We are paying for missed opportunities on border
On January 12, briefing the media before Army Day, Gen Manoj Pande, the Army Chief, described the situation on the northern borders as ‘stable but unpredictable.’ Things could have been different.
Of the 18 books by former External Affairs Minister Jaswant Singh, India At Risk: Mistakes, Misconceptions and Misadventures of Security Policy is today the most relevant. He remarks that India is in a strategic straitjacket, being confined by four lines: the LoC, the LAC, the Durand Line and the McMahon Line.
There is a reference to a paper in the book relating to external defence, called India’s Mongol Frontier. In the paper, Lt Gen Francis Tuker, in 1946, as the Eastern Army Commander, highlights that India’s vital area is the Tibetan Plateau, adding that China, not Russia, was the main threat to British India. He says that as British power withdraws from India, Tibet will lean to China, and India, rather than witness Chinese occupation of Tibet, should not just prevent it but also be prepared to occupy the Tibetan Plateau to negate a Chinese invasion. Routes for an Indian expeditionary force, moving to Lhasa through Sikkim and Diwangiri, are mentioned. He also recommends that India should maintain good relations with Nepal, especially with its people.
No historical records appear to exist as to why this pre-emptive operation was not undertaken, given that detailed records were available of the 1903-04 Francis Younghusband expedition which fought its way to Gyantgse, reached Lhasa and ultimately established a consulate.
The Anglo-Tibet Convention of Lhasa, later reinforced by the Simla Agreement (1914), granted special rights to British India in Tibet. These included trading marts in Yatung, Gyangtse and Garthok, temporary ceding of the Chumbi valley and a trade commissioner in Lhasa. These trading posts had military and communication detachments which were in place till 1954 and were unilaterally withdrawn due to Nehru’s fatal attraction to China and the Panchsheel Agreement.
Military records show that two rifle companies of 8 Gorkha Rifles (in the Indian Army today) and one company of the Royal Fusilliers were the infantry component of the Younghusband force. Lt John Grant and Havaldar Kabir Pun won the Victoria Cross and the Indian Order of Merit First Class, the highest award for the non-British at the time. Marwari traders in Gangtok even today recall their forebears doing a thriving business in Tibet through the Nathu La and Jelep La Passes.
Surprisingly, in several books on China by Indian authors, this missed opportunity is not considered — in fact, hardly, if at all, mentioned. It would have changed the face of the Indian subcontinent and India’s locus standi in the region.
The moot question is: was the occupation of Tibet feasible to prevent the Chinese invasion in 1950? No one has seriously investigated this idea, though Jaswant Singh mentions in India At Risk that in January 1961, the then Army Chief Gen KS Thimayya, when asked about the practicality of the Tibet operation, said: “I cannot as a soldier imagine India taking on China in open conflict on its own as war will be beyond the capacity of our forces. China’s present strength in manpower, equipment and aircraft exceeds our resources.” Thimayya, before he became Army Chief in 1957, presumably advised against a Tibet adventure. His apprehension was echoed by the Director General, Military Operations, Brig DK Palit.
Consider the military situation after the Partition: India’s share of military assets was around 3,00,000 troops from the 4,00,000-strong undivided British Indian Army. New raisings were in the pipeline. Operations in J&K had sucked in roughly 1,30,000 (all ranks) and a ceasefire was announced on December 31, 1948. Home Minister Sardar Patel’s two White Papers — one in July 1948 on the McMahon Line and another in February 1950 — resulted in Maj Bob Khathing establishing Indian Administration in NEFA and evicting Tibetan officials from Tawang in 1951. It seems that even the redoubtable Patel did not press for the pre-emptive military expedition to occupy Tibet.
The Indian force, if sent in early 1950, would have accomplished a fait accompli. Reports available suggest that Tibetans, including the young Dalai Lama, would have welcomed an Indian force to deter the Chinese invasion. Given Nehru’s love for China, besides military fatigue, the invasion did not take off.
Another reason for ignoring the Tuker option is mentioned in Gen Monty Palit’s War in the High Himalayas. Palit states that there was probably an agreement between India and China. The Indian intervention in 1950 to fly out King Tribhuvan happened around the same time (October 1950) as China took Tibet. India succeeded in toppling the Rana autocracy to restore monarchy through the Delhi Agreement of 1951 and it subsequently introduced democracy in Nepal. The India-China agreement was perhaps a Nepal-Tibet quid pro quo.
Returning to Tibet, in hindsight, it was militarily feasible to occupy Tibet in early 1950 by employing two divisions supported by air. The US assistance would have been readily available. The pre-emptive operation may have resolved the unsettled borders in Ladakh and the McMahon Line. Tibet would have remained the buffer between India and China. After World War II and the Kashmir operations, the Army was indeed stressed but a Tibet expedition was not undoable, though it required political will and risk-taking.
We are paying for that mistake hands down. Equally, had we accepted Chinese Premier Chou Enlai’s offer in the 1950s of a land swap — Aksai Chin for the McMahon Line, veritably the status quo then — we might have prevented the high cost of a two-front dilemma.
Today, India holds a subordinate status on the border, but some relief may accrue from restoring deterrence through horizontal escalation: another Snow Leopard. It is the only way to break the stalemate in military and political dialogue and also reviving the Special Representative-level talks on the border issue. The border will be volatile and escalation-prone.
