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siachen anniversary
29 men in minus 30°C on a Baisakhi Day |
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Five words at the heart of the dispute
Why the icy tangle evades solution
It’s a no-win for both India, Pak
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30 years of the world’s coldest war April 13, 1984, was the first time Indian troops landed on the icy heights called Siachen Glacier. Hundreds of deaths and three decades on, the battle zone continues to inspire awe and fear. The Tribune takes stock. By Dinesh Kumar
THE bumpy road constructed by the Border Roads Organisation after painstakingly cutting at the mountainside meanders up the imposing rocky Ladakh Range visible from Leh. The slow ride leads to the world’s highest motorable pass, the Khardung La at 18,380 feet. It’s the highest point on planet earth to which a human being can travel on wheels without having to walk a step. From there, the road winds down northwards past small hamlets and villages into the Shyok Valley through which the Shyok river snakes its way, eventually merging into the Indus river that flows into Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (POK). After some hours of driving, the Shyok river is greeted by the Nubra river which flows in a southerly direction from the Siachen Glacier. This point at which the two rivers (known as ‘Yankee point’) meet becomes a valley wide enough for an Indian Air Force (IAF) Antonov-32 transport aircraft to take a U-turn, usually an extremely hazardous manoeuvre while flying in a valley flanked by imposingly high mountains. A straight drive from there leads to Partapur where the headquarters of the Army’s 102 brigade, colloquially known as the Siachen brigade, is located.
Oxygen at a premium A short distance further up from Partapar is Thoise airbase, which serves as the runway closest to the Siachen Glacier where the IAF’s transport aircraft land after some skilful flying through the high mountains. A signboard put up at this airbase tellingly states, ‘You are breathing 30 per cent less but pure oxygen’. A right turn from ‘Yankee Point’ and a short drive on a bridge over the Shyok river leads into the Nubra valley with the Nubra river to the left. The road goes past the Old Silk Route before culminating at the snout of the 76 km long Siachen Glacier, the world’s second largest glacier outside the polar region and also the origin of the Nubra river. From the snout (height approximately 12,000 feet), the glacier extends 76 km like a giant white tongue to as high as 18,875 feet at its source which is Indra Col (24,493 feet), the northern most tip of India. It is near the snout — blackened over the years due to pollution, human habitation and mixing with gravel from the mountains — where the Army has a major Base Camp equipped with a training school for soldiers, helipads, a battery of the Swedish-made Bofors 155 mm Howitzer, and a memorial with the names of soldiers killed either due to weather, terrain or Pakistani fire over the last three decades among other equipment and facilities. However, for almost 11 years now, beginning November 2003, both sides are maintaining a ceasefire in the area leaving soldiers on both sides to contend with weather and terrain, which arguably is a far bigger threat than the now silent guns of the adversary located on both sides of the 110-km long Actual Ground Position Line (AGPL) that runs along the Saltoro Ridge.
110 km trek in the freeze This Base Camp caters for the northern and middle portions of the Siachen Glacier. A second Base Camp, catering to troops deployed in the southern Siachen Glacier, is located ahead of Thoise. It is from these two base camps that Army soldiers begin their long arduous trek to the 100-odd posts located along the AGPL that begins from map grid reference NJ 9842 all the way northwest to Indra Col, which overlooks the Shaksgam Valley. The altitude of the Saltoro Ridge ranges between 17,800 feet and 25,500 feet, which is barely 3,500 feet less than Mount Everest, the world’s highest peak. The Indian Army is strongly positioned on the Saltoro Ridge, which overlooks Gilgit and Baltistan (POK) in the far distance and is located well ahead of the entire Siachen Glacier. But along with this major strength is also a pitfall. The nearest road head is located as far as 80 km from the farther Indian post. In these high killer mountains, 80 km can seem an endless distance for a soldier who has to spend up to several days traversing the glacier and climbing high peaks to take his position on one of the scores of Army posts dotting the Saltoro ridgeline. Such distances in the absence of any possible roads on the glacier poses a herculean logistics challenge. How does one transport equipment and supplies? A helicopter? Yes, but it comes at a huge cost. The IAF and the Army Aviation Corps, which flies a range of helicopters – the smaller nubile Cheetah, the larger sturdy Mi-17-1V and the indigenously developed Dhruv advance light helicopter – carry far less than their designated payload. This is because these helicopters take off from Leh, Thoise and the Base Camp, all of which are located above 10,000 feet and therefore permit carrying only a substantially reduced payload in the rarefied atmosphere. While Cheetah helicopters can fly up to those posts where makeshift helipads have been created, the much larger Mi-17 and Dhruv helicopters cannot land on these posts and have to mostly airdrop supplies. But most posts cannot be air-maintained since it is not easy to construct helipads at those heights. Soldiers here thus have no option but to trek up the spurs of the Saltoro range carrying supplies on their back.
