Thinking straight, not laterally, the way forward
THERE are many ways to kill a good idea; implementing it shoddily is the simplest.
The manner in which the recruitment of 45 officers of the Joint Secretary/Director level laterally was requisitioned and withdrawn suddenly is a good example. The withdrawal was surprising on three counts. One, lateral induction had been resorted to in the past, including by this government without getting mired in debilitating controversies. Second, as the Opposition fired its precision-guided ‘reservation’ missile, some ministers launched a counterattack, not aware of the swift, embarrassing retreat being planned. Third, a government known to be tough buckled under a smoking gun. The irony was that ministers who should have known better were brandishing their swords even as the retreat was being sounded.
Before coming to the issues involved in the non-political endeavour of lateral recruitment, one cannot help but pity the language of the ‘instrument of surrender’, which could have been a straightforward official communication instead of a demi-official letter from the minister giving the impression that his ministry made a mistake, which the Prime Minister (who is in charge of the ministry) stepped in to correct. He even traduced the Opposition for overlooking the principle of ‘social justice’ it advocated while making lateral recruitment when in power.
Much has been written about previous governments inducting experts from the market into the bureaucratic system, the recommendations of the Administrative Reform Commission and the Group of Secretaries, the examination of the proposal by the Department of Personnel from various angles, and the peaceful induction earlier. This was not the first attempt by the government, and hopefully it will not be the last, to draft outside talent to shore up its skill set.
It would be unfair to endorse lateral entry or dismiss it without understanding the context and the motivation for such a move. Let us look at some fundamental issues.
The Government of India (GOI) runs the affairs of the Central Government and other national-level bodies by recruiting officers to services such as income tax, Railways and Posts through the Union Public Service Commission (UPSC), following the reservation policy. It also takes on deputation All India Services (AIS) officers borne on state cadres recruited through the same process. The GOI has no cadre of AIS officers; the states maintain a deputation reserve as part of their sanctioned cadre strength. The GOI draws upon this reserve to fill positions at different levels in the ministries and other apex organisations through an empanelment process for joint secretaries and above.
Many GOI ministries have their specialised services to deal with their allotted subjects, as in the case of agriculture, commerce, civil and cost accounts, etc. In addition, the government has fruitfully drawn upon the expertise of outside talent occasionally without being bound by its reservation policy. While earlier governments selected eminent experts through an informal system, this government tried to institutionalise the selection through the UPSC. Also, there has never been an attempt at such large-scale lateral induction.
It would be interesting to understand how effectively is the expertise of the existing specialised cadres utilised by the government, especially when professional advice conflicts with short-term objectives of the government or the political interests of the ruling party.
If the government wishes a sprinkling of external experts in the bureaucratic system and treat it as quasi deputation, it must identify ministries needing such ‘market borrowing’ and simultaneously rationalise and redraw existing cadres. Further, it should be clear whether such induction is routine recruitment or contextual. In case it is contextual and need-based, experts could be hired as consultants who can give their opinion and make recommendations freely without being burdened with bureaucratic decision-making. It is one thing to give a professional view and quite another to be responsible for navigating through the system, especially if one is unfamiliar with the ropes and the eddies. Of course, being in the system, their advice could be either tempered or hindered by practical considerations. It would be useful to evaluate the contribution of the lateral entrants thus far in injecting ‘fresh’ ideas and approaches they were expected to bring and to assess whether the system utilised their expertise when it countered political judgment or allowed it to dissipate in the bureaucratic sea without making waves. Even if useful, sadly they have to leave after their contract or deputation ends.
The Indian Administrative Service is accused of being a ‘generalist’ service lacking in specialised knowledge of any discipline, a concern oft-repeated without any serious attempt at reforming its character. In 2004, I had written to the then Cabinet Secretary, suggesting that the existing system of empanelment be revamped. The proposed system envisaged the departments of GOI divided into broad sectoral groups such as rural development, economic administration, social services and energy. AIS officers can be asked to opt for two or three sectors after completing 16 years of service, which entitles them to be considered as joint secretaries. Based on an examination, the UPSC can determine the suitability of the officers to be allocated to a specialised sector cadre. Selected officers can then serve the GOI in the area they have qualified for till retirement, acquiring experience in a special area of governance. Those officers that do not opt for serving the Centre continue to work in their original cadres. This system will not create a separate class of ‘empanelled’ officers serving the Centre for a limited period and returning to their cadres for ‘cooling off’. It will also remove allegations of subjectivity in the current empanelment process and hopefully identify officers with special aptitude and governance experience.
It is at this stage of creating sectoral streams of officers that the government could consider inducting lateral entrants, depending on the shortfall of selected officers, the special needs of a ministry or for a unique priority area for the government.
To my mind, the government should keep a window for lateral entry and open it selectively for delivering a certain project or handling a specific assignment. However, a door for lateral entrants should remain open as part of building specialist cadres, as suggested above. Otherwise, the survival of outsiders in the inhospitable terrain of the civil services could be as difficult as for the cheetahs to roam free in the unfamiliar environs of Kuno National Park.
