The Tribune, Chandigarh, India

The Osama pix controversy
Releasing them would serve no purpose

US President Barack Obama should stand by his decision of not releasing pictures of the body of Osama bin Laden after he was killed in his Abbottabad hideout. When a cool and collected President Obama announced: “The United States has conducted an operation that killed Osama bin Laden,” the world at large believed him.

No doubt there has been a mounting clamour from some quarters, including presidential-aspirant Sarah Palin, for these pictures to be released; however, not much will be achieved by doing so, except to feed a gory need of people to see the body of the terrorist leader. The pictures could be used as propaganda devices to further terrorist ends.

White House, however, showed undue haste in releasing details about the raid that killed Osama. Officials, presumably under pressure from the media to provide more information, gave various descriptions of the raid which they had to later retract. The fluidity of narrative further fed sceptics, and thus these people have much to tear apart from the official versions of the raid. Indeed, at one time, it seemed that the moment of victory for the Obama Administration would well become a public relations fiasco, as one after another statements about the raid were revised.

Some recently-filed requests by a new organisation for the release of pictures of Osama’s body and burial under the US Freedom of Information Act, may even be fruitful, but the time-lag would make the exercise far less inflammatory, though no less offensive. President Obama has rightly said “We don’t trot out this stuff as trophies.” Indeed, the President’s dignified mannerisms bring a dash of sobriety in an emotionally surcharged environment that seeks closure over the 9/11 attacks. The killing of Osama bin Laden was not a media event; it was a significant military victory in the continuing war against terror. Decisions about what to reveal about the operation and when should therefore be based on long-term strategic thinking rather than on knee-jerk responses to external pressures.

Rehabilitating sex workers
SC injects a sense of urgency

In February this year, the Supreme Court had directed the Centre and states/Union Territories to prepare suitable rehabilitation schemes for the welfare of sex workers, who, the court said, were entitled to a life of dignity under Article 21. On May 4, the court sought reports on what vocational and technical training schemes the states were proposing to ensure meaningful rehabilitation of the physically and sexually abused women; sex workers to be precise.

This reflects seriousness of the apex court in ensuring a life of dignity to the women who indulge in the oldest profession of the world. According to a report published in 2007 by the Ministry of Women and Child Development, over three million women sex workers are involved in the trade in India, of which over 35 per cent enter it before they are 18. About 1.2 million children are working as child prostitutes.

Significantly, the court has put the onus for delivering vocational alternatives for sex workers on the chief secretaries of the states and has also assigned a deadline, which is rather short. But, rehabilitation of such a large number of women, who are caught up in an extremely well-knit system, whose tentacles remain invisible yet formidable, is a huge task. It may take time.

The move is important to lend some degree of dignity not only to the women but to the children of these women, who remain at the receiving end of deep rooted scorn and rejection from society. In January, another welcome step taken by the court had ensured that father’s name will not be asked for the children of single mothers and prostitutes, at the time of school admission. These small steps will go a long way in ensuring dignity for this hapless section of society.

Thought for the Day

Listen to many, speak to a few. — William Shakespeare

ARTICLE

The problem of food wastage
It is a question of policy and priorities
by S. S. Johl

A huge wastage of food grains due to lack of proper storage facilities is not something that has come to notice now. After food grains in the markets of Punjab had suffered damage for many years, the state government constituted a committee under my chairmanship in 1985.

A report of the committee on remedial measures was submitted in 1986. The problem was so serious that at some places paddy stocks in the market got burned due to the generation of internal heat because of moisture in paddy heaps. The Central government dragged its feet on procurement due to excessive stocks in its godowns. Consequently, farmers suffered and the state government agencies were helpless.

Among the measures, the report suggested diversification of crops, replacing 20 per cent of the area under wheat and rice with other crops. Quite a few alternatives were suggested, but all those needed definitive government policy and financial support. However, the continuous drought for the next four years from 1987 onwards resulted in shortages of food grains and no government cared for the report. Whereas the authors of the report had a projected period of 50 years in mind in making their recommendations, the government did not see beyond its nose.

As a result, the state again faced the problem of unmanageable surplus stocks. Consequently, the government started exporting food grains at very low prices. In many cases exports were made at prices below the BPL prices. Even then quite a few consignments were rejected by importers because the grains were not fit for human consumption. The damage to the grains was so serious that several lots were unfit for animal feed even. As an example, the Government of India exported 35 million tonnes of food grains between 2001 and 2005. Of these 23 million tonnes were rice and 12 million tones wheat.