Survival is the job What mountaineers elsewhere in the world do as a novelty, the average Indian soldier does as a matter of duty on a routine posting living up to three to six months on icy heights with temperatures dipping as low as minus 40 degrees Celsius. The farthest post – Bana Post at 22,100 feet – takes a soldier up to 20 days of trek to reach. Indeed, this is a cruelly unique part of the country where breathing is at a premium, bathing a dream, a change of clothes an impossible luxury, and where raging blizzards, sudden deep crevasses in the glacier and unforgiving avalanches devour soldiers like a hungry monster. Then there is always the danger of frostbite leading to gangrene and amputation of a limb and high-altitude pulmonary oedema and memory loss owing to the low content of oxygen. It is a battlefield fit only for the Gods and not for mortal beings, some would say. Between April 1984 and August 2012, the Indian Army had lost 846 soldiers with many more wounded. Both sides have deployed a brigade strength (about 5,000 troops) that costs about Rs 5 crore a day to maintain in the region and comprising Infantry battalions along with a host of supporting units. Siachen remains one of the Indian Army and Air Force’s greatest story – of valour, grit, fortitude, logistics, manoeuvres, battles and skillful flying. Equally important, there would be scores of human interest stories for every soldier posted in the area. It would arguably surpass the stories of many if not all militaries in the world.
Men who mattered
Lt Col DK Khanna: Commanding Officer, 4 Kumaon, which marched on foot with full equipment for several weeks across some of the world’s toughest terrain and forbidding climate to occupy the glacier.
Capt Sanjay Kulkarni: Recently promoted as Lt General, he was the first person to land on Saltaro Ridge on April 13, 1984, and hoist the Indian flag at Bilafond La. He was awarded Shaurya Chakra.
Sqn Ldr Surinder S Bains and Sqn Ldr Rohit Rai: Posted with 114 Helicopter Unit, they undertook 17 sorties in the early hours of April 13, 1984, to air-drop troops from 4 Kumaon on Saltaro Ridge.
Pakistan’s failed attempts 1984.. Pakistanis made their way up to the glacier in 1984 and found elements of 4 Kumaon already entrenched there. The area in question was about 2,300 sq km. After 1984, Pakistan launched several failed attempts to dislodge the Indian forces. 1987.. Another attempt was masterminded by then Brig Pervez Musharraf, who later became the Pakistan president. He was also the architect of the Kargil misadventure in 1999. Pakistan’s aim was to capture Bilafond La. A bitter battle ensued, including hand-to-hand combat, and the Pakistani attack was repulsed. 1990-1999.. Further attempts were launched by Pakistan in 1990, 1995, 1996 and early 1999, just prior to the Lahore Summit. Under Operation Badr in 1999, Pakistan’s infiltration across the LoC in the Kargil sector was undertaken to sever the link between Kashmir and Ladakh. The idea was to push the Indian Army out, thus forcing India to negotiate a settlement of the broader Kashmir dispute.
Roll of honour Naib Subedar Bana Singh of 8 J&K Light Infantry is the only recipient of the PVC so far. In a daring daylight raid, he led an assault on and captured a Pakistani post, Qaid, atop a 22,000-ft-high peak after climbing a 1,500-ft ice cliff face, in 1987. The position was renamed Bana Post.
