Why Taliban are spurning global community’s demands
AUGUST 15 marked the second anniversary of the Taliban reoccupation of Kabul after almost two decades. Ashraf Ghani, then President of the Afghan Islamic Republic, fled the country that day. With that, the Taliban, using military force, re-established their Afghan Emirate across Afghanistan; it had collapsed in November 2001 consequent to the United States’ military action in response to 9/11. Significantly, the Taliban’s military takeover of the country did not conform to the stipulations of their Doha agreement of February 2020 with the US.
The Doha agreement had envisaged that the US and NATO forces would withdraw from Afghanistan. In return, the Taliban would not allow the Afghan territory to be used by terrorist groups as well as negotiate a power-sharing arrangement with the Afghan Republic to administer the country, leading to the formation of a new Constitution. The power-sharing arrangement became redundant as the Taliban swept aside the US-fashioned Afghan National Army and achieved a military victory. While the Taliban are taking on the Islamic State of Khorasan, their continuing relationship with al-Qaeda was demonstrated when the US killed its leader Ayman al-Zawahiri in a drone attack in July 2022 in mid-town Kabul.
The fact is that the US and NATO suffered a strategic defeat in Afghanistan, which was compounded by their inability to accomplish the smooth withdrawal of their forces from the country. Over the past two years, the US, its allies and much of the international community’s member-states are demanding that the Taliban form an inclusive government and adhere to internationally accepted norms on human rights, especially on gender issues.
The Taliban have spurned these demands. They are asserting that they have representatives of all major Afghan ethnic groups in their official apparatus and hence, they have formed a representative system. On gender issues, they are showing a growing tendency to follow their rigid and obscurantist interpretation of the Sharia, but have, as yet, refrained from the excesses witnessed during their rule in the 1990s. There is little likelihood that the Taliban would relent on either of these two demands of the international community as long as the group’s ultimate power lies in the hands of the present emir, Haibatullah Akhundzada.
The Taliban are essentially a Pashtun group, but are also Islamic. While over the past half a century of turbulence in Afghanistan, sociological changes have weakened the traditional Pashtun power structures, status of Amir al-Mu’minin vested in the supreme Taliban leader makes it difficult for other leaders to defy his diktats. It is believed that younger leaders like interim Interior Minister Sirajuddin Haqqani, whose power base continues to lie in the south-east, and interim Defence Minister Mullah Yaqoob, who has the advantage of being founder Mullah Omar’s son, are more open to change. However, they are unable to take on Haibatullah and his group of conservative clerics who are willing to continue to defy the world on gender issues.
Since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the prime attention of the major powers and the rest of the international community has been on this war. Its consequences for European security and the US-China contestation have been enormous. It has also had an adverse impact on the welfare of the Global South. This has majorly contributed to putting the Afghan situation on the back burner over the past year and a half. The international community seems to be satisfied with making ritualistic demands for an inclusive government and gender equality and the imposition of sanctions because of the continuing Taliban rigidity.
Meanwhile, some humanitarian assistance is flowing in to prevent a complete economic breakdown, which would lead to an unpreventable outflow of refugees. At the same time, those who can are leaving the country.
The international community simply has no appetite to effectively intervene in Afghanistan, not even to stem narcotic flows. Besides, what can any power really do except to monitor the activities of terrorist groups through both technical and such human intelligence, as is possible without an on-the-ground presence? That these can be effective, at least occasionally, was shown by the al-Zawahiri killing.
Besides, the Taliban know that, if required, the western powers possess aerial means for inflicting damage, even if the Taliban regime cannot be overthrown. That can only be done through domestic opposition and there is no evidence of a possible public uprising or armed action by opposition groups based abroad. The Taliban will seek to ensure that the US, European, Russian and Chinese interests are not hurt even if they ‘allow’ the presence of some terrorist groups on their territory.
That clearly does not apply to Pakistan. Relations between the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and the Afghan Taliban are rooted in tribal, personal and religious bonds. It is believed that the TTP leaders have pledged loyalty to the emir and that is a sacred bond for both. The Pakistan army and its intelligence services are increasingly frustrated at the lack of the Afghan Taliban’s cooperation in reining in the TTP. This frustration is leading to friction, which is finding acrimonious public expression from both sides. During his address at the Pakistan Military Academy at Kakul on August 14, the Pakistan Army Chief, Gen Asim Munir, said, “With respect to our Afghan brothers, we have been the most hospitable nation and wish that they reciprocate our earnest efforts to the least (sic) and not allow their soil to be used against us.”
On the other hand, the Afghan Taliban spokespersons reject these charges. The TTP is a card that the Afghan Taliban will not give up and Pakistan will not be the first country to realise that there is no reciprocation of generosity in international relations.
India has been wary of opening up fully to the Afghan Taliban, though a ‘technical team’ has been in place in Kabul for a year now. Humanitarian assistance is also being sent. What is needed is to approach the Afghan situation pragmatically and while looking after the security interests, loosen up the visa policy, which is undermining the goodwill earned through decades of efforts.
