Victory must not make us complacent
by K. S. Bajwa

PAKISTAN through its failed adventure in Kargil has done a multi dimensional service to India. We have been shaken out of our reverie. Unlike in the debacle of 1962, we have emerge stronger politically, diplomatically. The initial failures of our intelligence and lack of political and military vigilance was overtaken by the very speedy buildup of a determined military response. The magnificent grit, determination and valour of our military leaders and men in the conduct of operations, has more than made up for our failures. There was wisdom in allowing the media a free access to the fighting. Dedicated visual and printcoverage combined with the decision to honour the martyrs has galvanised the nation behind the soldier. The upsurge of affection, admiration and support for the soldier has rarely been witnessed in the recent years.

Internationally, our stature as a nation has gone up several notches. The adroit handling of the situation by our Prime Minister and the Minister for External Affairs has definitely convinced the leaders of the world that the Indian state has to be taken seriously where the pursuit of its vital interests are concerned. For the first time we also waged a reasonable and effective information campaign.

As against our considerable gains, Pakistan has suffered a military humiliation as well as loss of credibility amongst the world community. Internally an adverse impact is slowly emerging.

Most significant for us has been the failure of Pakistan to gain even a modicum of tacit support not only from its traditional mentors but also from the Organisation of Islamic Countries. While our national euphoria is understandable, we must not delude ourselves into believing that the war is over. We must seriously reflect upon the "whys" of Kargil and fashion our readiness to deter Pakistan from such misadventures. If such follies are still launched, be prepared to inflict an unbearable cost.

Internal compulsions in Pakistan are such that no government can survive without actively pursuing a Kashmir agenda. We should prepare ourselves to meet a stepped up proxy war in Jammu and Kashmir along with a high pressure anti-India information war. The crisis will deepen if we are complacent in the formulation and pursuit of our national security goals.

In spite of the much publicised intentions and resolves of the present government, policy formulation for our national security continues to be plagued by endemic infirmities. Integration of professional expertise into the policy formulation frame work is largely peripheral. Restructuring of the higher defence organisation has remained a much-touted intention. The vital organs of a purposeful and dynamic defence structure, the National Security Council and the Joint Intelligence Committee seem to have merely acquired the status of a college debating society.

Integrating the service headquarters with the Ministry of Defence has not progressed beyond wishful thinking. Obviously the bureaucracy is not prepared to yield the turf usurped over the years. The total silence of the mandarins during the currency of the fighting in Kargil was in sharp contrast to their meddlesome vetoes during the interludes of peace. Perhaps they found themselves out of their depth in the circumstances of a near-war situation. While it was satisfying to see the two chiefs of the Army and the Airforce occupying their rightful place in the prosecution of the crisis the nation was facing.

The mandarins still hold power and authority without the attendant responsibility, in reality. Let this lesson learnt at such high cost not be obscured by smoke screens bound to be deployed in the post-Kargil era.

The speedy buildup of resources by the Army was laudable. Nevertheless it had a significant element of adhocism. The immediate response was gathered by moving units deployed in the Kashmir and the Ladakh valleys. Next to be lifted by air were infantry battalions and units of supporting arms conveniently located close to air fields spread around the country. Smooth movement and superior concentrations of troops needed was a tribute to well oiled organisation and an effective joint effort by the Army and the Air force. However units so extracted have caused an operational imbalance in the existing army formations assigned other roles in the over all security shield covering the nation. This cannot be accepted in the context of our fractured security environment.

These units, hurriedly inducted into a very demanding high altitude theatre of operations, came minus some essential equipment and clothing. It took time for them to become fully effective. Soldiers freshly introduced into the rarified air at an high altitude need two to three weeks of acclimatisation to get used to live and operate in this very demanding environment. Even then physical efficiency is appreciably lowered.

The other handicap which affected their operationally efficiency initially was a lack of training specific to operations in this area. The bulk of the troops trained for operations in the plains or jungle covered hills of the eastern region. They had been committed for prolonged periods for counter insurgency operations. In the Kargil area there are very high mountains bare of any vegetative cover, this operational techniques for attack are significantly different from those employed elsewhere. The enemy, occupying well- prepared defences on dominating hilltops, covering the narrow and steep hill sides with his fire, has a distinct edge over the attackers. The very difficult approaches to these objectives, invariably do not permit the classic assault in an extended line as practiced in other terrains. Fighting, of necessity, invariably takes places by sections, platoons and in race cases by companies.

This advantage of the enemy is only marginally offset by heavy concentrations of supporting artillery fire. The ultimate solution lay in attacking by stealth and infiltration, which too was not easy to achieve against an enemy anticipating to be attacked.

In the end it was the sheer grit, determination and valour of our soldiers, led from the front by their leaders, that made the difference. The point that forcefully emerges is that this kind of ad-hoc commitment of troops is not only undesirable but can turn out to be an invitation to a disaster. While soldiers from the Indian infantry regiments of the line have been in the forefront of our successful operations, it also cannot be denied that troops recruited locally or from areas where living conditions are similar, adjust more readily to high altitude parameters.

This has been shown by Pakistan by employing troops largely drawn out of the residents of the Northern Areas in 1947-48 and in the present incursion in Kargil almost exclusively employing its locally recruited Northern Light Infantry battalions. On our side the Ladakh Scouts have done commendably well. There is a need to create forces specific to these areas which put a premium on special physical attributes and operational skills. Moreover these skills acquired with effort and experience are liable to be lost if the units are periodically turned around all over India.

It is equally relevant to point out that in this emergency, we resorted to use of very valuable assets of special forces, which is basically wasteful. These highly trained and specially equipped special forces, such as para commandos, need avenues of opportunities to exploit their capacity for dynamic initiative. Best returns from such troops accrue when committed to special tasks such as raids on enemy gun areas, headquarters and vital administrative installations. By all considerations it is operationally advisable to raise specially equipped units from hillmen to serve in Jammu and Kashmir, which would be turned over with in this specific operational area.

This course would ensure continuity and operational efficiency. In turn in the long run this will also provide more effective operational readiness as well as economy.

Prolonged commitment of the Army in counter-insurgency operations, which again require a different mental orientation and operational skills can only be at the cost of readiness of units for their primary role of offensive defence against external threats for instance the caution with which militants holed up in populated areas are tackled is not conducive for fostering aggressive dynamism needed while dealing with an enemy. It is, therefore, advisable to constitute a national paramilitary force specially equipped and led (by non police officers) for peace time security of the borders as well as for employment for counter-insurgency operations of the type we have been fighting in Kashmir for over a decade and else where in the country of much longer periods. The Rashtriya Rifles, the Border Security Force, the Assam Rifles, the Indo Tibetan Border Police and most of the other such organisations which have become private armies of vested interests, could be merged together. Besides economy, the outcome would be a far better operational readiness and performance.

Our security in Kashmir will depend on our response to actual or perceived aggression by Pakistan. For over a decade we have chosen to ignore infiltration of mercenaries/militants into the state and firing across the Line of Control. By any international reckoning these are violations of our territory and acts of naked aggression. Unless we treat these as such and act forcefully in retaliation, Pakistan will not be deterred. Be it hawkish, we must teach lessons of unacceptable costs for any adventures into our territory.

To prevent any more Kargils in the future and to stop the proxy war in our state of Jammu and Kashmir will depend on how quickly and firmly we address our infirmities in our defence management.

This feature was published on August 1, 1999