Op Meghdoot
The cost Indian soldiers killed: Over 850 soldiers Pakistani casualties: About 1,800 Annual operation cost:
Rs 3,000cr
The glacier Location: East Korakoram range, northern Ladakh Length: 76 km Width: 3 km Height: Peaks up to 25,000 ft high Coverage: 700 sq km Average winter snowfall: 35 feet Min temperature: Minus 50 degrees Celsius Fauna: Rare species like snow leopard, brown bear and ibex Battlefield: World’s highest, coldest, most expensive Since 2007, India has allowed limited civilian trekking expeditions
MANNING SIACHEN
The 102 Infantry Brigade, headquartered at Partapur near Thoise, is the principal formation tasked with occupying and defending the glacier. It is part of the Leh-based 14 Corps, raised after the Kargil conflict. The brigade is supported by artillery, air defence, engineer and other logistic elements. Ladakh Scouts battalions are also deployed in Karu, Nubra, Leh and Partappur areas. Infantry deployment in the region ranges between five and eight battalions. Troops man outposts and artillery observation posts; maintain helipads and carry out patrols. The brigade maintains the Siachen Base Camp, which is the launchpad for inducting troops in the glacier and also runs the Siachen Battle School for pre-induction training, orientation and acclimatisation for fresh troops. The base camp is located at about 12,000 feet above sea level, with the highest posts on the glacier being Pahalwan (20,000 ft) and Indira Col. IAF helicopters units in Leh, Thoise and Srinagar are deployed for air maintenance of forward posts and casualty evacuation. Airlifting troops and supplies to Leh, Thoise and advance landing grounds like Daulat Beg Oldie as well as para-dropping supplies is primarily undertaken by 12 Wing, Chandigarh. The IAF’s latest transporters, C-17 and C-130, are also involved in logistic operations. TIMELINE
1949: The Karachi Agreement demarcated the Ceasefire Line (now LoC) in J&K but stopped at NJ 9842 as both sides agreed it would be understood to extend “thence north to the glaciers”. It was not delineated beyond this point after the armies restored status quo ante after the 1971 war. 1974: Pakistan opened the region for foreign expeditions to Baltoro Glacier, near Mount K2, and to explore the no-man’s land around Siachen. 1977: Col Narinder Kumar, an ace mountaineer, approached by a German rafter keen to undertake the first descent of the Nubra. He shows a map depicting Siachen as part of Pakistan.
1978: Col Kumar takes the map to the Army top brass and later leads a reconnaissance expedition to Siachen; tin cans and cigarette packs found with Pakistani names along with German, Japanese equipment. 1983: Both nations carry out several military expeditions to scan the glacier. 1984: Indira Gandhi orders Army to take control of the glacier; Operation Meghdoot launched; India occupies it. 1985: Pakistan attacks Bilafond La; fails to dislodge Indian troops. 1986: Two rounds of defence secretary-level talks resolve to seek settlement in accordance with Simla Agreement. 1987: Infantry battalion dislodges Pakistani troops; captures Qaid Post; talks suspended. 1988: Third and fourth round of secretary-level talks in Islamabad, New Delhi. 1989: Agreement reached on settlement based on troop redeployment; PMs meet in Islamabad, approve results of fifth round of talks; defence secretaries told to arrive at settlement; military commanders resume discussions in Rawalpindi; talks suspended. 1992: Foreign secretaries propose resumption of talks on Siachen; no progress made; talks suspended. 2004: Two rounds of talks in Delhi, but not conclusive. 2005: Ninth and 10th rounds of talks between defence secretaries in Islamabad. 2006: Defence secretary-level talks within the framework of the Composite Dialogue held in Delhi. 2007: Defence secretary level-talks on Siachen held in Rawalpindi. 2011: Defence secretary-level talks in New Delhi; both sides acknowledge ceasefire holding since 2003 and exchanged suggestions towards dispute resolution. 2012: Pak army chief Ashfaq Kiyani proposes demilitarisation of Siachen after avalanche kills 125 Pakistani army men; Indian Army opposes move. Inputs: Vijay Mohan
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29 men in minus 30°C on a Baisakhi Day
