New policy needed to keep China in check

LAST Friday, Northern Army Commander, Lt Gen Upendra Dwivedi described the situation along LAC as in a state of ‘heightened alert’, meaning reserves pulled back in winter redeployed to prevent a Chinese repeat of misadventure in May 2020. He added that new CBMs like avoiding body-push to obviate physical contact were in place to prevent violent situations. He said that India now had ‘strategic patience’ and was negotiating from a position of strength. How India had acquired this negotiating advantage, he did not explain when ground reality indicated otherwise: PLA refusing to disengage from some friction points, imposing patrolling moratoriums and not restoring status quo ante, May 2020.

Otto von Bismarck had said: “Disputed borders are continuation of war by other means.” That’s why China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s unannounced visit to Delhi on March 25 to invite Prime Minister Modi to the BRICS summit drew a blank. For Modi’s presence at the 2017 BRICS summit in China, Beijing offered to disengage at Doklam. No similar incentive was offered this time, signalling a new normal — LAC turned LoC. Wang’s mission included persuading India into accepting segregation of border situation from the overall India-China relations. His rhetoric resembled old Maotai in new bottle. He urged Foreign Minister S Jaishankar to abide by their ‘leaders’ consensus’ that the two countries are not threat to each other; they are partners, not rivals who will help and assist, and not cut each other. Wang’s three-point proposal revealed were: (a) Put differences on the border issue at an appropriate place; (b) China does not advocate unipolar Asia but India-China cooperation in South Asia; (c) if both countries speak in one voice, the world will listen.

Jaishankar put border peace and tranquility front and end of India-China relations, emphasising that the relationship was ‘not normal’ and suggesting that if the border situation is abnormal, no normal relations is possible. He introduced three ‘mutuals’ — of respect, sensitivity and interests. The Wang-Jaishankar conversation had taken place against the background of a feisty exchange between India and China during the last Quad Foreign Ministers’ meeting. Jaishankar said India-China relations are going through a bad patch and very difficult phase. He added that when a large country ignores written agreements, it is a legitimate concern for the international community. The Chinese Foreign Ministry retorted: “Refrain from irresponsible remarks and take action to jointly create peace and tranquillity on border.”

In March and April, the Indian military played war games in the north and east, deploying Special Forces in the Siliguri Corridor below Doklam with one exercise held when Wang was in Delhi. Two years earlier, around this time, the Chinese PLA had amassed troops in east Ladakh in guise of annual exercises and occupied Indian territory from Depsang to Demchok, corresponding to their 1959 claim line. According to former NSA Shivshankar Menon, the Chinese shifting LAC to their 1959 line and preventing Indian patrolling on territory controlled by India is a paradigm shift in Chinese behaviour. Because our initial response was non-strategic (kinetic), India was forced to cede territory and accept fait accompli. China put the onus of escalation on India by occupying Indian territory to restore status quo. Given that Chinese economy is five times and defence budget thrice the size of India’s, New Delhi opted for diplomacy forfeiting horizontal or vertical escalation. Unlike past standoffs — Chumar (2013), Depsang (2014) and Doklam (2017) — there was no pullback, signalling that this time it was President Xi Jinping calling the shots.

The Chinese have created three buffer zones within India’s patrolling jurisdiction at Galwan, Fingers Area, Gogra and Depsang and prevented patrolling by the ITBP/Army. Hot Springs is close to Galwan where the Chinese have built a road and will not retract. The Chinese have built a bridge over the Tsangpo for strategic mobility towards Spanggur Gap.

India’s bottom line for normalising relations is restoring status quo ante, May 2020. This is virtually impossible now because of demilitarised zones (DMZs), remaining friction points and new dual use infrastructure including 628 model villages created by the PLA, 15 to 20 km behind the new LAC. A permanent military presence seems to be the new normal. In hindsight, it was strategic folly, conceding to Chinese demands: for their demilitarising the Fingers Area and Indian withdrawal from the commanding Kailash heights on Chushul range. This has facilitated construction of the bridge over Tsangpo, conferring strategic advantage on the Chinese. Also, it would have been wise to escalate horizontally — occupying Chinese territory across LAC at one or two places as trade-off. Finally, had our strategic and tactical intelligence been robust, our forces could have forestalled the multiple intrusions.

India’s official position is that no territory has been ceded and that Chinese PLA’s ‘attempted’ transgressions were thwarted. Law Minister Kiren Rijiju said in Parliament recently that not an inch of territory was ceded. Whenever this myth is challenged, the government wags its finger saying it is questioning the valour of our soldiers, adding (in future tense) nobody will be able to occupy an inch of our territory.

A permanent military presence on the LAC is the new normal. The challenge is in putting the genie back in the bottle and reverting to diplomatic status quo ante. Clearly, India-China relations will not return to the pre-May 2020 normal till Xi is re-elected in November to a third term at the 20th National Party Congress. Even then, China’s interpretation of status quo is the November 7, 1959 LAC that it has crafted through deceit, aggression and coercion. Two formulations the Chinese have consistently avoided during written or oral exchanges that India uses are status quo ante and LAC; instead, they use peace and tranquillity and border areas.

India will need another 1988 Sumdorong Chu moment to negotiate from a position of strength. New Delhi requires a new China policy. New CBMs and protocols or identification of LAC (tried earlier) will merely help in managing the border but delay resolution of the boundary question. For starters, Wang handles both, the border dispute as well as bilateral relations. But strategic patience alone will not achieve total disengagement.