E D I T O R I A L   P A G E

EDITORIALS

National Security Advisory Board draft report on Indian doctorine
Excerpts from the preamble and the objectives of the National Security Advisory Board draft report on the Indian nuclear doctrine dated August 17, 1999.

NPT to pre-empt India?
THERE is good reason to believe that formation of the NPT was hastened to pre-empt India from joining the Five heavy weight nuclear weapon states.

CTBT: Unhelpful American attitude
Urgent need for a viable nuclear strategy
by O. P. Sabherwal

THE Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) is once again in focus. A convergence of international factors — political, economic and military — has led to a situation where correct and timely decisions on the treaty can enhance India’s standing as a nuclear weapon state as well as brighten its economic prospects.

The reverse is also true. It is therefore important that the ongoing debate in the country on the CTBT is set on the right parameters.

Hitherto, the debate has been fudged by hangovers from the past. The NPT and CTBT have criss-crossed, their lines of distinction blurred in public perception. Another term in current international lexicon, the FMCT, adds to the confusion (see box for details).

Little is understood about the FMCT and the clout that India could wield by a correct posturing on this treaty, which is still in the making. Even more than the substance of these treaties — distinct in themselves — it is the history surrounding them that has influenced opinion in this country. It would be in order, therefore, to have a glimpse of this history and a closer look at what these treaties mean to India.

First came the deceptively termed, nuclear non-proliferation treaty (NPT) under the guise of curbing nuclear weapons — a blatant move by the West, and with full approval of the former Soviet Union, to keep nuclear weapons as an exclusive preserve in the hands of five states which had launched the nuclear arms race headlong.

There is good reason to believe that formation of the NPT was hastened to pre-empt India from joining the five heavy-weight nuclear weapon states. For India was the only country outside the five weapon states which had the scientific know-how and infrastructure to develop nuclear weapons indigenously.

Why and how? A breakthrough in 1964 by Indian scientists in spent fuel reprocessing technology made the USA apprehensive; this breakthrough brought India to the threshold of building plutonium-based nuclear weapons, bypassing the enormously expensive uranium enrichment route which India had rejected. India's newly- acquired weapons capability was proven by the Pokhran test in 1974, but the NPT powers refused to allow India entry in this exclusive weapons club even though France and China were taken into the NPT much later.

Nor did India stake its claim on weapon status in the NPT, even by virtue of having developed weapon grade plutonium capability in 1965, but was content to castigate the NPT as discriminatory. That was a mistake with adverse fall-out for India, which still persists.

Having refused to accede to the NPT, India maintained its right to conduct nuclear tests, thereby keeping its weapon option open despite tremendous pressure from the USA and its Western allies. It was a touch and go situation in 1974 when India conducted its first nuclear test at Pokhran, a great success by any yardstick. Over the years, nuclear technology moved forward and India maintained steadfast growth, but yet kept its weapon option open. This was disturbing for the West.

It was to circumvent this situation that the concept of a comprehensive test ban, originally propounded by Nehru in the 50s to limit vertical piling up of nuclear weapons by the USA and the Soviet Union — but then rejected by the West — was revived.

The comprehensive test ban idea took care of two other aspects — the danger of nuclear weapon proliferation by what in American parlance were 'rogue' states, and the Pakistan factor.

For two decades, the West turned a blind eye to Pakistan's nuclear ambitions, allowing strident clandestine nuclear smuggling to pass, if only to counter India. It was under the nose of over a dozen top Western intelligence agencies that this smuggling — from components for the Kahuta centrifuge plant to maraging steel used in nuclear projects, and even enriched, uranium and weapon grade plutonium — was conducted by top Pakistani agencies. Soon nemesis overtook, for Pakistan's clandestine nuclear activity now posed a threat to the USA itself, because of the former's kinship with Islamic fundamentalist and terrorist groups.

Undoubtedly, the CTBT was crafted as a follow-up of the NPT under stewardship of the USA. But it was an admixture of positive moves intertwined with America's hegemonic designs. In sponsoring the CTBT, the USA had three principal aims.

One, to barricade India's weapon capability, and making India's weapon option redundant, since the proposed test ban was expected to be in place before India was able to conduct tests to make its nuclear deterrent credible and transparent.

Two, ensure American nuclear global supremacy by freezing China's weapon arsenal's quality at prevailing levels.