AT around 6 am, exactly 30 years ago, Captain Sanjay Kulkarni (now lieutenant general) and another Army soldier jumped on to the heavily snow covered Bilafond La (17,881 feet), a tactically important pass located on the Saltoro Range, from a hovering French-origin Indian Air Force Lama (rechristened Cheetah) helicopter. These two men were the first of a total 29 soldiers belonging to 4 Kumaon Regiment to be heli-dropped on the Bilafond La (Pass of the Butterflies in Balti language) by the IAF which flew about 17 sorties over the subsequent six to seven hours that fateful Baisakhi Day, when the temperature hovered around minus 30 degrees Celsius. Within a few hours of their landing, however, the radio operator was stricken by high altitude pulmonary oedema (HAPO), a common ailment in high altitude, and therefore had to be airlifted, leaving 28 soldiers on the pass on that day. Late that afternoon, even as a blizzard set in, Captain Kulkarni planted the first Indian flag on the pass, thus marking the beginning of the taking of a 110-km long Saltoro ridgeline located ahead of the 76 km long Siachen Glacier. Known as Operation Meghdoot, which continues even today, that singular action in this remote northern part of Jammu and Kashmir led to this region turning into, what is cliché-like referred to as the world’s highest, coldest and most expensive-to-maintain battlefield, as also one of the world’s highest junkyard and garbage dump. Four days later on April 17, Lance Naik Ramesh Singh of 4 Kumaon died of hypoxia thus becoming the first casualty in this mountainous wasteland where temperatures dip to as low as minus 50 degrees Celsius (up to as low as minus 100 degrees in crevasses) and where blizzards can rage as high as 100 km an hour. Lance Naik Singh’s name figures topmost on the list of over 800 soldiers whose names have been etched on a memorial erected at the Base Camp near the snout of the Siachen Glacier. The number of those wounded or rendered permanently disabled far exceeds the dead. The first base camps Two days after Bilafond La was taken, the Army established two camps en route to the pass as a step towards building a logistics line. Owing to bad weather, the Army had to wait four days before, on April 17, a platoon of the Ladakh Scouts, another Infantry unit, led by Major Ajay Bahuguna were heli-dropped near Sia La (18,337 feet), another tactically important Pass, in five Cheetah and two Soviet-origin Mi-8 helicopters belonging to the IAF that flew 32 sorties that single day. Owing to heavy snow, the soldiers were dropped 5 km east of the pass, from where they had to trek up a treacherous terrain to wrest control of Sia La. In due course, the Army reached Indra Col (24,493 feet), the starting point of the Siachen Glacier where the latter begins from a height of about 18,875 feet. Indra Col is also the de facto tri-junction between India, China and Pakistan. Initially, the Indian Army only focused on taking the key passes. The race to move up vertically to the Saltoro ridgeline started after the Pakistani Army failed to dislodge the Indian Army from the passes. Over time, the Indian Army went on to gain control of the Saltoro ridge, the altitude of which ranges between 17,880 feet (lowest point) to 25,330 feet (highest point). The Army gradually established 108 posts along what has come to be termed as the un-delineated Actual Ground Position Line, or AGPL. This has placed the Indian Army at a major tactical advantage. The Indian Army is in physical possession of most of the heights on the Saltoro Range west of the Siachen Glacier with the Pakistani Army reduced to holding posts at lower elevations of western slopes of the spurs emanating from the Saltoro ridgeline. The Pakistani Army, which was planning a similar assault in May of that year (details in subsequent paragraphs) and which is acknowledged by former Pakistani President and Army Chief General Pervez Musharraf in his book In the Line of Fire, was caught by complete surprise. Enemy contact Owing to bad weather, Captain Kulkarni had been unable to establish radio contact with the base camp. For, after he did, which was to inform about Lance Naik Ramesh Singh’s casualty, the Pakistani Army intercepted the signal to learn that the Indian Army had established its presence. The Pakistani Air Force immediately launched helicopters and even fighter aircraft on reconnaissance missions. The Indian Army responded swiftly by deploying the late-1960s vintage SA-7 or Strela-2 man portable shoulder-fired low-altitude surface-to-air missile systems and late-1950s vintage Soviet-origin Zentinaya Ustanovka or Zu-23-2 anti-aircraft guns. Interestingly, as Nitin Gokhale recounts in his just released book, Beyond NJ 9842 – The Siachen Saga, along with other