No room to be unprepared for terror strikes

The Israel-Hamas conflict in West Asia has many dimensions — historical, political, diplomatic and military. National security and military preparedness are the most important aspects that hold lessons for India.

The October 7 strikes by Hamas caused mayhem in Israel, which seemed overwhelmed for a short time. Not only Tel Aviv but also the world at large was surprised by the rocket barrage, speedy infiltration, targeting of Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) personnel and civilians. It was a ‘shock and awe’ operation, levelling the vast disparity between asymmetric forces. The number of Israeli and Palestinian fatalities put together has crossed 4,000.

The retribution by Israel has been intense and swift. Strident statements by the Israeli leadership were followed by military action as the northern parts of the Gaza Strip were bombarded with missile, rocket and aircraft strikes, taking a heavy human toll. Seething with justifiable anger, Israel is now unrelenting in its campaign. The ultimatum to Palestinians to relocate to the southern parts of Gaza is a clear precursor to the ground offensive. The world is witnessing the unfolding of a major humanitarian crisis in Gaza, with almost one million people displaced from their homes.

As the death toll mounts in this conflict between a nation-state and a militant organisation, the biggest casualty has been the credibility of the much-vaunted IDF, Mossad and Shin Bet. This abysmal failure of intelligence about the goings-on in its immediate neighbourhood and the lack of awareness and preparedness of its security forces will haunt Israel for a long time. The reasons are many at this preliminary stage, including internal political and administrative differences, divergent societal stances, complacency and the like.

In its hour of crisis, military support for Israel is coming from its closest ally, the US, whose largest aircraft carriers have sailed into the Mediterranean and are positioned in the vicinity. However, this kind of force projection is only a signalling for Arab and Islamic countries in the neighbourhood to refrain from supporting Hamas and other inimical non-state actors. While most of the Western world is expressing support for Israel, the fight against militant terrorism has to be fought by the IDF itself, with boots on the ground.

In this conflict lie some lessons for us, especially along our north-western border, where a rogue state has been actively waging a proxy war with a bevy of militant organisations carrying out terror strikes across the Line of Control (LoC). While the geography and geopolitics of West Asia are very different from those of the subcontinent, there can be similarities in the modus operandi of the Hamas and terror outfits such as the Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), Jaish-e-Mohammed and Pakistan’s whole fungible family of terror.

Akin to regular armies which draw lessons from war zones around the globe, militant terror organisations would be following and learning from the way Hamas launched its attack. Also, unlike the latter, which sustains on external help, terrorist outfits based in Pakistan are supported by the army and the government, both in military or financial terms. In fact, they are an integral part of the state.

While India has carried out retaliatory strikes across the border in the past, these are limited in scope and basically convey a message of resolve without the diminishing of terror factories. Pakistan also exercises a policy of ambiguous deniability, and given the force equations and nuclear capabilities, the country and its terrorists feel safe from large-scale reprisals or land offensives, unlike the Gaza residents.

While a Hamas-style large-scale raid across the LoC may not be feasible for the LeT and others, it is imperative to keep our guard up at all times to guard against any misadventure by terrorists.

First and foremost, it is essential to maintain constant surveillance, fortified by intelligence. The reach and responsibility of the field army on the LoC is only up to the tactical and, at the most, operational depth. Government agencies and organisations, which are responsible for keeping a watch and providing constant intelligence inputs about activities inimical to our national security, need to be on the ball. Both the 1962 war and the 1999 Kargil conflict saw an abysmal performance by such agencies despite the finances and other resources at their disposal. Their regular performance review and accountability are, therefore, required to prevent being surprised in this vital aspect.

To maintain combat soldiers at the optimum level may require reorganisation and redeployment within the existing structures. Overlong hours of duty by perennially short-staffed battalions are among the serious lacunae hiding in plain sight. The earlier remedial steps are taken the better. Technology is critical, but it can go only so far. The IDF is testament to this hard, out-of-fashion truth.

The biggest task facing Israel is revisiting the assumptions about its security management that seem to have been blown apart. India, faced with a neighbour that thinks murdering civilians is part of its war doctrine, will also need to test its conventional wisdom that informs our security posture.

While the creation of unified theatre commands seems to be a vexing issue, bedevilled by a sense of constant vacillation, the command-and-control structure of the formations responsible for a live border like the LoC should remain as it is. Further, the border-guarding forces (CAPFs), wherever deployed on the LoC, have to be under the command of the local Army formations.

The political stand against externally supported terrorism has been quite clear and consistent. What is needed to buttress this policy is to ensure an adequate defence budget so that state-of-the-art systems are available for defence and retaliation against any terror strike, even if imports have to be resorted to in the absence of indigenous capabilities.

The defining lesson from this conflict in West Asia can be found in the Boy Scouts motto: ‘Be Prepared’. Prevention is better than cure; in the security paradigm, it translates as deterrence is better and cheaper than conflict.