Three, to remove the Pakistani threat by freezing it at its existing low levels and ultimately squeezing it; as also eliminate the horizontal spread of nuclear weapons by 'rogue' states.

It should be recognised that besides serving American hegemonic aims, the proposed CTBT was also a step forward in the direction of phased elimination of nuclear weapons by freezing them at existing levels. This was reflected in the preamble of the CTBT and its other provisions.

The preamble speaks about "stressing the need for continued systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally, with the ultimate goal of eliminating those weapons". Unlike the NPT, there are no discriminatory provisions in the CTBT, which creates a cast iron mechanism for outlawing future tests by all states.

The verification regime which is being built for enforcement of the CTBT is veritably foolproof. Its only controversial aspect is that it does not ban sub-critical nuclear testing, as against complete ban on all explosive nuclear tests. It is doubtful if China has facilities and capability of refining nuclear weapons by sub-critical testing, but the USA has sophisticated nuclear capability for simulation and sub-critical testing (which is being further enhanced), strengthening its existing leadership in nuclear weapons even after the CTBT comes into effect.

But the CTBT, while imposing a comprehensive ban on nuclear weapon tests, does not prohibit fresh weapon making provided the state concerned has the wherewithal for weapon making — either weapon-grade uranium or weapon-grade plutonium. Further accumulation of fissile material fell within the domain of the fissile material cut-off treaty (FMCT), which is still being negotiated at Geneva where China is, as of now, a recalcitrant party. While vetoing the CTBT at Geneva, India's objection was that it failed to incorporate a time-bound plan for phased elimination of nuclear weapons, and that it was essentially a non-proliferation treaty rather than a treaty for nuclear disarmament as it posed to be. But the most important, one might say, critical reason for India's veto of the CTBT at Geneva was that its enforcement would have made India's weapon option virtually redundant by outlawing all nuclear tests, except laboratory guided simulation tests, a year after adoption of the treaty.

Had India not conducted the tests at Pokhran on May 11 and 13, 1998, its nuclear option would have become lame duck, certainly not verifiable, nor transparent, not to speak of a credible nuclear deterrent. That situation changed completely after the tests, more so because, the Pokhran II test series proved to be an unalloyed success and, in the words of the chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, it gave the Indian scientists all required data for "providing India a credible nuclear deterrent".

What has completely transformed India's position in relation to the CTBT is the advanced Indian nuclear capability backed by a nuclear infrastructure and R&D capability next only to the “big three” — USA, France and Russia.

Doubts have been expressed whether just one series of tests were sufficient to make India an effective nuclear weapon state. Others have doubted the success of the thermonuclear test on May 11, conducted along with a fission test and a sub-kiloton test. The Atomic Energy Commission chief, Dr Chidambaram, has set these doubts at rest. In an interview on the first anniversary of Pokhran II, the AEC chief said: "The tests that we carried out on May 11 and 13 in 1998 were a very carefully planned series of tests in order to design the types of devices that India would need to develop a credible nuclear deterrent.... We tested a dozen new ideas and sub-systems and every one of them worked perfectly. As a result now we have generated a very valuable database on which you can base a credible nuclear deterrent. That is why we advised the government that it can now declare a moratorium on further tests." He clarified that nuclear deterrence should not be equated with a global arms race with the big powers.

There has been an important transformation after Pokhran II: India is now unambiguously a nuclear weapons state, with transparent and credible nuclear weapon capability. The thermonuclear test, backed by advanced Indian nuclear technology, further uplifted India's status. This transformation completely changed India's situation vis-à-vis the CTBT. Having announced a moratorium on further testing India has already met the core requirement of the treaty.

Why then should India hesitate from being a full signatory to the CTBT? The gains that would follow are obvious — for India's security concerns and its global standing as also for the larger cause of nuclear disarmament. For India can fight for complete elimination of nuclear weapons, which is its goal, far better from within the non-proliferation regime being set up by the CTBT than from outside.

Hurdles to India being a full signatory to the CTBT are not per se in the contents of the treaty but in the continuing shadow cast by the NPT. In varying degrees, the five NPT weapon powers are unwilling to give up their superior status which finds no place in the CTBT as such. A new brand of doublespeak nuclear diplomacy is at work. China wants India and Pakistan to give up their nuclear weapon status, citing a UN Security Council resolution, while France and Russia are veering round to de facto acceptance of India's nuclear weapon status provided this country accedes to the CTBT. The USA, the decisive power in creation of the global non-proliferation regime, is mid-way.