interesting details of the operation, some of which have been recounted above, the imported equipment and clothing had arrived from abroad the evening before the launch of Operation Meghdoot. Why April 13 In his book Gokhale quotes Brigadier Channa, who was then brigade commander (Commander 26 Sector) entrusted with launching the assault, as saying that April 13 was deliberately chosen because it was Baisakhi day, which is celebrated with equal fervour in both India and Pakistan, and when he expected the guard to be down. “Pakistan had a much shorter distance to cover, had lesser logistical problems… I mulled over it and thought about Baisakhi. Now Baisakhi is celebrated with equal fervour on both sides. People are in a joyous mood. Their guard is down. It was also the most unlikely date to launch a military operation. So there you are. 13 April it was. I would concede that it was risky. Some called it suicidal. But that is exactly why we had to do that day,” he says. Immediate provocation Interestingly, as brought out in his book Pakistan Leadership Challenges, Lieutenant General (retired) Jahan Dad Khan, then commanding the Pakistani Army’s 10 Corps, writes that a company of the Pakistani Army’s Special Services Group had established its presence on Bilafond La only nine months earlier in end-August 1983 but was ordered to pull out after 10 days owing to bad weather, for which they had not been equipped. On August 21, 1983, around the same when Pakistani troops were lodged on Bilafond La, the Northern Sector Commander of Pakistan handed to his Indian counterpart in Kargil a protest note claiming that the Line of Control (LoC) from map reference point NJ 9842 joined with the Karakoram Pass and that the area west of this extended line belonged to Pakistan. It was on receipt of this note and ground confirmation that the Pakistani Army had occupied Bilafond La that the Army Headquarters after approval from Prime Minister Indira Gandhi ordered the Northern Command, headed then by Lieutenant General ML Chibber, to prevent occupation of the Siachen Glacier by the Pakistani Army at the start of the mountaineering season in 1984. The Pakistani Army had foreseen the Indian move and in a meeting held in December 1983 with General Zia-ul-Haq, then President and Pakistan Army Chief, had directed the Army to launch a pre-emptive action in May 1984 to prevent Indian occupation of the passes. Preparatory work had begun soon after, which included procurement of high-altitude equipment and clothing, improvement of roads and tracks and recruitment of porters. Instead, the Indian Army acted first, taking their Pakistani counterparts by surprise. Interestingly, the Pakistanis placed an order for Arctic-weather gear from a London-based company that also supplied the Indian Army, which, in turn, was quick to order 300 outfits, twice as many as Pakistan. “We had obviously failed to appreciate the timing of the Indian move and our intelligence agencies had failed to detect the movement of a brigade size force in this area,” wrote Lt General Khan. In his book, Musharraf concedes that Pakistan lost almost 2,331 sq km of territory.
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Five words at the heart of the dispute the
origin of the Siachen conflict lies in an omission and to a set of five words dating back to the Cease Fire Line (CFL) Agreement signed in Karachi 65 years ago on July 27, 1949, by military representatives of India, Pakistan and the UN Military Observers Group. It demarcated the 740 km CFL up to Chalunka, Khor and map grid reference NJ 9842 and thereafter left the remaining portion open with the line ‘thence North to the glaciers’. The segment beyond NJ 9842, seen as an uninhabited and inhospitable terrain, was not demarcated. Neither side possibly imagined either side occupying that stretch of land. Neither side foresaw the historical events that were to follow. As of then India had taken the Kashmir issue to the UN and it was hoped that the matter would be judiciously settled by the then newly created international organisation. That, owing to a long list of reasons, never happened. For the subsequent 13 years, the area remained relatively quiet. But this was also the period when major geo-political shifts were underway. Sino-Indian relations, initially marked by bonhomie, steadily deteriorated over interpretations of the way the two sides viewed the international boundary. Taking advantage, Pakistan began cosying up to China based on the maxim ‘my enemy’s