Why lessons of 1962 war should still hold good

The 62nd anniversary of the 1962 India-China war is a time to reflect on what happened and why, and also what the present portends. The conflict is singular in many respects — a combination of political naivete, abject intelligence failure and military incompetence.

The leadership of the newly independent India adopted a policy that prioritised amity with nations that had experienced colonialism, direct or indirect, and a refusal to get entangled with blocs on either side of the Cold War. China, which had seen the Communists successfully fighting their way to power, was given special importance, although there was never a shortage of differences that could grow into disputes and discord.

In fact, China had become our neighbour by quickly establishing control over Tibet and, finally, annexing it. The Indian response was muted, to say the least. In the heady days that followed the Independence, it was easy to talk of solidarity with the developing world and coining slogans like “Hindi-Chini Bhai Bhai.” The problem with articulating and iterating such ideas is that these can blur reality. Geography, however, is unforgiving and any attempt to ignore it in the pursuit of rosy ideas is dangerous.

On October 20, 1962, the Chinese gave us a reality check and the debacle that followed has had a lasting impact on the Indian mind, scarring the national psyche. The fact that only a limited number of Army formations fought this battle is often forgotten, as are key statistics. The contact battles in different sectors along the border were fought between October 20 and 24 in the first phase and between November 17 and 20 in the second phase. The total force levels involved were approximately four Divisions of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) against less than three Divisions equivalent of the Indian Army. While the Indian Air Force was used only for limited logistic support, the Navy did not find any role in the conflict.

The figures of total casualties suffered on either side have been corroborated from different sources — the Indian Ministry of Defence report on the 1962 conflict, a Beijing Military Science Department document and a US publication on the PLA. The broad figures in all three match. The Indian Army suffered about 3,000 killed/missing and 4,000 prisoners of war. The PLA had about 2,000 killed and wounded. This defeat had been squarely attributed to the national, political and higher military leadership. The reversals were mainly in the Kameng area of western NEFA (North-East Frontier Agency), where a study of individual battles clearly pointed to operational and tactical incompetence. Acts of outstanding individual gallantry and fierce sub-unit and unit-level battles, especially in Eastern NEFA and Ladakh notwithstanding, it almost became a rout in Kameng.

Post 1962, the Indian approach to the northern borders was quite ostrich-like, with its head in the sand. In the sensitive area of northwest Arunachal Pradesh, there was minimal deployment ahead of the important town of Tawang. Border roads were almost non-existent and border villages existed in under-developed isolation. All this started changing from 1980 and gradually picked up pace. The Indian Army has since mastered the hostile terrain and harsh weather. Infrastructure development is now a government priority and local habitations are turning into modern villages and townships. However, the terrain advantage is with China on the Tibetan plateau, and the differential in infrastructure north of the Line of Actual Control (LAC) is in its favour.

As the development and deployment on the Indian side catch up with its adversary, the Chinese leadership well realises that a contact battle may not be decisively winnable. It may have to do some serious introspection about how to employ the PLA for the furtherance of its revisionist and expansionist policies. In the disputed and sensitive areas along the LAC, the PLA has time and again endeavoured to occupy Indian territory, which has often resulted in scuffles with our Army — a most unusual form of conflict between two major nations. Troops of two nuclear powers brawling is not only an unedifying sight, it also hints at a poverty of diplomatic solutions.

Recent headlines about an agreement for disengagement in eastern Ladakh, which was a precursor to the Modi-Xi Jinping meeting at Kazan in Russia, on the sidelines of the BRICS summit, projected it as a major diplomatic achievement. However, there were subtle differences in the official statements from the two sides. The follow-up, too, appears to be shrouded in opacity with no clarity on the timeline for the restoration of “peace and tranquillity.”

This is a scenario similar to the resolution of the Doklam standoff between the Indian Army and the PLA in August 2017, when, for the first time, our Army stepped on to foreign soil in Bhutan to confront and stare down the Chinese big bully. While India may well claim a tactical and operational victory of sorts at Doklam, the fact is that the PLA continues with its presence on the plateau in semi-permanent structures, less than 200 m away from the standoff point. The disengagement then was also a precursor to the visit by Modi to Xiamen in China for the BRICS summit in September 2017.

There have been speculations about the reasons behind Beijing’s offer of disengagement in east Ladakh after procrastinating for well over four years. The necessity of economic engagement with the large Indian market, especially when the Chinese economy is getting sluggish with attendant internal implications, is being billed as a major factor. Be that as it may, it makes perfect sense for the world’s major economies to be robustly engaged, despite the skewed balance of trade in favour of China, as economic linkages would, no doubt, be beneficial for both countries.

It is worth mentioning that despite major political differences, the US and China have a massive trade volume. Geographical disputes and a bitter history of discord have not stopped Japan and China from being major trade partners.

However, militarily, India can ill afford to lower its guard along the LAC. There is, thus, a need for a dual policy of “containment” and “engagement” with China — containment by the armed forces on the northern borders and engagement in commerce and trade. This, however, would necessitate imaginative diplomacy, with a long-term focus rather than the one that goes from BRIC to BRIC.