Why rooting out Hamas is a Sisyphean task
IN his presentation during the 2018 World Summit on Counter-Terrorism, Boaz Ganor, Founding Director of the International Institute of Counter-Terrorism (IICT), Tel Aviv, underlined that defeating terrorism involved defeating the military capability of terrorists as well as their motivation to fight; he said achieving both within the ambit of the law accorded legitimacy to the exercise. Ganor stated that the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) was a shackled unit, something we know about in the Indian Army — fighting terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir with one arm tied at the back. The IDF turning counter-terrorism into a skill/art is a far cry from the prevalent tactics of an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth and shooting first without pausing to ask questions.
No other international conference in the world dissects terrorism, violent extremism and radicalisation as this annual summit on counter-terrorism does. Hamas, Hezbollah, Islamic Jihad, Islamic State — they are all mentioned. The IDF attends the conference in good strength. I hadn’t missed any edition of this summit till Covid-19 struck.
The IDF re-entering Gaza evokes a sense of déjà vu since Hamas took control in 2007. This time, Hamas did not fire the usual Qassam rockets and missiles but executed a brilliant but brutal raid inside Israel, causing 1,400 fatalities (including about 260 IDF personnel) and taking over 200 people hostage. The IDF’s Operation Iron Swords is tasked to rescue hostages and ‘destroy Hamas forever’. The IDF retribution by air raids, blockade and siege has been massive; it is aimed at taking Gaza and Hamas back to the Stone Age. About 6,000 bombs in six days is more than those used during the 1973 Yom Kippur War. The preparatory bombardment of civilian areas is a stark violation of all laws of war coined in New York, Geneva, Hague and Rome, besides the Ganor principle of legitimacy. Israel still has several hostile neighbours and terrorist entities — Hamas in Gaza, Hezbollah in Lebanon, Palestinian militants in the West Bank. The IDF has failed to deter them and they are periodically up in arms. Tel Aviv, known to have defeated ‘suicide terrorism’ (nearly 4,000 attacks during Intifada), is helpless for once.
Five cross-border multi-domain operations in Gaza, beginning in 2006, ended in 2021; the incursions lasted from eight to 56 days. Hamas would mainly fire Qassam rockets, whose accuracy improved over time. So did that of the IDF antidote, Iron Dome. Similarly, between 1978 and 2006, the IDF conducted three invasions of Lebanon in the face of Hezbollah rocketry. In both attempts, the IDF managed to merely dry the swamp or mow the grass; it was not able to eradicate the two terrorist organisations. During numerous war games at the IICT, usable options indicated the limits to the use of force — that a decisive victory could not be attained without losing legitimacy. And that victory would require Gaza’s reoccupation, which was avoidable. High-order military deterrence required low restraint, and vice versa. The IDF realised that deterrence was not viable against non-state actors like the Hamas and Hezbollah. The breakdown of decisive deterrence was due to the inability to achieve a decisive victory. The IDF, therefore, chose to contain the two. This was tantamount to managing conflict rather than resolving it. Will it be different this time?
The battle against terrorism has seen three major successes: Malaya (1967), Punjab (1990s) and Sri Lanka (2009). The Sri Lankan military was able to conquer the LTTE, a deadly terrorist organisation with a defined territory and a tri-service organisation that had human bombers in all three domains. The entire LTTE political and military leadership was holed up in one place without escape routes. It was destroyed root and branch. The Hamas leadership is dispersed and some would have slipped out already. One parallel with Sri Lanka is the use of civilians as human shields. Nearly 300,000 Tamil civilians were caught in the crossfire, like the Gazans are now. No-fire zones and safe areas were established, but most of all, there was no carpet bombing like in Gaza.
The IDF has announced that the offensive will be ‘in and out’, not reoccupation of Gaza. For the sixth time, Hamas and Gaza are being pulverised, the lawn mown with disproportionate force. But Hamas will not be permanently destroyed. This time around, there is one major constraint — the hostages. Hamas has released two Americans, but the rest are there, probably hidden at different locations. Limited humanitarian aid has got through into Gaza City and Khan Yunis. Qatar has and will play a key role in this regard. It is known for letting the Taliban and Hamas open political offices.
The priority is probably destruction of Hamas rather than the release of hostages. This is the big risk the IDF will take if it goes in before some deal or understanding about the safety of the hostages is reached. Hamas may announce that it will begin executing hostages unless the offensive is called off. Or a deal could be negotiated on trading hostages for Palestinians in Israeli jails, which is one of the objectives of Hamas’ Operation Al Aqsa Flood. The IDF has never faced a similar hostage situation in Gaza. A long pause before the ground offensive will allow Hamas to readjust its defences. Along with Hamas is Palestinian Islamic Jihad. Hamas is using kinetic strength along with psy-war by flooding social media with posts to motivate West Bank Palestinians.
The IDF has lost legitimacy. Article 51 (Right of Self-Defence) of the UN Charter does not give the IDF licence to breach international humanitarian law, Geneva Convention, Hague Convention and the Rome Statute. As for crushing Hamas, the IDF will largely attain that goal, although not completely. But it will be at an enormous human and infrastructure cost. What it will not achieve is defeating the will and motivation of Hamas (and allies) to fight another day. A military solution will not work here.