enemy is my friend’. It was also the period when India’s relations with the US began to sour whereas Pakistan began to openly ally itself militarily with the US. India instead turned to the Soviet Union, which in turn was beginning to have difficulties with its fellow Communist country, China. Enter the dragon Then followed the Sino-Indian War in October-November 1962 when China seized portions of the Ladakh region (Aksai Chin) and, in the process, became a third party to the Indo-Pak dispute over the state of Jammu and Kashmir. A year later, in 1963, Pakistan signed a boundary agreement with China in which they unilaterally ceded about 5,200 square km of the Shaksgam Valley to China located north of Indra Col, the starting point of the Siachen Glacier. With this, now both Pakistan and China flanked the Siachen Glacier and the world’s second highest peak, the K2, came to be jointly owned by these two countries. Not surprisingly, India’s protests at Pakistan’s cessation of territory went in vain. On December 11, 1972, following the signing of the July 2, 1972, Simla Agreement, India and Pakistan revalidated the CFL as the Line of Control (LoC) in an agreement signed by Lt General Premindra Singh Bhagat (Indian Army) and Lt General Abdul Hameed Khan (Pakistan Army) at Suchetgarh after incorporating all military gains made during the December 1971 India-Pakistan War at the end of a total nine meetings that began on August 10, 1972. In the Kargil sector in particular, all gains went entirely to India, which acquired the Turtuk salient just south-west of NJ 9842. The problem lies with the interpretation of the five words, ‘thence North to the glaciers’. Pakistan interprets it as drawing a line that runs north-east from NJ 9842 to the Karakoram Pass in China, encompassing the entire Siachen Glacier. India advocates the watershed principle and interprets it as running up to Indra Col along the Saltoro ridge which arcs north-west from NJ 9842 and encompassing the entire Siachen Glacier. A vertical straight line running north would involve cutting through the glacier and entail the north-western part of the glacier as well as part of the Saltoro Ridge going to Pakistan and the south-eastern part going to India.
Cartographic encroachment Even so, all seemed well until two sets of developments took place before the Pakistani troops briefly positioned themselves on Bilafond La in August 1983. The first was cartographic encroachment that started in the 1960s. The second was Pakistani sponsored mountaineering expeditions that begun in the 1970s and continued until the Indian Army established its presence on the Saltoro ridge. Both the cartographic encroachment and mountaineering expeditions began soon after the cessation of the Shaksgam Valley following the signing of the 1963 Sino-Pakistan border agreement. Pakistan initially began licensing western mountaineering expeditions up to east of K2. But the real thrust came from the US Defense Mapping Agency (later renamed National Geospatal Intelligence Agency), an international reference point for cartography, when starting from 1967 it began to suo motu extend the CFL from NJ 9842 east-northeast to a point just west of the Karakoram Pass (18,136 feet). Pakistan only gleefully followed suit and began granting permits for mountaineering expeditions. After signing of the December 1972 Suchetgarh Agreement, Pakistan began permitting mountaineering expeditions to enter the un-demarcated area comprising the triangle formed by NJ 9842, the Karakoram Pass and Indra Col. In 1975, a Japanese mountaineering expedition led by H. Katayama climbed Terma Kangri I and Terma Kangri II, both over 24,000 feet, which were approached through Pakistan via the Bilafond La. In 1978, a German Siachen-Kondus expedition led by Jaroslav Poncar with Major Asad Raza of the Pakistan Army as the liaison officer, entered the Siachen Glacier via Bilafond La. A documentary on this expedition was shown on a German TV channel in 1979. Interestingly, beginning from 2007, India has begun permitting both Indian and foreign mountaineering and trekking expeditions in the area. For example, in 2007 alone (July 30 to September 1), India permitted an Indo-French expedition to Mamostong Kangri Peak, located about 30 km east of the snout of the Siachen Glacier. On September 6 of the same year, the Indian Mountaineering Federation sent an expedition comprising six civilians and four Army men to Rimo Peak located east of the Siachen Glacier and overlooking Aksai Chin.
