Managing diplomatic contradictions

EXTERNAL Affairs Minister (EAM) S Jaishankar concluded his opening statement at the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) meeting in Goa on May 5 thus: “I… sincerely hope that we can together make the SCO Heads of State Summit meeting in New Delhi a great success.” These words show that the SCO summit was planned to be held in New Delhi in the physical format and, if some of the SCO leaders did not come, it would have been conducted in a hybrid manner. Hence, the Ministry of External Affairs’ announcement on May 30 that the summit “will be held in the virtual format on July 4, chaired by Prime Minister Narendra Modi” was surprising. The absence of a mention of the venue of the meeting in the May 30 announcement in contrast to the EAM’s words reveals the changed decision regarding the summit’s format; no reason was given for the change.

According to SCO rules, no bilateral issues can be raised during its meetings, including those at the summit level.

Last year, the SCO summit was held in a hybrid manner in Samarkand. It was on the sidelines of this summit that Modi made his, by now, oft-quoted remark to Russian President Vladimir Putin that today’s era is not “an era of war”.

India has stressed the importance it attaches to its SCO membership and the seriousness which it has accorded to its SCO presidency. The May 30 statement itself emphasised that “India has hosted a total of 134 meetings and events, including 14 ministerial-level meetings…” It also noted that during its presidency, India had established ‘new pillars of cooperation’ startups and innovation, traditional medicine, digital inclusion, youth empowerment and shared Buddhist heritage. The theme selected by Modi for the Indian presidency was “Towards a secure SCO”.

All this work and positivity naturally should have led to a physical/hybrid New Delhi summit to crown the great efforts made during its presidency, but India deliberately decided to give up that option and go in for the virtual format. There is an enormous difference between direct physical meetings of leaders and virtual ones.

Certainly, the decision to go virtual would have been taken at the highest level of government. One reason for the decision can be ruled out outright. This relates to infrastructure or venue issues. A summit involving eight current member states, including India, and four other Heads of State as observers or guests, could easily be held in Delhi. What, then, could have led to the virtual summit decision?

A reason which may have weighed with the Modi government was the presence of Pakistan’s Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif, who would not have missed the opportunity to show up. Modi and Jaishankar may not have wished to give Sharif a platform to spew venom against India, on Indian soil, like Pakistan’s Foreign Minister Bilawal Bhutto Zardari did during his visit to Goa to attend the SCO foreign ministers’ meeting. This point deserves an analysis.

The SCO rules require that no bilateral issues be raised during its meetings, including those at the summit level. This can be stretched to imply that SCO officials, ministers and even Heads of State or Government should not raise controversial bilateral issues outside the meetings’ venues during their visits. Bilawal did so and India would have been well within its rights to complain to SCO member states against his conduct and, perhaps, it did. However, the apprehension that Pakistan would indulge in such behaviour at the summit and, therefore, India giving up the physical/hybrid format is to give Pakistan the ability to influence India’s choices on the format of meetings. This should obviously not be given to any participating member state. Besides, India has the instrumentalities to deny the misuse of its territory by a visiting Pakistani leader and there should be no reluctance to use them.

Another reason for India’s decision may have been the presence of Putin, who may have made strong statements against the West. It would have been difficult to deny him the opportunity to interact with the Indian media. While a virtual summit takes care of this possibility, the problem is that the G20 summit is going to take place in September and it is unlikely that Putin will not come for that. That will be a far more difficult issue to handle, for western leaders may decide not to be in the same room with him. Are we then, based on the SCO summit example, looking at the possibility of a G20 summit in the virtual mode?

There would also have been a natural sensitivity to the presence of Chinese President Xi Jinping in Delhi for the SCO summit, if he decided to come, even though Chinese intransigence on border issues continues. The problem, though, is that Xi, like Putin, is unlikely to avoid the G20 summit and the dilemma of how to deal with his presence would be the same then as it would have been if he was here for the SCO meeting.

Besides, the same argument as in the case of Pakistan of not allowing any member state to decide on the choice of a multilateral meeting’s format would apply in the case of China.

Certainly, Iran which is due to join the SCO as a full member, would have liked to have a physical summit. So too the Central Asian Republics (CAR). They had perhaps already given their consent to be in Delhi for the summit. With the Chinese moving rapidly ahead to create a sphere of influence in Eurasia, India has to use every opportunity to counter its northern neighbour’s moves in the region. The presence of all CAR leaders in Delhi would have been one such opportunity.

Modi is going on an important state visit to the US later this month. It is difficult to believe that this invitation would have had a bearing on India’s decision to hold the SCO summit in the virtual format. This is because Indian diplomacy has the dexterity to manage contradictions. There is no reason to believe, as yet, that it has lost that touch! Hence, the reason for going in for a virtual SCO summit is so intriguing.