution of plans and coping
with changing situations is feasible only if the bulk of
the authority is decentralised. Consequences of a major
failure in battle are generally irreversible and the cost
very high.
The final authority and
the matching responsibility for success or failure must
stay at the top. This creates its own special burdens,
pressures and a syndrome of concern. Far too often, this
tends to lead to over centralisation and exercise of
excessive authoritarianism. This tendency (if unchecked),
inhibits initiative, deprives the command system of its
flexibility and makes the organisation less productive.
It may be argued that considerable decentralisation of
authority is built in the system.
Admit-tedly, this is so in
the matters of peace time administration and similar
logistic command functions. In the sphere of situational
responses in battles, adequate rules and regulations can
neither be framed nor are desirable. Doctrines and
concepts only exist to produce a community of thought and
approach. In practice, the dominant position of the
leader at each level of command provides to him not only
an opportunity for intervention when needed, which is
essential, but also power of interference and veto which
is undesirable.
To a large measure, the
authority of subordinate commanders becomes a form of
perpetual delegation, which introduces a potential to
make the command system unstable.
In essence, the military
command system is highly personality intensive. While
personal equations are important in all walks of life,
these are much more so between commanders in the armed
forces. A leader has a dominant impact on the
organisation and on the personnel subordinate to him.
In turn, he is subject to
a similar domination by the leader above him. In the
absence of institutional regulation of inter-leader
relationship, a lack of adequate quantification of
performance and the disproportionate value acquired by
confidential reports, which are largely opinion based,
there is a potential and a demonstrated tendency to form
master-slave relationships.
In order that the
assignment of tasks to subordinate commanders is sound
and the delegation realistic, the executive leader must
consider capabilities and break down of the task two
levels below him. Since the eventual responsibility of
achievement of the task rests with him, he must approve
the plans at the level just below him. Thinking any
further down the chain or approving plans of levels lower
than the one below him, results in interference and can
only paralyses the organisation.
By selection of higher
commanders of the right temperament and ability; by
training and education and by regulatory patterns and
usage, we must reduce excessive authoritarianism of the
military system. The principle of "think two below
and approve one under" could be profitably applied
to information gathering, participation in operational
designs, intervention and even leadership assessment.
Emphasis should be on
gearing up an unobtrusive monitoring system and a timely
intervention as against interference or even a premature
intervention. Cultivation of sound and dependable human
equations, regulated by self-restraint and mutual
confidence will go a long way to ensure smooth flow of
leadership throughout the military organisations.
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