Indian forays India’s first foray into this region was in 1957, designated by the UN as the International Geophysical Year. India had then mounted a major multi-disciplinary scientific expedition to the Siachen region to map the glaciers, geology, and flora and fauna of this then little known area. It was quite by accident that the Army discovered Pakistan’s machinations. In 1977, Colonel Narendra Kumar, a well-known mountaineer who was then commanding the Army’s High Altitude Warfare School at Gulmarg, was approached by a German rafter who wanted to undertake the first descent of the Nubra River from its source at the snout of the Siachen Gacier. He showed a map that showed a dotted line connecting NJ 9842 to the Karakoram Pass. Colonel Kumar, nicknamed Bull, showed the map to Lt General Chibber, who was then Director Military Operations in the Army Headquarters. He then quickly obtained permission for Colonel Kumar to mount a reconnaissance expedition to Siachen. Colonel Kumar thereafter went on a major mountaineering expedition that saw him trekking up to the glacier’s halfway point and then ascending the Teram Kangri II located on the southern edge of the Shaksgam Valley. The team returned with trash left behind by Pakistani expeditions as evidence of the latter’s incursions. In 1981 Colonel Kumar traversed the entire Siachen Glacier and hoisted the Indian Tricolour at the farthest end. In the eight weeks spent in the inhospitable region, Colonel Kumar scaled the Sia Kangri (24,350 feet), which is now in POK; Saltoro Kangri I (35,400 feet), which is with the Indian Army; Indra Col and skied to the Bilafond La, Sia La and Turkistan La. His exploits were published in both Indian newspapers and foreign journals in the years 1978, 1982, 1983 and 1984, thereby becoming a matter of public knowledge. It is quite likely that these publications may have further alerted the Pakistani Army. In tribute to his reconnaissance that provided the Army vital information, the battalion headquarters located on the Siachen Glacier is named Kumar Base. Following Colonel Kumar’s expeditions in the early 1980s, the Army began launching long-range patrols to the Siachen Glacier during the summer months between May and August. Prior to launching its assault on Bilafond La, 4 Kumaon was one such battalion which undertook such patrols.
Lore of the wild roses
Originally known as Saicher Gharni, local folklore has that a small Yarkandi village existed at the entrance of the Teram Shehr glacier where Yarkandis, natives of Yarkand, an oasis city in the west end of the Tarim Basin of Chinese Turkistan, would meet the Baltis, inhabitants of Gilgit-Baltistan region of Pakistan Occupied Kashmir. Once Yarkandis descended the Ghyari nala and took away a Balti woman with them. The Baltis then contacted a cleric who gave them a talisman for placing on the Bilafond la. Against cleric's instruction of returning via the Nubra valley, the Baltis, after placing the talisman on the pass, returned the same way they had come. The glacier faced a storm that destroyed the settlements but spared the wild roses. This gave glacier its name Siachen (Sia-rose, chen-place of), the land of roses. Today wild roses grow in plenty near the snout and in the lower valleys. In 1912, two Americans, Fanny Bullock Workman and her husband, William surveyed it for the first time and found walls of a settlement near Teram Shehr glacier.
— Vijay Mohan
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Why the icy tangle evades solution
can
the Siachen issue be fixed? Both sides have come close to resolving it but each time it has fallen through. The biggest hurdle lies in the way the two sides view the problem and the lack of trust that has marked bilateral relations ever since 1947 when the Indian subcontinent was partitioned and Pakistan came into being. In the case of Siachen, however, both sides feel tricked and see it as deceit. India accuses Pakistan of disturbing the status quo by engaging in cartographic aggression and permitting expeditions by foreign mountaineers assisted by its army. Pakistan views India as the aggressor and blames India for surreptitiously occupying the Saltoro Ridge ahead of the Siachen Glacier. But this again is based in the way in which the two sides interpret the line ‘thence North to the glaciers’, which refers to the un-demarcated portion north of NJ 9842. While Pakistan interprets these words as a line extending in a north easterly direction from NJ 9842 to the Karakoram Pass in Chinese occupied Aksai Chin, India interprets it as following the Saltoro Range, which begins at NJ 9842 and runs in a north westerly direction, on the watershed principle all the way up to Indra Col. Both interpretations encompass the massive Siachen Glacier. Neither interpretation leaves scope for sharing the icy wasteland. Although some authors have termed Siachen to be the ‘low hanging fruit’ of the Indo-Pakistan peace process, it is not that easy. Listed below are several issues that India needs to consider before ever letting go of the Saltoro Ridge:
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It’s a no-win for both India, Pak
india
holds the view that it can consider withdrawing (as would also Pakistan) provided both Indian and Pakistani military positions in the area are first demarcated, authenticated and officially recorded on maps to be exchanged. Furthermore foolproof mechanisms are needed to ensure verification and prevention of Kargil type intrusions as engaged in by Pakistan in 1999. The issue then can be left for subsequent negotiations for a permanent settlement. Pakistan rejects this suggestion saying that this will legitimise and accord recognition to India’s occupation of the Saltoro Ridge. Instead, Islamabad advocates that any Indian withdrawal or redeployment must be as per deployment of Indian forces post the December 1971 ceasefire. This means India permanently vacate the Saltoro Ridge and the Siachen Glacier.