All these exports were at a loss of thousands of crores of rupees. Surprisingly, in 2005 up to the month of September, five million tonnes of rice and 0.72 million tonnes of wheat were exported and in December the government faced shortages and imported some five million tonnes of wheat in 2006, which was not needed and this export was made at very high prices and huge costs. One wonders at the mindset of the policymakers that deal with such exports and imports.

On the other hand, the government imported pulses, oils and oilseeds worth Rs 14,000 crore per annum. The Government of Punjab again constituted a committee under my chairmanship in 2002 to suggest remedial measures. This report was submitted in May-June 2002, suggesting the replacement of one million hectare of land under paddy with oilseed and pulses and other high value crops and fruits and vegetables. But all these again needed policy and financial inputs from the government. Although on my own I could convince the Union Ministry of Food on the viability and economics of the scheme and even the Ministry of Finance agreed and the scheme was forwarded to the Union Ministry of Agriculture for consideration, but the Punjab bureaucrats concerned did not show interest and could not carry the proposal with the Ministry of Agriculture. No political process was undertaken as well. As a result, the Punjab government lost a valuable opportunity to rectify its untenable and unsustainable cropping pattern. It is all a failure at the level of policy priorities and lack of political will at the level of the state government.

At the level of technology and state policy, especially on free supply of electricity for tube-wells and starving the state research apparatus of needed financial support, there is no likelihood of the rice crop being replaced with alternative crops on a large scale. If the Central and state governments are seriously interested in the diversification of the cropping patterns in the state, they need to flush Punjab Agricultural University with funds and demand matching accountability. The situation can change in less than three years if such a support is provided and a challenge is put to the university.

But our political leadership has put this high-potential university on the back-burner and surprisingly some farm leaders say that they do not need the university. Under these circumstances, what can be expected of such a premier agricultural institute — starved of funds and political backing? The state government needs to realise that it is only the area and region specific research that finds effective application at the field level. Looking to the ICAR institutions for such results is nothing but dreaming in the vacuum.

On storage, Dr M.S. Swaminathan has unfortunately blamed the state government for laxity. He has suggested that Rs 6,000 crore should be spared by the state government for the construction of metallic grain silos. Good, but it is peanuts in the face of some twenty million tonnes of food grains procured by the state on behalf of the Central government every year. We need to understand that the state procurement agencies act only as the agents of the FCI. There is comparatively very little that the state agencies procure for their own needs. The storage problem rests with the Centre and not with the states of Punjab and Haryana. Where from can the state government spare Rs 6,000 crore when already there is a financial crunch and the government is borrowing heavily even to meet its revenue expenditure and retire its interest payment obligations? The Central government has much wider financial capacity and in its own interest can easily create such scientific metallic storage structures as has been created at Moga, maybe in the private sector or under the public-private partnership model.

If the Central government had paid heed to the problems of grain storage over the last three decades, it would have easily solved the problem much earlier and there would have been no wastage of grains and no loss on exports when needed and would have avoided imports at heavy costs. Way back, I suggested that at least five to six million tonnes of wheat should be stored in metallic silos and one-third of these grains should be recycled every year. These grains should be specifically put under the direct control of the PMO and should be considered for release only when the need arises for imports or surpluses have to be exported. At least ten million tones of grains should be kept in metallic silos and the rest in covered storage. There is no place for open storage or plinth storage if food security is the primary concern of the government. The cost of such additional storage will not be more than one or at best two financial scandals perpetrated by politicians, bureaucrats and business houses at the Centre!

Agreed, there is widespread corruption in almost every aspect of the state administration and some laxity on the part of the state government in handling the grains in the markets and their storage, yet given the volume of arrivals in a very short period and shortage of space due to the inability of the FCI to vacate the godowns in time, the state government is doing as best as it can. There is no point in blaming the state government on this aspect. The ball is in the central governments’ court and it needs to correct its priorities.

MIDDLE

Cinderellas and cellphones
by Chetna Keer

Downtown damsel to duchess, Kate Middleton’s spectacular sojourn into the palatial portals of British royalty bears all the frills of a fairytale.Closer home, another commoner’s fleeting foray into the British Raj-reminiscent chandeliered chambers of the Indian sovereign many summers ago carried a Cinderella-esque charm, too.

Rashtrapati Bhavan was playing host to a group of media school grads from City Beautiful. There was a ball and banquet any bachelorette, fed on a Victorian literary diet of M&Bs and Georgette Heyers, would have died to be at. There were the ‘princes’, too — strapping bachelors whose deportment was no less regal than the scions of sovereigns. Their liveried lanky frames made no less pretty a picture than Kate’s Prince William in RAF regalia. These were men from the Forces, whose duty it was to dance attendance on the President of India.