While one segment (Strobe Talbott) favours India's right to a nuclear deterrence, another line fears that this would upset the USA’s bid for creating a strong global non-proliferation regime which stops the further spread of nuclear weapons.

In the event, the right course would be for India to declare its adherence to the CTBT unambiguously, while reserving the final step of signing and ratifying to an assurance from the USA — and others — that in implementation of the CTBT, India's nuclear status will be equal to the five recognised weapon powers. Thereby India has nothing to lose and a lot to gain.

India has to fashion a strategy and use the very same nuclear diplomacy for the US recognition of its nuclear weapon status. The important thing for India is to forge an understanding with the USA, in the first place, and thereafter with France, Russia and China, on the global nuclear regime and India's active role in its furtherance.

With the USA, India can build partnership of a sort, with assurance of not only making a success of the CTBT but also contributing to the ongoing negotiations for the FMCT. India's help in the FMCT negotiations can be invaluable for the USA since the CTBT is of little value without the FMCT being in place.

As of now, China is dragging its feet on the FMCT, the reason being that it wants to build up a massive fissile pool before the cut-off date for applying the FMCT. A constructive role by India in this regard will be a major gain for the USA. Of course, India too has to work for creating an adequate fissile pool before the FMCT cut-off date which is likely to be two years from now.

With France, India can facilitate understanding on the CTBT and India's nuclear weapon status by an accord on French light water reactors for rapid augmentation of its power capacity.

The deal can be on the same terms as with Russia for the latter's two reactors of 1000 MW each, now under construction in Tamil Nadu. The French nuclear industry, with its idle capacity, will lap up this deal which even the USA’s nuclear industry will welcome. Let the decks be cleared for these big nuclear power projects, for they will be a big leap into the future.

The writer is a well-known commentator on nuclear affairs.

National Security Advisory Board draft report on Indian doctrine

THE following are excerpts from the preamble and the objectives of the National Security Advisory Board draft report on the Indian nuclear doctrine dated August 17, 1999:

Preamble

1.1. The use of nuclear weapons in particular as well as other weapons of mass destruction constitutes the gravest threat to humanity and to peace and stability in the international system. Unlike the other two categories of weapons of mass destruction, biological and chemical weapons which have been outlawed by international treaties, nuclear weapons remain instruments for national and collective security, the possession of which on a selective basis has been sought to be legitimised through permanent extension of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) in May 1995. Nuclear weapon states have asserted that they will continue to rely on nuclear weapons with some of them adopting policies to use them even in a non-nuclear context. These developments amount to virtual abandonment of nuclear disarmament. This is a serious setback to the struggle of the international community to abolish weapons of mass destruction.

1.2. India's primary objective is to achieve economic, political, social, scientific and technological development within a peaceful and democratic framework. This requires an environment of durable peace and insurance against potential risks to peace and stability. It will be India's endeavour to proceed towards this overall objective in cooperation with the global democratic trends and to play a constructive role in advancing the international system toward a just, peaceful and equitable order.

1.3. Autonomy of decision making in the developmental process and in strategic matters is an inalienable democratic right of the Indian people. India will strenuously guard this right in a world where nuclear weapons for a select few are sought to be legitimised for an indefinite future, and where there is growing complexity and frequency in the use of force for political purposes.

1.4. India's security is an integral component of its development process. India continuously aims at promoting an ever-expanding area of peace and stability around it so that developmental priorities can be pursued without disruption.

1.5. However, the very existence of offensive doctrine pertaining to the first use of nuclear weapons and the insistence of some nuclear weapons states on the legitimacy of their use even against non-nuclear weapon countries constitute a threat to peace, stability and sovereignty of states.

1.6. This document outlines the broad principles for the development, deployment and employment of India's nuclear forces. Details of policy and strategy concerning force structures, deployment and employment of nuclear forces will flow from this framework and will be laid down separately and kept under constant review.

2. Objectives

2.1. In the absence of global nuclear disarmament India's strategic interests require effective, credible nuclear deterrence and adequate retaliatory capability should deterrence fail. This is consistent with the UN Charter, which sanctions the right of self-defence.

