Myriad challenges on the security front

AS 2023 draws to a close, some developments in the security domain point to the complex challenges that India will have to be prepared for in the year ahead. A brief review would suggest that these could prove to be more daunting than expected. These disparate developments relate both to the internal security fabric of the country and the external challenges that came to the fore with the Galwan clash in Ladakh in June 2020.

Exercising the military option is to be decided by the political leadership. Normatively, there has to be an informed political assessment of the objective of expending military resources in different scenarios.

The internal security situation takes precedence. The December 21 ambush in Rajouri district of Jammu, resulting in the death of four Army soldiers and injuries to three others, underscores a key aspect of India’s internal security challenge in this region that harks back to the Kashmir war of 1947-48.

In September, the Commanding Officer of 19 Rashtriya Rifles was killed in an anti-terror operation in Anantnag. This consistent loss of lives is an indicator of the tenacity of a threat that has become more virulent since the early 1990s, when state-sponsored terrorism became a pernicious reality.

In another development relevant to the internal security matrix, the Indian Air Force had to airlift the unclaimed bodies of 87 Zo-Kuki victims from mortuaries in Imphal and other locations using helicopters. These hapless victims of the ethnic violence that rocked Manipur in the preceding months were finally laid to rest on December 20 in a mass burial. The reason for the airlift was that the families of the deceased were uncertain about whether they could travel safely to claim their loved ones and mourn their loss. The state’s necessity to facilitate the airlift underlines the fragility of the internal security fabric in Manipur and the unease that prevails.

Concurrently, internal strife in Myanmar, where armed ethnic groups have been fighting the military junta for decades, has spiked and the refugee influx into the North-East is a cause for concern. Reports indicate that as many as 5,000 refugees from Myanmar have entered Mizoram; this may disturb the delicate inter-state ethnic harmony.

The security breach in the Lok Sabha on the anniversary of the December 13, 2001, terror attack also points to systemic inadequacies in the internal security setup. These lapses need an objective review and a political redressal that should be consensual as well as durable.

As regards India’s external security challenges, the most complex and grave issue is symbolised by the Galwan clash, when PLA troops breached the Line of Actual Control (LAC). This matter has come into renewed focus courtesy Gen MM Naravane, the then Army Chief. In his memoir, excerpted in media reports, the former Chief recalls the events of August 31, 2020, that followed a tense operational exigency when the PLA moved its tanks and troops to the Rechin La area along the LAC. Naravane recounts his communication with Defence Minister Rajnath Singh: “I conveyed the criticality of the situation to the Raksha Mantri (RM), who said he would get back to me, which he did, by about 2230 hours.” The recall adds: “He (RM) said he had spoken to the PM and that it was purely a military decision. ‘Jo uchit samjho woh karo (do whatever you deem is appropriate).’ I had been handed a hot potato. With this carte blanche, the onus was now totally on me. I took a deep breath and sat silently for a few minutes. All was quiet save for the ticking of the wall clock.”

To his credit, General Naravane was able to make a calibrated decision that night to deal with the ‘hot potato’ handed to him by the political leadership. However, it was clearly a lonely and onerous decision that the Chief had to take.

This account (which I daresay will be addressed in much greater depth in the coming weeks) points to some unsettling inferences about the institutional setup for India’s higher defence management.

One would presume that the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS), the highest political body entrusted with matters of national security, would have met to review the ground situation along the LAC on August 31, 2020, as reported by the Army Chief, and arrived at a calibrated political decision regarding the Indian response, and this would have been conveyed to the military brass in the appropriate manner. However, the Naravane account, which quotes the political directive as ‘jo uchit samjho’, appears to be a case of passing the ‘hot potato’ in a manner that challenges the fundamental politico-military axiom — that war is an extension of politics. Often ascribed to Prussian strategist Carl von Clausewitz (1780-1831), exercising the military option or taking action is to be decided by the civilian political leadership in a democracy. Normatively, there has to be an informed political assessment of the objective of expending military resources — both human and material — in different scenarios, with directives issued accordingly.

Clearly, the Chinese PLA had ‘surprised’ the Indian Army in Galwan, shattering many assumptions about the India-China relationship. Notably, the insurance against escalation provided by their nuclear capability and the inviolability of the 1993 agreement was in tatters. Did the CCS deliberate upon this challenge to territorial integrity and seek different options from the military, or was the buck passed? These are questions that need to be addressed in a non-partisan manner, given their grave import, to enable optimal management of national security.

Be it internal security challenges or external, 2024 will throw up complex exigencies and the new government will need to fine-tune India’s higher defence management in a more nimble and effective manner.