What kind of military power does India need

SOME unrelated events of the last week draw attention to India's modest trans-border military (TBM) capability and the manner in which certain disruptive technologies are impacting the conduct of war. The military operations in the ongoing Russia-Ukraine war (that began in February 2022) and the spiral of violence triggered by the Hamas terror attack on Israel (in October 2023), now roiled by the entry of Hezbollah and Iran, testify to the latter trend to a certain degree. Some preliminary policy inferences can be drawn that are relevant for India.

The first development pertains to the October 9 Cabinet Committee on Security approval for the acquisition of two nuclear propelled submarines (SSN); these platforms are also referred to as attack-submarines or hunter-killers. They will be indigenously designed and built at Visakhapatnam. This is a major policy decision and an ambitious one at that.

India was yet to acquire the requisite level of technological competence to design and build a conventional diesel-electric submarine, but yet it had moved straight to design and build a SSBN (a nuclear powered submarine with nuclear-tipped ballistic missiles) —- the INS Arihant. The SSBN has a strategic role, which is to ensure credible second-strike capability to render nuclear deterrence more robust. India joined this select group of nations in 2018, one which includes the USA, Russia, the UK, France and China.

After a long gestation period of almost 17 years since the acquisition of an SSN was first mooted, India is now embarking on the project, though this approval has to be followed by adequate budgetary allocations. An SSN is a totally different platform by way of technological features and as is the case with the first type of any naval platform, the journey will be long, arduous and expensive.

The two SSNs are reported to cost Rs 15,000 crore each, though this is an initial estimate. When these two boats enter service in an operational manner — with full ordnance package, which means submarine-launched missiles — India will have a credible underwater capability, wherein the SSN can be tasked with attack, surveillance and special operations roles, depending on the tactical exigency. In essence, the SSN can remain on extended underwater 'prowl', and unfriendly navies will have to factor this capability when operating in maritime areas of relevance to India.

In the same week, on October 7, the CCS also approved phase III of the Space Based Surveillance system (SBS), which will allow India to launch 52 spy satellites in low earth and geostationary orbits. Expected to cost Rs 27,000 crore, the trans-border surveillance capability of this cluster will be enhanced by artificial intelligence and give a fillip to India's comprehensive TBM index.

Air power is a core element of a nation's TBM capability and this aspect came into focus with the assumption of office by the new air chief, Air Chief Marshal Amar Preet Singh, who took over in end-September. During the traditional media interaction in the run-up to the Air Force Day on October 8, ACM Singh noted the gap between India and its principal strategic challenger, China, in the air power domain and dwelt on the need to ramp up domestic production of fighter jets to redress dwindling numbers. Moreover, he said, his first effort would be not to allow "the fighter aircraft strength go down below 30 squadrons" and that HAL should stick to its promise to deliver 24 aircraft every year to bridge the numbers gap.

The 30 squadron figure has to be seen against the aspiration of the IAF to have 42 fighter squadrons to deal with a two-front operational requirement against China and Pakistan. This number was arrived at after the 1965 war with Pakistan; and none other than the legendary JRD Tata, an accomplished pilot and founder of Air India, was a member of the group that made this assessment.

The manner in which air power has been transmuted is evident in the Russia-Ukraine war as well as the violence in West Asia, where the use of relatively less expensive unmanned drones and missiles/rockets have replaced the once-familiar deployment of fighter aircraft and long-range bombers. The writing on the wall, air power experts agree, is that the days of the land-based, manned fighter aircraft are numbered.

While modern fighter aircraft are moving from the fifth to the sixth generation, and will be even more technologically advanced with recent strides made in avionics and the entry of AI, the cost of designing and manufacturing such platforms has become truly astronomical.

Major military powers are grappling with how to acquire affordable and effective air power that is also sustainable. India, too, is in a complex and difficult spot. There is no denying that air power is an imperative tool for ensuring national security. The question, of course, is, what kind of air power — manned or unmanned platforms — and in what distribution (Air Force, Navy, Army and space-cyber commands). That will be a complex issue to resolve for the higher defence management hierarchy, both military and civilian.

TBM capability is a combination of the classical military tripod — the ability to deliver ordnance over long ranges with proven accuracy; ensure surveillance, both defensive and offensive, incorporating the latest technologies in communication warfare; and being capable of moving tangible military assets to distant theatres when warranted.

The Indian military is going through a period of transition towards greater jointness, while theatre commands have been mooted. There is a case for the evolving military architecture to objectively review individual service or domain-specific trans-border capabilities across the tripod — and move towards acquiring a holistic national TBM capability.

The specific scenario where this would come into play is in relation to China. Even as the geo-economic and trade compulsion introduces one layer of robust bilateral interaction, there is a need for India to acquire the desired degree of TBM capability in a progressive manner, so that Delhi acquires the appropriate degree of equipoise in engaging with Beijing — and does not need to be either deferential or belligerent.

Later this month, the trauma of October 20, 1962 will be recalled. It is hoped that the right policy cues regarding TBM will be internalised by the Indian security apex.