Regime change in the Maldives distinctly favours China
THE not-unexpected regime change in the Maldives distinctly favours China and will disturb the strategic matrix in India’s neighbourhood, especially in the Indian Ocean Region. It is the first time that any election in the region was fought conspicuously as a battle between two slogans — ‘India First’ and ‘India Out’. This postulation was avoidable. Some called the elections a virtual referendum on India or China. The opposition party did not mask its pro-China leaning and staked its claim to power on the sovereignty plank — no foreign troops on Maldivian soil.
The split in the ruling party by the mercurial Mohamed Nasheed catalysed the defeat of President Ibrahim Mohamed Solih. In the Maldives elections, seats are won and lost on a 20-vote margin. India’s bete noire, former President Abdulla Yameen, who was in jail, has been put under house arrest. Like in Sri Lanka, given the Maldives’ geography, India has invested heavily in its development and security. The India-China contestation in South Asia is being won by Beijing’s deep pockets and other asymmetries in its favour.
President-elect Muizzu is committed to sending back foreign soldiers. How India will handle the Maldives’ request will become a sensitive strategic issue that New Delhi has faced earlier. Then President Jayawardene invited the IPKF in accordance with the India-Sri Lanka Accord in 1987. On his election, then President Premadasa asked the IPKF to leave and later issued an ultimatum to withdraw or be evicted. Fortunately for Premadasa, the regime change occurred in India, too, with VP Singh getting elected as PM; he wanted to bring back the IPKF.
A similar political congruity will not emerge in the Maldives. India’s High Commissioner to Male Munu Mahawar met Muizzu and said they would discuss all issues. The US noted that troop withdrawal was a matter between India and the Maldives. The US, India and China are among the few countries with embassies in Male.
India is unhappy with the regime change, especially after extricating Sri Lanka from China’s embrace through an assistance of $4 billion to Colombo during its economic meltdown and securing an IMF loan, currently stuck in its second tranche. The India-Maldives-Sri Lanka Trilateral Maritime Security Agreement is vital for overseeing the sea lanes of communications to the Malacca Straits; this could be the first casualty. Sri Lanka and the Maldives have close relations and are joined at the hip. Beijing had distanced itself from Colombo’s economic collapse and recovery, letting India do the heavy lifting. There is a third player in India’s neighbourhood, which has its own axe to grind. The US is very active in Colombo, where China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) did not let the US MCC (Millennium Challenge Corporation) take root.
China is galloping to progress in its border dispute with Bhutan, especially after the Galwan clash, which undermined New Delhi’s image as the primary military and security responder in the region. Although India intervened in Doklam, invoking the treaty obligations of 2007, China came back to construct the road southwards, but close to the Bhutanese border, even across the border to get close to the Siliguri Corridor. The holding of three expert group meetings on border negotiations this year alone is unprecedented, especially when India has been kept out of the loop, which is equally unprecedented. Any trading of 269 sq km in Doklam for thrice the inconsequential areas in the north will become India’s Doklam dilemma.
In Bangladesh, an uneasy balance exists in the strategic matrix. Although the Bangladesh military opts to buy Chinese equipment and platforms, Sheikh Hasina’s government maintains good relations with India. India has kept out of the US-Bangladesh spat over elections, but is worried about a submarine harbour China is known to be constructing near Chittagong. Elections are due in January, and a free and fair poll under a neutral caretaker government could spring a Maldives-like surprise.
In Afghanistan, where India has invested $3 billion, China has made stellar progress. Last month, it replaced its Ambassador and fielded a special envoy without formally recognising the Taliban. The without-limits partnership with Russia, arguably the most active country in Afghanistan, is proving useful to Beijing in Kabul. China has invested in mineral resources, especially lithium, whose potential reserves are hugely exaggerated. The Chinese have agreed to extend the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor through Afghanistan, a diversion which has been on the drawing board for years. India maintains a technical office in Kabul for humanitarian aid and will likely close the Afghan embassy in New Delhi.
It is in Kathmandu that Beijing is bogged down despite Maoists leading the government and Communists in the opposition. Prime Minister Pushpa Kamal Dahal’s meeting last month with President Xi Jinping in Hangzhou did not yield concrete results, though the agreements on paper repeated commitments made by Xi in 2014 when he visited Nepal for the first time. The argument is over including development projects under the BRI when Nepal is insisting on grants, not loans, to avoid the Chinese debt trap. China’s wolf-warrior diplomacy is at its best (and worst) in Nepal. At a recent seminar in New Delhi, a former Nepalese diplomat accused former Chinese Ambassador Hou Yanqi of bullying Kathmandu over Tibetans in Nepal and the ‘One China’ policy. India has worked quietly, focusing on the quality and delivery of economic assistance and projects. Prachanda’s visit to India in June was successful, with additional petroleum pipelines and the sale of Nepal’s hydropower to India and, for the first time, to Bangladesh. For the moment, it is advantage India in Nepal.
Prime Minister Modi was the only Head of State present at Solih’s swearing-in as President in 2018. India’s investments in the Maldives include a $500-million Line of Credit, with a total commitment of up to $2 billion. Some 38 projects are under construction, in addition to a naval harbour at the Uthuru atoll. Around 75 military personnel are stationed at Addu and Lammu since 2014. Will both sides be able to negotiate a face-saver over their de-induction and resolve the tricky issue of sovereignty?
