Partition
and sins of big three
The Great Divide:
Britain-India-Pakistan by H.V. Hodson with a new
introduction. Oxford University Press, Karachi. Pp.
xl+590. Rs 450.
AMONG the large, and now fairly
impressive, corpus of serious studies on Indias
Independence and partition both came together
"The Great Divide" occupies an important
place. Convincingly evidenced by the fact that since its
publication almost three decades ago (1969), it has
reappeared twice over. First in 1985 and now in 1997.
In its essence, the hard
core has remained untouched; the 1985 edition appended a
25-page Epilogue covering events since the partition
while the new edition, under review, surveys the
intervening ground in a fresh 42-page introduction,
"Fifty years on".
That the author has
resisted the temptation of rewriting his old narrative
argues powerfully in favour of his conclusion that in its
essentials, his account has stood the test of time. And
is as relevant today as when it was originally composed.
It should follow that the
intelligent reader would do well to have a good
acquaintance with Hodsons broad theme and thrust.
So as to be able to fit in his later reflections on the
shape of things as they emerged in the aftermath of the
great divide, the trauma of 1947. Placing thereby the
Epilogue as well as his "Fifty years on" in
their proper perspective.
Hodsons five-part
large, if impressive, tome of over 600 pages revolves
mainly though by no means exclusively around its middle,
the third part. It is the story of Mountbatten
"The last of the Viceroys". And what he did and
why? His brief tenure March 23 to August 14, 1947,
as Viceroy of united India constitutes as it were the
centrepiece of the high drama leading to partition and
its aftermath.
Here Hodson discusses at
length such crucial issues as Mountbattens talks
with the Indian political leaders, the accession of the
princely states, the problem of the armed forces, the
manner in which the June 3 plan took shape and form.
Reduced to brasstacks, Hodson set himself the task of
enquiring as to how and why the
"self-liquidation" of the Empire began, giving
birth to the "two new great Sovereign States".
Without going into too
many details, some of the conclusions Hodson has drawn
deserve to be noted. To start with, he posits the view
that "given the basic and rival objectives" of
the three great participants the British, stable
government; the Congress, national independence; the
League, security of Muslims from Hindu raj all
three "must share responsibility" for bringing
about the unenviable situation that confronted them in
1947.
Insofar as the Congress
made the "worst errors", it paid "most
dearly" in the sacrifice of its ideals. Again, by
the time Mountbatten arrived the possibility of any other
answer than total partition was "extremely
remote". The great divide imposed "a draconian
solution" which resulted in an orgy of "hideous
bloodshed and rapine" in the North-West. And the
demise of princely autocracies.
More, the direct
consequences of the divide linguistic and regional
conflicts, strife on the tribal fringe, the Indo-Pak
confrontation were all "continuing
expressions of readjustment" after that stupendous
historical drama.
The men who played
important roles in this "revolutionary time"
were no mere puppets, much less "corks on a torrent
flooding from a burst dam". Yet clearly they
"could not" have withstood forces "far
stronger than any policy, any government, any
administrative machine". Some of them were great men
but Mountbatten "was among the greatest".
Now in his early nineties
and with the hindsight of half a century after the events
of 1947, Hodson has some interesting observations to
make. And it is instructive to ponder over some of them.
Answering the oft-repeated accusation that the British
betrayed a trust in dividing the land before they quit,
Hodson is of the view that a single Indian nation state,
if established in 1947, "would have been inherently
unstable in its communal chemistry".
Again, the fact that
Pakistan had to wait for more than a decade and a half
before it forged a permanent, home-made Constitution
(1973) was due largely to the fact that the Muslim League
which assumed the reins of government had no clear
political and social agenda. Being "essentially a
pressure group for communal causes", all the way
from separate electorates to an independent Muslim state.
Reverting to the troubled
legacy of the Kashmir dispute, Hodson lists various acts
of omission and commission, both by New Delhi as well as
Islamabad. The latter, he avers, was "wrong",
to give a green signal to the tribal invasion which was
clearly in breach of the letter and spirit of the pact
for the transfer of power. Again, Mountbatten was
"wrong" to accept the chairmanship of the
Indian Cabinets Defence Committee. By becoming an
instrument of the executive, he prejudiced his proper
role as a constitutional Governor-General.