Can’t trust, can’t verify The biggest problem remains trust. Even if an agreement is reached to pull back forces, how does each side trust and monitor the other? If either side reneges on the agreement, it will be militarily difficult to dislodge the other as has been proven with Pakistan unable to oust the Indian Army from the towering heights of the Saltoro Ridge and the passes. Both assault by ground troops and employment of precision guided munitions from land and air are difficult in this harsh and unforgiving terrain. Satellite surveillance is not very accurate in mountainous terrain. For example, given that even an average mountain can have inclines at 80 degrees, a one metre resolution actually compresses features about four to five times the size. Experts say a polar orbit satellite can be over a spot for a very short time but then its timing over the region can be easily predicted and measures taken to hide movements. Then again, ground based sensors are difficult to install at those heights in the rugged terrain. Howling blizzards which are a frequent occurrence could easily render them non-functional. Sceptics in India will always question whether a ‘rogue’ Pakistani Army general won’t launch an incursion as did General Pervez Musharraf in 1999 across the LoC in the Kargil sector despite very clearly delineated maps signed by both sides.
Paradox of status quo India may not have foreseen that the Army’s taking of the Bilafond and Sia passes and subsequently the Saltoro Ridge would, as Lt General ML Chibber says, lead to a permanent military deployment. But now that India has established military control over the area, it will find it difficult to vacate the area in the absence of a mutually acceptable agreement that can be verified on ground. The fact remains that the Pakistani Army has been unable to scale the crest of the Saltoro Range while the Indian Army cannot come down and abandon the high posts. The Siachen region has since been condescendingly described by some as ‘a struggle of two men over a comb’, ‘an ego problem between two armies’, a ‘futile war’ to name a few. Perhaps it is all and more. War is never a pleasant business. Defence expenditure always seems a waste, especially for developing countries with poverty stricken people. But then so are insurance premiums for the healthy. Just as one needs an insurance policy to deal with a sudden health problem or death, one needs an armed force, which theoretically speaking may never be employed, in the event of an external aggression. The Siachen region presents itself as one of the world’s most hostile terrain where sustaining human life is difficult. But in a post-Westphalian world, sovereignty and the sanctity of geographical territory is often more sacrosanct than human lives. Indeed, as long as the two sides remain deadlocked in Siachen, the Indian Army will forever remain confronted with the paradox of ‘higher is better’ (which is good military tactics) and yet at the same time ‘higher is harder to supply’ (which makes for bad military logistics).
—DK
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Lt Gen ML Chibber: Then GOC-in-C, Northern Command, oversaw the conduct of Operation Meghdoot. He had also served as Director Military Operations and GOC of a strike corps. 
Lt Gen PN Hoon: As GOC, 15 Corps, Srinagar, he planned and executed the operation. He later served as Director Military Operations and GOC-in-C, Western Command, Chandimandir. 
Air Marshal MSD Wollen: A decorated fighter pilot and ‘71 war veteran, he was Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Western Air Command, and responsible for air support for the operation. 
Col Narendra ‘Bull’ Kumar: He was Commandant, High Altitude Warfare School, and carried out mountaineering reconnaissance expeditions in Teram Kangri and Saltoro Range. 
As many as 26 decorations, including a Param Vir Chakra (PVC), five Maha Vir Chakra and 20 Vir Chakra have been awarded to 11 officers and 15 men. Among them nine are posthumous. There have also been a number of Kirti Chakra, Shaurya Chakra, Sena Medal and Vayu Sena Medal recipients. 
Launched 30 years ago, Operation Meghdoot is the longest sustained military operation. After India learnt of Pakistan’s intent to occupy the glacier, it beat Pakistan by a week to gain control over the area. Troops require arctic clothing and personal equipment, most of which is imported. They get special rations and dietary supplements. State-of-the-art shelters have been made available for them. Actual stay on the glacier does not exceed three months and on completion of 45 days’ stay, troops are eligible for award of the Siachen Medal (above), distinguished by its grey and white ribbon.