2.2. The requirements of deterrence should be carefully weighed in the design of Indian nuclear forces and in the strategy to provide for a level of capability consistent with maximum credibility, survivability, effectiveness, safety and security.

2.3. India shall pursue a doctrine of credible minimum nuclear deterrence. In this policy of "retaliation only", the survivability of our arsenal is critical. This is a dynamic concept related to the strategic environment, technological imperatives and the needs of national security. The actual size components, deployment and employment of nuclear forces will be decided in the light of these factors. India's peacetime posture aims at convincing any potential aggressor that :

(a) any threat of use of nuclear weapons against India shall invoke measures to counter the threat: and (b) any nuclear attack on India and its forces shall result in punitive retaliation with nuclear weapons to inflict damage unacceptable to the aggressor.

2.4. The fundamental purpose of Indian nuclear weapons is to deter the use and threat of use of nuclear weapons by any State or entity against India and its forces. India will not be the first to initiate a nuclear strike, but will respond with punitive retaliation should deterrence fail.

2.5. India will not resort to the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against States which do not possess nuclear weapons, or are not aligned with nuclear weapon powers.

2.6. Deterrence requires that India maintain: (a) Sufficient, survivable and operationally prepared nuclear forces, (b) a robust command and control system, (c) effective intelligence and early warning capabilities, and (d) comprehensive planning and training for operations in line with the strategy, and (e) the will to employ nuclear forces and weapons

2.7. Highly effective conventional military capabilities shall be maintained to raise the threshold of outbreak both of conventional military conflict as well as that of threat or use of nuclear weapons.

NPT to pre-empt India?

THERE is good reason to believe that formation of the NPT was hastened to pre-empt India from joining the Five heavy weight nuclear weapon states. For India was the only country outside the five weapon states which had the scientific know-how and infrastructure to develop nuclear weapons indigenously. A breakthrough in 1964 by Indian scientists in spent fuel reprocessing technology brought this country to the threshold of building plutonium-based nuclear weapons, bypassing the enormously expensive uranium enrichment route.

Moves: Positive vs hegemonic

Undoubtedly, the CTBT was crafted as a follow-up of the NPT under stewardship of the USA. But it was an admixture of positive moves intertwined with America’s hegemonic designs. One was to barricade India’s weapon capability, and to make India’s weapon option redundant, since the proposed test ban was expected to be in place before India was able to conduct tests to make its nuclear deterrent credible and transparent. Another objective was to remove the Pakistani threat by freezing it at its existing low levels and ultimately squeezing it.

Had India not conducted the tests at Pokhran on May 11 and 13, 1998, its nuclear option would have become lame duck, certainly not verifiable, nor transparent, not to speak of a credible nuclear deterrent.

It should be recognised that besides serving American hegemonic aims, the proposed CTBT was also a step forward in the direction of phased elimination of nuclear weapons by freezing them at existing levels. This was reflected in the preamble of the CTBT which speaks about “stressing the need for continued systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally, with the ultimate goal of eliminating those weapons”. Unlike the NPT, there are no discriminatory provisions in the CTBT which creates a cast iron mechanism for outlawing future tests by all states.

Indian veto

While vetoing the CTBT at Geneva, India’s objection that it failed to incorporate a time-bound plan for phased elimination of nuclear weapons, and that it was essentially a non-proliferation treaty rather than a treaty for nuclear disarmament as it posed to be. But the critical reason for India’s veto of the CTBT at Geneva was that its enforcement would have made India’s weapon option virtually redundant by outlawing all tests a year after adoption of the treaty. That situation changed completely after the tests, more so because Pokhran II test series was an unalloyed success and, in the words of the chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, gave the Indian scientists all required data for “providing India a credible nuclear deterrent”.

After Pokhran II

There has been an important transformation after Pokhran II: India is now unambiguously a weapon state, with transparent and credible nuclear weapon capability.

The thermonuclear test, backed by advanced Indian nuclear technology, further uplifted India’s status, completely changing India’s situation vis-a-vis the CTBT. Hurdles to India to being a full signatory to the CTBT are not per se in the draft of the treaty as such but in the continuing shadow cast by the NPT. In the event, the right course would be for India to declare its adherence to the CTBT unambiguously, while reserving the final step of signing and ratifying to an assurance from the USA — and others — that in implementation of CTBT, India’s nuclear status will be equal to the five recognised weapon powers.