That evening though, these ADCs were doing more dancing than duty. As hosts of this unofficial bash, that saw them in the company of small-town bright-eyed belles, they were in foot tapping mode instead of playing foot soldiers to the First Citizen.

From captain to commander, the dapper dudes were soon floored by some commoners. That meant cross-cultural connections being cultivated on the dance floor.

What followed was a close contest of who would put the best foot forward: the media or the military. Sometimes, the military ‘moves’ put the media on the back foot. Sometimes, the media caught the military on the ‘wrong’ foot.

Whilst this wooing and waltzing was on, a singular ‘unit’ of the media found itself on the fringe of the frolicking, owing its seclusion more to disposition than to dancing disability. Being of a temperament that got tongue tied in the profuse presence of specimens of bachelorhood, that gawky sample of girlhood preferred the periphery of the pirouetting population.

But who could check an advancing army (man)! The marginalised media element had caught the eye of a defence ‘unit’ that detached itself from the grooving group and attached itself pronto to the singleton on the sidelines. As the evening advanced, so did the advances of this ADC.

So ‘single’ minded was the ‘naval pursuit’ that the choreographically challenged commoner ended up doing lambada with the liveried lieutenant-commander.

Then, as in the fable, the midnight hour struck and it was time to depart.

In a departure from the fable though, it was not a sour stepmom but a sardonic spinster aunt that awaited this visiting niece, partying past permissible time and beyond parental proximity.

Bidding adieu, when this Prince Charming asked for that crucial contact number to call at the next day, visions of the aged aunt — who looked upon any man in uniform as a possible rake with a propensity to inflict heartbreak — sabotaging a telephonic tryst led to a ‘departure’ that didn’t see the casting of the customary cue.

Had those been more tryst-enabling tech times, I could have dropped a SIM number, if not a slipper. There could have been a twist, rather tweet, in the tale!n

OPED defence

Synergising the drivers
The story of Indian defence technology is one of unexpected miracles and unacceptable failures. Indian defence technology is at the crossroads today, with each of the stakeholders and its drivers wanting to take a different road resulting in an impasse. The answer lies in an Indian military industrial commission that would visualise, coordinate and synergise all efforts of military, research and industrial establishments
Vice Admiral Venkat Bharathan & Brig (Dr) Arun Saghal

A Russian-made T-90 tank on parade during Army Day. The post-Independence policy of non-alignment coupled with inadequate indigenous defence technology has resulted in a peculiar situation, with the Indian military remaining a British clone, mostly using Russian equipment with Western doctrines in South Asian terrain

The philosophy of approach in Military technology is based on the concept of purpose, vision of intent, potency in performance and relevancy in role, together with effectiveness in execution and purposeful in performance. Sixty years down the line and four wars in our fledgling democratic history, the story of defence technology is one of unexpected miracles and unacceptable failures. Indian defence technology is at the cross roads today.

There are four roads for us to take. These are:

l The Import Highway

l The Indigenous Route

l The Private Path

l The Nowhere Road

In our context, the technology omnibus has five concurrent drivers, which include:

l The Indian Military

l The DRDO & DPSUs

l The Private Sector

l The Political leadership

l The People of India

Of the first three, each want to take a different road. Each one is correct and each one is wrong. The fourth diver lacks understanding while the fifth is passive and perhaps indifferent. Since no consensus is emanating, the omnibus has driven itself mostly to the fourth road.

The most important aspect of this impasse is that the import highway is used by outsiders as a quick fix to show their advanced technology hardware much to the relief and delight of the operationally hard-pressed military concerned about its dwindling operational preparedness. It naturally wants to induct equipment within an acceptable time frame so that it would serve them optimally.

The Indian (indigenous) route is slowly gaining in traction and progressively finding its niche, thanks to the persistence of the government that has sensed the wisdom of allowing the import highway and Indian route to coexist in the interim.

The private path has just begun to be paved, remains dependent upon on both the military and Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) and the Defence Public Sector Undertaings (DPSUs). Increased participation with greater access to technology is key to Indianisation.

The “Nowhere road” is an illusion. It looks real and good close at hand, but is actually a shimmering mirage. Our country had no choice but to be on this road. Post-Independence, India chose to be non-aligned. The West shunned us and ensured that even Great Britain did not pass on any military technology. If we missed the industrial revolution in the distant past, we missed the technological evolution of the late 19th and early 20th century. Compounding this is the ironic reality of the Indian political leadership’s approach of separating foreign and security policy. Consequently, development of defence technology remained far removed from the politico-bureaucratic-military mind.

Resultantly, the Indian military remained a British clone, mostly using Russian equipment, with western doctrines in South Asian terrain -- an enigma to itself and the world.