And finally the Indian
government, "specifically" Nehru and Patel,
were wrong in pressing for accepting the Maharajas
accession to India which they "mistakenly" saw
as necessary to validate the dispatch of armed forces
into a friendly neighbouring state to help defend it
against external aggression. They were "also
wrong" in their "permanent hostility"
toward a reference to the UN. And taking no steps to
implement the letters recommendations about a
plebiscite.
Hodson is also critical of
Mountbattens role in regard to the incorporation of
Hyderabad into the Indian dominion. As Governor General
he was supposed to act, save in a crisis, upon the advice
of his government: "instead, his government were
constrained, often reluctantly, to act upon his
advice." And not only in regard to Hyderabad, and
earlier Kashmir. But the whole pattern of events from
August, 1947 (when he took over as Governor-General of
India) to June, 1948 (his departure for home) had been
moulded "not by constitutional niceties but by the
masterful personality and unique prestige" in India
that Mountbatten had acquired.
Was the last British
Viceroy wrong in accelerating the handover of sovereign
power by the best part of a year, from June, 1947, to
August, 1948? For this "seemingly rash policy"
led to fearful disorder and worse. Hodson is less than
sure if there could have been further postponement
beyond August, 1947 and cites Ismays
considered view that successive British governments had
"little by little divested themselves of power"
in India.
No wonder, the February 20
(1947) statement of Attlee about the definite intention
of the British to quit by June (1948) had been the
"last straw" in creating a situation "in
which they were no longer able to discharge their
responsibilities". That testimony, Hodson insists,
must be reckoned as "conclusive".
All the same, he enters a
caveat. Mountbattens accelerated time table, had
"assumed" that the two dominions (nations)
would have, in their early days, a common
Governor-General. Jinnahs insistence that he
himself would be Pakistans first Governor-General
"torpedoed" that expectation. In the event,
Mountbattens acceptance of the Governor-Generalship
of India "made him a partisan" in the cascade
of events between August, 1947, and September, 1948, and
"undermined" his role as a moderator and
peacemaker.
A great deal of
"controversy and recrimination" surrounds Sir
Cyril Radcliffes late amendment of his boundary
award in the North-West in the area of Ferozepore. Hodson
is convinced that the allegation that Mountbatten brought
pressure to bear on Radcliffe to alter his award is
"basically improbable". And for the simple
reason that "no one has shown what pressure he could
exert". Radcliffe was an eminent lawyer with no
political or social aspirations which Mountbatten could
affect. On the contrary, he had every interest in
"preserving his own reputation" for
independence, impartiality and cool judgement.
For his part Mountbatten
had been careful all long "not to intervene" in
Radcliffes task: "his own reputation was at
stake as well as Radcliffes". To no ones
surprise, he has refused to revise his earlier account
(1969) for, barring minor particulars, it "remains
basically correct".
A word on the author and
his Indian connection. Apart from his rich academic and
journalistic background, as a Fellow of All Souls
College at Oxford (1928-35) and editor of the Sunday
Times (1950-61), Hodson had a brief stint (1941-42) as
Constitutional Adviser to Linlithgow. Affording him a
unique opportunity to gain an insight into the tangled
web of Indian politics and politicians.
He had free access to
Mountbattens private papers and his reports besides
long talks with him. More, the last Viceroy read his
manuscript, made "many valuable comments" yet
did not alter his conclusions much less press any
amendments.
Hodson interacted with a
number of Indian and Pakistani friends, including V.P.
Menon and Mohammed Ali Choudhury who later rose to be his
countrys Prime Minister. Among his British
informants were such heavyweights as Sir George Abell,
Field Marshal Auchinleck, Sir Olaf Caroe, Sir Conrad
Corfield and Sir Panderal Moon.
Hodsons father T.C.
Hodson, who later became Professor of Social Anthropology
at Cambridge, was a member of the ICS and, in the 1890s,
had served in Assam where he made studies of the Nagas
and some neighbouring tribes.
How does Hodsons
account differ in content and emphasis from that of V.P.
Menon, Mushirul Hasan, B.R. Nanda, Tara Chand and a host
of others who have researched and written authoritatively
on the subject? In one important respect. Hodson was, in
many ways it would appear, an "insider" who
makes the candid admission that insofar as his sources
and outlook were "predominantly British", his
viewpoint "cannot but" be British.
The "Great
Divide" is a handsome tribute to the honesty and
integrity with which this viewpoint has been so lucidly
spelt out.
Parshotam Mehra
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