Why scaling back troops on LAC is risky

INDIA and China appear to be moving swiftly towards the normalisation of relations following the meeting between Prime Minister Narendra Modi and President Xi Jinping on October 23 in Kazan, Russia, held on the sidelines of the BRICS Summit. A key outcome of the talks was the initiation of Coordinated Joint Patrolling along the Line of Actual Control (LAC).

India’s stance on its relationship with China in recent years has been firmly anchored in the principle of resolving friction points along the LAC as a precondition for any meaningful progress.

Experts have long stressed the importance of a structured approach to normalisation, involving de-escalation, disengagement and the eventual de-induction of troops from sensitive border areas.

However, given the deep trust deficit between the two Asian powers, any move to revert the troop levels to the pre-2020 conditions poses significant risks for India.

Recent weeks have seen a substantial momentum in multilateral diplomacy, with platforms like the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) summit and the G20 meetings fostering an environment conducive to breakthroughs between the two nations. Agreements reportedly under discussion include the resumption of direct flights, reciprocal accreditation of journalists and improved visa facilities, signalling a potential thaw in bilateral relations.

While these developments are welcome, they represent only the low-hanging fruit. Any temptation to scale back troop deployments to the pre-2020 levels must be resisted as such a move could prove disastrous. This caution is rooted in China’s history of violating border agreements, including the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence (1954), the Border Peace and Tranquillity Agreement (1993), the Agreement on Confidence-Building Measures (1996), the Protocol for the Implementation of Military Confidence-Building Measures (2005) and the Working Mechanism for Consultation and Coordination (2012).

Despite 31 rounds of talks under the Working Mechanism for Consultation and Coordination framework and 21 Corps Commander-level discussions yielding some progress, these mechanisms have failed to prevent incidents like the 1962 war, the 1967 Nathu La conflict, the 1975 firing incident and the more recent confrontations at Sumdorong Chu, Chumar, Depsang, Doklam, Galwan and Yangtse. This history underscores the need for continued vigilance in managing bilateral relations and securing the LAC.

A fragile trust

The critical question for India is how much trust can be placed in Xi Jinping’s leadership. Time and again, China has embarrassed India by expanding its claims to previously undisputed areas. For instance, Galwan Valley, once considered uncontroversial, became a flashpoint. Similarly, in Bhutan, China arbitrarily raised the Sakteng Wildlife Sanctuary as a disputed area to pressure India. Disputes along the LAC are categorised as either contested areas or zones of differing perceptions of the boundary.

Beyond territorial issues, China’s “grey zone” tactics include cyberattacks — India is the second-most targeted country in Asia after Taiwan — causing losses amounting to billions of dollars.

Moreover, China actively interferes in India’s neighbourhood, straining relations with Nepal, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, the Maldives and, to a lesser extent, Bhutan. Instances like its near-success in turning the Maldives against India, gaining port access in Sri Lanka, and suspected military activity on Myanmar’s Coco Islands highlight China’s strategic manoeuvring to contain Indian influence in the Indian Ocean region.

In this complex and high-stakes environment, it is difficult to trust China’s overtures or confidence-building measures. India must ask: What assurances, if any, has Xi Jinping provided to guarantee that China will not engage in future conflicts?

Without credible commitments, any premature de-induction of troops could embolden Beijing to initiate further incursions, forcing India into a settlement on unfavourable terms.

The path forward

At a time when trust between India and China is at its nadir and China holds an upper hand in economic, military, intelligence and technological domains, troop de-induction from the LAC must not be entertained under any circumstances. For the first time since Independence, Chinese troops are deployed outside their peacetime accommodations in the challenging high altitudes of the Great Himalayan ranges.

This has created significant challenges for Beijing, including backlash from families due to the one-child policy, high sickness rates among Han Chinese soldiers and the need to recruit local troops better suited to the harsh conditions of Tibet and Xinjiang.

Despite efforts at theaterisation, the Tibetan and Xinjiang military regions remain distinct, reflecting Beijing’s logistical and organisational challenges.

India must maintain consistent military and diplomatic pressure to compel China to resolve the border issue on favourable terms. Any haste to normalise relations by withdrawing troops will only encourage China to launch another major incursion (the Big One), further undermining India’s position.

While economic ties with China — India’s largest trading partner — offer short-term benefits, these gains should not come at the cost of national security and military readiness.

India’s current achievements stem from a balanced application of hard and soft power. It is imperative to continue this approach, leveraging diplomatic and military strengths to buy time for enhancing military capabilities, completing the transition to theaterisation, and ensuring uninterrupted economic growth.

These efforts will help India realise the vision of ‘Viksit Bharat’ (Developed India) by 2047 — a nation backed by a robust military, ready to meet any challenge from adversaries, while ensuring the prosperity and wellbeing of its citizens.

This would also prevent any major clash between India and China and, thus, will help both Asian giants to achieve their centenary goals peacefully.