The dictator-general

I first met Pervez Musharraf, then a Brigadier, in the summer of 1990 at the Royal College of Defence Studies (RCDS), London, where I had done the same course in 1984 along with Brig Moinuddin Haider, who later became Musharraf’s mentor and interior minister. Lt Gen Haider, six years his senior, groomed Musharraf for his military career. Musharraf struck me as straight-speaking, confident and ambitious, and his thesis at the RCDS was on the economic uplift of South Asia. I next met him when he was the President, around 2005, at the Pakistan High Commission in New Delhi. I was writing the book, Operation Parakram: The War that Never Was, but had to shelve it for not having the Pakistani version. As obtaining a visa for Pakistan became improbable, I sought Musharraf’s help. Years later, former Pakistan High Commissioner Aziz Khan told me on the Track II circuit that the ISI had blocked the visa.

It is not widely known that Vajpayee and Musharraf were on the cusp of resolving the Kashmir issue.

Risk-taking was in Musharraf’s DNA, starting with the Kargil War; a planned coup and a mid-air gamble to force-land in Karachi while returning from a visit to Sri Lanka; the four-point Kashmir formula and declaring a state of emergency. These decisions, though not strategically thought through, were in sync with his nature of seeking outcomes. In the negative box are actions such as abrogating the Constitution, battles with the judiciary culminating in the sacking of the Chief Justice and storming of the Red Mosque. Benazir Bhutto had named him as one of her future assassins, as was evident from Foreign Minister Bilawal Bhutto’s tweet, hours after Musharraf’s death. In 2002, following a rigged referendum (98 per cent votes), he strengthened his hold on Pakistan as the President and Army Chief. His trademark salute in civvies and passion for speaking through the media facilitated press freedom in Pakistan. He styled himself on Kamal Ataturk. He followed the doctrine of necessity, justifying his actions and attributing them to national interest.

When he lost his constituencies, he first relinquished the charge of Chief of the Army Staff; later, in August 2008, he resigned from presidency and retired from public life. He faced myriad charges: treason, murder, war crimes against Balochs, including the killing of Akbar Bugti. He had to flee Pakistan, but returned to revive his All Pakistan Muslim League. He failed and exited again with the help of the army — first to London, and then Dubai in 2016. He was invited to lecture at the UK and the US, with organisers paying lavish sums for his presentations.

Musharraf stands out as a leader across the Radcliffe Line who tried to redeem and normalise relations with India after Operation Parakram when PM Vajpayee extended his hand of friendship in 2003 and the ceasefire took hold. That his four-point Kashmir formula was born around that time is revealed in his book of September 2006, Line of Fire. It is not widely known that Vajpayee and Musharraf were on the cusp of resolving the Kashmir issue. Musharraf told the Pakistan media in 2004 that the Vajpayee Cabinet refused to endorse the agreement. Later, in the spring of 2007, vigorous back-channel talks between Tariq Aziz and Satinder Lambah in Dubai, Bangkok and London resulted in the finalisation of the Kashmir formula. Its blueprint appeared in The Financial Times on April 25, 2007, authored by Faruq Bukhari and Edward Luce. Former Foreign Minister Khurshid Kasuri, in his book, Neither a Hawk Nor a Dove, has written that the Kashmir solution was ready to be signed and sealed, but in 2007, a summit between PM Manmohan Singh and Musharraf had to be postponed due to Indian request, as Singh feared it might negatively influence elections in Uttar Pradesh. The Indian version is that Musharraf’s popularity had declined and it was considered best to delay the summit.

In the events of 2007 and 2008, including the Mumbai attacks, a historic opportunity was missed to resolve Kashmir, Siachen and water issues. Such optimism must also recall the reality of what Musharraf told a Rotary Club meeting in Karachi in 1999: that even if the Kashmir issue is resolved, the India-Pakistan problem will remain. His RCDS thesis came alive in the four-point Kashmir formula as also breaking the ice at the SAARC Summit at Islamabad in 2004, when he marched up to Vajpayee, saluted and shook his hand.

Haider, who became a regular on the India-Pakistan Track II, which I have moderated since 2003 till Covid paused it, filled me with Musharraf tales. He loved life and all the good things associated with it. He took a detour to Thailand while on an official visit to China to meet his RCDS colleague, then Crown Prince and now King Maha Vajiralongkorn. Musharraf and Haider were neighbours in Karachi; in fact, Musharraf insisted that Haider buy the adjacent house. Musharraf’s mehfils were famous for ghazals and Indian film songs.

Musharraf leaves behind a mixed legacy and divided opinion. For some Pakistanis, he is the greatest soldiers’ General; and for many others, a ruthless, bigoted dictator who acted only in self-interest. For some Indians, he was the best thing that could happen to India-Pakistan relations; many others regarded him as the villain of the Kargil War. His survival rating was exceptionally high. However, despite his muscular image, he died at the age of 79 on a hospital bed tied to sundry tubes.