Policing communal riots calls for firm action

Ex-Director, National Police Academy

Last week, north-east Delhi was convulsed by communal riots that claimed over 45 lives. There was widespread loot, arson and vandalisation of government properties. The situation went out of hand, mainly because of the abject failure of the law enforcement authorities to deal with the situation firmly and with professional competence.

There were reports from many trouble spots that the police strength was totally inadequate to deal with the riotous mob and quell violence. Intelligence reports of the gathering storm also recommended the beefing up of security arrangements and augmenting the police strength. But the advice went unheeded. During my long years of service in police and intelligence organisations, I have seen that in many cases, though intelligence reports, regarding the eruption of trouble, were available in advance, there was failure at the decision-making level to promptly analyse and evaluate the reports and act on them.

According to the residents, the police were deployed in penny packets and thus were not able to effectively intervene to quell mob violence. While dealing with an unruly mob, there should be a show of strength with a massive deployment of the police, which could unnerve the mob and deter the hoodlums from committing further offences. In their defence, senior Delhi police officers have stated that adequate police deployment could not be made because a large number of officers and personnel were busy with bandobast duty for President Donald Trump’s visit.

However, nothing prevented the Police Commissioner from requesting for extra personnel from other Central forces to augment their manpower. Even with limited force, experienced police officers could have handled the situation far more capably and efficiently. Their failure to use the force firmly and decisively to deter the rioters is inexcusable. Admittedly, communal riots may be caused due to a variety of factors over which the police have no control. Yet, there is no doubt that failure of the police to take prompt action was mainly responsible for the extension and escalation of riots and consequent loss of human lives and national properties.

The police officers have to make a clear distinction between general law and order situations and communal riots. In a general law and order situation, there should be a restrained use of force, as prescribed in police manuals. But for combating communal riots, the police have to open effective fire at the first instance to break up a riotous mob and the failure to do so should be viewed as a grave dereliction of duty on the part of the officers concerned. This dual orientation has to be always borne in mind by the authorities charged with the maintenance of law and order. This was clearly emphasised by the Ministry of Home Affairs in an important circular issued to the chief secretaries of the states.

There was also a grave failure of the police to nab the anti-socials at the first whiff of communal violence. During communal outbreaks, it is these rowdies (known as dadas) who indulge in murder, loot and arson. Some members of the public may be influenced and animated by communal propaganda, but they do not go to the extent of resorting to serious crime and violence. It is the rowdies and anti-socials who remain on the vanguard and play the key role. A research study on stabbings during communal riots in the country shows that stabbers were professional goons and not amateurs or common men acting under a sudden flush of communal frenzy. It is a fact that the police find it difficult to nab these anti-socials as many of them enjoy political patronage and dare to defy the police.

Different inquiry commissions have deprecated this extraneous political interference. Indeed, nothing demoralises the police more than constant interference in the core functions of the police. It snaps the chain of command and control and makes police subordinates turn to outside elements for guidance and control. This raises the issue of urgency and the imperative need for police reforms to insulate the police from political pulls and pressures. Some key structural reforms were recommended by the National Police Commission (1979). The apex court in Prakash Singh’s case, directed the union and state governments to implement some of these core reforms (2004), but till date, the state governments have tried to shy away from meaningful police reforms and the apex court has also not tried to force the issue. It is becoming increasingly clear that a demoralised and politicised police force will be incapable of ably and firmly tackling serious riots or breakdown of law and order. Its dismal failure to contain communal violence in north-eastern parts of Delhi was reminiscent of its colossal ineptitude during the anti-Sikh riots in 1984.

Another serious allegation was that during the riots, some police officers and men were not neutral or impartial, but overly partisan. Similar charges have been made in the past against the police during communal riots and on inquiry, found to be true. The Madon Commission, inquiring into the Bhiwandi riots, found that some constables looted cash and ornaments from shops belonging to the minority communities and damaged properties of some mosques. The failure of the police to play a neutral role during communal upheavals is a matter of serious concern and goes against the tradition of the Indian police. The Simon Commission (1927), in its report, praised the tradition of neutrality of the Indian police during communal riots. The commission says that the Indian police, recruited from various communities, acted with commendable neutrality during communal riots. A ‘Muslim constable’, says the commission (in its report), ‘could be trusted to lead a Hindu procession playing music before a mosque and a Hindu constable performing the same functions for Moslem procession leading a cow to slaughter.’

Unfortunately, the position is not the same today. However, it remains the bounden duty of the senior police leaders to ensure impartiality and neutrality in the performance of duties and motivate their subordinates to live up to the best traditions of the service. This can be ensured by taking deterrent action against those police personnel who betray bias and partisanship in discharge of their duties.

Finally, there was no justification for the police to not arrest rabble-rousing political leaders like Kapil Mishra and Tahir Hussain spouting venom and inciting the mob by their inflammatory hate speeches. They should have been immediately arrested and prosecuted under Section 153(a), IPC, for spreading and inflaming communal passions. The police have so far lodged 63 FIRs and arrested more than 600 persons for involvement in communal riots. But mere arrests will not suffice unless there is vigorous investigation, determined prosecution and condign punishment of the trouble-makers. There will be enough evidence to nail them. Withdrawal of cases by the state government, as it often happens, with a view to allegedly promoting communal harmony, does not serve the purpose and has to be firmly discouraged. The National Police Commission had also recommended that during investigation, the police should record the extent of damages suffered by the victims and help the administration in paying due compensation to the affected persons.

Admittedly, the police chief and his officers failed at a testing time. Now, the challenge before them is to redeem their honour.