NPT-CTBT-FMCT triangle

NPT: Formed in 1969 with restricted membership of three states — the USA, former Soviet Union and Britain. France and China joined a decade later. It is overtly a Club of Five Nuclear Heavy Weights with exclusive rights of acquisition and development of nuclear weapons. All other members have an inferior status, strictly debarred from possessing N-weapons.

CTBT: Bans all explosive nuclear weapons testing. But allows sub-critical laboratory tests, for which USA alone has full capability as at present. A feature of treaty is that it creates a verifiable regime — still in process of being set up — which is veritably foolproof. After India’s veto at Geneva in 1997, the treaty draft was adopted by the UN General Assembly with India voting against.

FMCT: Fissile material cut-off treaty (FMCT) is being debated at Geneva and still faces several hurdles, with China and Russia dragging their feet. But the FMCT is crucial in building the nuclear non-proliferation regime. Without it the CTBT is lame duck.

‘Silent war’ claims 60,000 children
By Abu Abraham

THE world seems to have turned its face away as millions of people, specially children and old people, die in Iraq as a result of sanctions. And that it is happening under the auspices of the United Nations is shameful.

In this ‘silent war’, as some UN officials in Iraq have named it, some 60,000 children are dying annually due to malnutrition. One official likened it to two or three Hiroshimas over eight years of sanctions. But none of the warnings or pleas by diplomats and journalists have had any effect on those who are carrying on with sanctions with a vindictiveness that is inhuman and immoral.

Simultaneously, another silent war — not so silent but virtually unnoticed — has been terrorising the Iraqi population. In the Washington Post, a report by their correspondent, Edward Cody, under the stark title, ‘Under Iraqi skies, a canvas of death’, speaks of the “heavy toll of civilians as allies pursue their forgotten air campaign against Saddam.” This is how the report goes: ‘Suddenly out of a clear blue sky, the forgotten war being waged by the United States and Britain over Iraq visited its lethal routine on the shepherds and farmers of Toq al-Ghazalat about 10.30 a.m. on May 17.

‘Omran Harbi Jawair, 13, was watching the family sheep as they nosed the hard ground in search of grass. Omran, who liked to kick a soccer ball around this dusty village, had just finished fifth grade at the little school a 15-minute walk from his mud-brick home. A shepherd boy’s summer vacation lay ahead.

‘That is when the missile landed. Without warning, according to several youths nearby, the device came crashing down in an open field 200 yards from the dozen houses of Toq al-Ghazalat. A deafening explosion cracked across the silent land. Shrapnel flew in every direction. Four shepherds were wounded. And Omran, the others recalled, lay dead, most of his head torn off.

‘What happened at Toq al-Ghazalat, 35 miles south-west of Najaf in southern Iraq, has become a recurring event in the Iraqi countryside.’

According to spokesmen of Iraq’s air defence command, some 300 Iraqis have been killed and more than 800 wounded by US and British retaliatory attacks in the 18 months since President Saddam Hussein ordered his anti-aircraft batteries to fire on allied war planes enforcing ‘no fly’ zones in northern and southern Iraq. Most of the casualties were civilian. According to the Pentagon, more than 280,000 sorties have been flown since ‘no-fly’ zones were introduced nearly a decade ago.

George Bush, Republican presidential candidate, has threatened to “bomb Iraq back to the stone age” if necessary. “We had to destroy Ben Tre in order to save it,” said an American major in Vietnam. That lunatic spirit still lives in the United States.

American foreign policy needs a demon all the time. If it isn’t Gaddafi, bring back Saddam (once an ally, but so what?). Islamic villains are sure to bring Jewish votes after all.

Most independent observers agree that sanctions against Iraq have failed. If the United States and Britain want to change the Government in Iraq, they will have to physically capture Saddam and eliminate him, but even then there can be no certainty. Another dictator, more ruthless than him, could come in his place. There is every evidence that the more aggressive US policies are against Iraq, the greater is the support of the people for Saddam.