Establishment of indigenous research and development (R&D) facilities in terms of DRDO has the embryonic flaw of being hierarchical, with seniority taking priority over talent and innovation. The promotion structure, the pulls and pushes of the annual confidential reports, often result in the sacrifice of true R&D. The armed forces are also obtuse in their appreciation of what military technology development entail. Most ironically, the concept of tasking DRDO to develop a felt need or upgrade an existing system was rarely contemplated.

THE STATE OF INDIANISATION & INDIGENISATION

Indianisation means converting all equipment to meet our specific military needs. In this there has been considerable achievement as proven in the 1971 Indo-Pak war and the 1999 Kargil conflict. The use of missile boats, MIG 21s, armour and weapons is testimony to our innovative adaptation of equipment. Indigenisation means building at home complete systems or parts thereof. Here too, we have several achievements in terms of graduating from assembling knocked-down kits to building systems from scratch. All these have been part of a big trial and error process. The services too have set up considerable technology infrastructure -- base repair depots, EME workshops, naval dockyards for operational maintenance and repair.

In a nutshell we have Indianised well, indigenised satisfactorily. Herein comes our latent and potent skill euphemistically called “Jugard” and often laughed at. A serious look at our five “Is” of Indianisation, Indigenisation, Innovation, Industrialisation and Integration reveals as to how we have built ourselves from nothing to something sustainable and very recognizable. We are capable of becoming, “Indian” in terms self-reliance across the spectrum of a conflict scenario. It entails the politico-bureaucratic-military-DRDO-industrial leadership to grasp that self-reliance is not a cliché but a caveat that needs to believed and obeyed. It must openly acknowledge that, complete dependence on outsiders is actually deterrence across the spectrum of development, security, economic health and strategic confidence of ‘Bharat’. Yet it must also recognize the prudence of interdependence on advanced technological sources to achieve successful leapfrog results in our security and military preparedness.

What prevents us from achieving this are some macro realities; The Indian psyche, of grossly exaggerating our achievements, glossing over screw driver technology successes, ultra-sensitiveness to criticism over failure and reluctance to work together in synergy remains burden of our mindset. The way the higher defence decision structure is designed is sub-optimal in function, output and result. The concept of stakeholder/customer satisfaction as an important accountable imperative is virtually absent. Lack of ownership approach by the armed forces too is a militating factor. Notable examples are the LCA, the MBT Arjun, Dhruv helicopter among the many. In all these, the military virtually took a hands-off approach wanting the DRDO/DPSU to hand them a readymade product that they would then examine for failure!

THE MILITARY INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION

The dynamics of defence technology is complex. It needs a simple strategy of didactics, direction, determination and drive through the aegis of a Military Industrial Commission (MIC). The. MIC charter has to be inclusive and participative. This could be set up from existing entities like CII, FICCI, DRDO, DPSUs, armed forces, CSIR, NRSA, ISRO, private and public sector companies. The Defense Acquisition Council, the Director General Acquisition and the service chiefs/vice-chiefs can become part of the MIC. This could be tiered suitably for policy, planning, review and oversight. It would then emerge as a coordinating catalyst in an all round defence technology development in a win-win scenario. The success of MIC would lie in its composition, autonomy and executive authority. It must have oversight right to review long term perspective planning. It must be empowered to negotiate with foreign governments and international defence companies on transfer of technology.

The foundation of our defence technology edifice is ready and strong. Rapid advances in science, materiel development, electronic-engineering fusion all point towards the advantages of adopting a strategy of technology leapfrog. Reinventing the wheel is no longer needed as India is emerging out of the denial drought. The West woos us while the East engages us vigorously. All this highlights the availability of a span of technologies that can be adopted and adapted to become industrially and militarily Indian. MIC would enable melding military technology and civil technology as an enterprise. Maturing of military commerce, intensive and expansive R&D and focused objectives are the consequent collateral benefits.

The IMMEDIATE STEPS Required

The armed forces must commit to operationalise all Indian systems despite perceived limitations. Equipment and system improvement through upgrades must become ongoing exercise. We need to take a leaf out of Chinese technology innovation To cite an example, it developed the WS-10 engines for its prestigious J-10 fighter aircraft with only a 20-hour life initially. Subsequent upgrades were done based on operating experience and feedback from the end- users.

The MIC can convert the four roads into one common highway. The omnibus can be driven in synergy, and in shifts, by all the drivers and stakeholders. Our five I’s can be maximised. India can be truly independent while being interdependent. It is an exciting prospect. Most importantly it is very realisable and really important for India to reach its destiny. The answer lies in an Indian military industrial commission with the Five-I approach.

The writers are former Vice Chief of the Naval Staff and former Director, Faculty of Studies, Army War College, respectively