There has been, in the past four decades, an attitude in the minds of the Administration and the Pentagon that the western man may not be too scrupulous in destroying Asian lives and that they do not hold the same kind of view of life as ‘we’ (i.e. the West) do.

James Thomson, East Asian specialist at the Department of State and the White House between 1961 and 1966, has written of “an unprovable factor that relates to bureaucratic detachment: the ingredient of crypto-racism.” He says: “I do not mean to imply any conscious contempt for Asian loss of life on the part of Washington officials. But I do mean to imply that bureaucratic detachment may well be compounded by a traditional western sense that there are so many Asians, after all; that Asians have a fatalism about life and a disregard for its loss; that they are cruel and barbaric to their own people; and that they are very different from us (and all look alike?). And I do mean to imply that the upshot of such subliminal questions is whether Asians, and particularly Asian peasants, and most particularly Asian Communists, are really people — like you and me. To put the matter another way: would we have pursued quite such policies — and quite such military tactics — if the Vietnamese were white?”

The above passage is from Noam Chomsky’s book, At War with Asia. America seems determined to change the face of Asia, with or without her traditional allies.

Profile
Harihar Swarup
A doughty fighter against Musharraf

Emerging out of her cloistered hearth only eight months back, Kulsoom Nawaz, wife of deposed Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, has acquired the stature of one of most prominent personalities in Pakistan’s politics.

She is known to be the only leader who is directly challenging the military ruler, Gen Pervez Musharraf in a male dominated society, struggling under the shadow of Islamic extremism. An M.Phil from Panjab University, she is also known to be a clear- headed person.

The history of the sub-continent has demonstrated that women rise like meteor whenever forced to come to streets and take cudgels against an oppressive regime. Hasina Wajid and Khalida Zia of Bangladesh, Bandernaike of Sri Lanka, Nobel prize winner Aung San Suu Kyi in Myanmar and Indira Gandhi were thrown in to politics by a quirk of destiny, but once they were in the thick of it, there was no looking back. Kulsoom, too, appears to be moving in that direction.

In Pakistan itself when Z.A. Bhutto was arrested in 1978, his aggrieved wife, Nusrat , aided by young Benazir, jumped into the fray assuming the leadership of the rudderless Pakistan’s People Party (PPP). They faced baton charges and one can recall the widely published photograph of Nusrat, hit on the head and bleeding. The stewardship passed on to Benazir following the hanging of her father and she, subsequently, emerged as “the daughter of East”.

Kulsoom Nawaz (49) faces almost identical situation as Nusrat not knowing the fate that may befall on their men. Kulsoom too has assumed the leadership of the Pakistan Muslim League when the party is in disarray and her husband, Nawaz Sharif was languishing in jail, not knowing if he may have to go to the gallows like Bhutto. Kulsoom has shown that like Bhutto women she is capable of organising and leading demonstrations. She gave the slip last week to security cordon round her house in a bid to lead a rally from Lahore to Peshawar and managed to drive through police road blocks leading to a 10-hour standoff with the military regime.

The army rulers may have been able to send Kulsoom back to her residence but her daring escape pitchforked her to the front rank of Pakistan’s politicians and enabled her acquire wide public sympathy. Hundreds of her partymen were arrested in a pre-dawn swoop. She would not have gained so much popular support, had she led the rally. Her attacks on the military regime are becoming sharper than those by her detained husband. She now demands Gen Musharraf’s trial for treason, calls for an investigation into bloody Kargil war and denounces trial of Nawaz Sharif as farce.

Nawaz Sharif’s ouster and arrest in an army coup motivated Kulsoom to give up the isolated comfort of her home to jump into the political fray with the avowed objective of fighting oppression and for protecting my son and husband. She has always asserted: “I have never had any political ambitions in politics . I am here to save my husband and I will say goodbye the moment my husband comes out”. As a Pakistani commentator rightly pointed out “the only reason the Sharif woman, a housewife, came out in open is that there are no men left in PML”.

The situation has changed since then. Kulsoom now leads her husband’s party with the intention of participating in politics and there appears to be a remote chance of her going back to the kitchen even if Nawaz Sharif is released. Political observers see her as a tenacious fighter and astute politician. Dissent is no longer heard in the PML and her voice heard with rapt attention. She managed to keep her husband in the limelight when the PML reposed confidence in him in April despite a bitter divide over his leadership.

Kulsoom may face charges of treason for attacking the army and Gen Musharraf but she says: “It doesn’t matter if they arrest me. I am ready to go to prison. My husband is in jail and if I too go there, it doesn’t matter”. Also she evokes public sympathy when she reposes trust of Allah and says: “They (generals) have to do their politics and I have to do my own job. I have to struggle for the people of Pakistan, for my party and for my husband. Everywhere I go, I feel the entire Pakistan is with me and Inshallah, Pervez Musharraf will be out soon there will be democracy in my country”.

Kulsoom has also sought the support of former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, her husband’s bitter rival and offered talks with the PPP. Although talks were yet to be held but Benazir did call for Nawaz Sharif’s release.

Reports from Pakistan say that the only leader military leaders now fear is Kulsoom but she has a long way to go. Her tryst with destiny has just begun.

Delhi durbar
Mediatory role for George again?

The presence of Defence Minister George Fernandes at the presentation ceremony of the Dr B.C. Roy National Awards at Rashtrapati Bhavan on Friday morning raised many a eyebrow.

With Defence and Health and Family Welfare being two totally diverse subjects, the arrival of Mr Fernandes evoked considerable discussion among some of those present there. While it is normal practice to extend invitations for official functions to all Ministers, it is unusual for anyone except for the Minister concerned to be present on such occasions.

The reason for his presence that morning became clear soon when Mr Fernandes after his entry, straightaway went to the Jammu and Kashmir Chief Minister, Dr Farooq Abdullah, and the two spoke for a considerable length of time and if one could interpret gestures of the former, it seemed he was trying to explain a few things to the Defence Minister. Dr Abdullah was presented the Dr B.C. Roy National Award in the category of medicalman-cum-statesman.

After the ceremony, the two once again resumed their dialogue. With the National Conference Working Committee in Srinagar set to resume its debating on the issue of whether or not to continue in the NDA, the ceremony at the Rashtrapati Bhavan was probably the best opportunity for the coalition leaders to speak to Dr Abdullah before the party took a final decision.

So after heading the panel to discuss all aspects of Udham Singh Nagar issue, Mr Fernandes seems to be a natural mediator for the NDA which in this case seems logical after Mr Fernandes was the Minister of Kashmir Affair in the V.P. Singh Cabinet.

Sonia turns media-savvy

For someone who consciously avoided the media and preferred her aides to do the talking, there has been a surprising turnaround in the attitude of the Congress President, Mrs Sonia Gandhi, during the past one month.

For scribes covering the AICC it was an unusual occurrence last Thursday when the Party chief not only stopped by after a meeting of PCC chiefs and CLP leaders to chat with them but was also at ease. Gone was the hurry in which she used to be and rushing into her vehicle with steely SPG men keeping a watchful eye.

The change was in fact not something that happened all of a sudden. For nearly a month, the Congress President has been having a one-to-one interaction with correspondents covering the AICC. The tete-a-tete was always informal and would invariably be “off-the record”. Perhaps after this over a month long exercise for which credit must be given to the Media Department and its Secretary Tom Vaddakan, the effort seemed to be paying results. If the Congress President found herself in the midst of known faces from the media, the hard-boiled scribes got an opportunity to get something on record from the otherwise reluctant chief.

Animal rage

The capital has been in the grip of an animal rage these days. Last week saw a bull gore a man to death and the next day a cow went berserk killing another man. While the unusual reaction of the bovines made big news in the city, there were thousands of people who were not surprised about it.

For several years now, at the behest of animal activist Ms Maneka Gandhi, the Capital has been home to all kinds of stray animals. Elephants plod along busy traffic in the roads, monkeys create nuisance in busy public places especially the Raisina Hill which houses among others the offices of the Prime Minister, the Home Minister, the Defence Minister and the Finance Minister not to mention the dogs and other stray animals that dot virtually all the colonies. It is not an uncommon sight to see scooterists, pedestrians and street urchins being chased by dogs and some even get bitten.

The municipal authorities at their end plead helplessness as they say that their hands are tied. The authorities are scared about being charged with inflicting cruelty on animals.

While much is being done for the ‘hapless’ animals, may be it is time for setting up a society for prevention of cruelty towards common man (from animals).

(Contributed by T.V. Lakshminarayan, K.V. Prasad and P. N. Andley)