Lapses by intelligence agencies to blame for Maoist attacks
A couple of recent incidents show that the Maoist threat continues to loom large. On January 30, a combined force of CoBRA (Commando Battalion for Resolute Action) commandos, the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF), the Special Task Force and the District Reserve Guard (DRG) of the state police was attacked along the Bijapur-Sukma boundary near Tekulagudem village in Chhattisgarh. It resulted in the martyrdom of three CRPF men, including two CoBRA commandos, and injuries to 15 other personnel. Among the injured were a deputy commandant and an assistant commandant. In the retaliatory fire by the forces, six Maoists were killed, whose bodies were carried away by the retreating insurgents.
With their strongholds under threat, the Maoists chose to attack the security forces that had set up a camp in Tekulagudem village and were carrying out combing operations in the area. While the number of Maoists who attacked the security forces is estimated to be not less than 500, some reports state that their strength could have been about 1,000. Tekulagudem is close to Tadmetla, which is near the Telangana border, where 76 CRPF personnel were killed by Maoists in April 2010. Attacking the security personnel in hordes of hundreds is one of the strategies adopted by the Maoists with a view to overawe them.
In undivided Andhra Pradesh in the 1980s, when Maoists — then known as the People’s War Group (PWG) — attacked police stations, the state police fortified the premises with concrete sentry posts atop every station and hiked the strength of police personnel deputed in each of them. The area around the police stations up to 100 metres was cleared of any tree or growth, and floodlights were installed for a clear all-round view at night. The retaliatory fire by the police personnel caused many casualties among the PWG extremists, which ended their attacks on police stations.
Over a thousand extremists of the People’s Liberation Guerrilla Army, the armed wing of the CPI (Maoists), descended on Jehanabad town in Bihar on November 13, 2005, attacked the prison officials there, killed 12 men of the Ranvir Sena and set free 389 of their comrades. The town was virtually under their control for a few hours before they left. In a well-planned operation, they cut off the electric supply to the city, plunging the entire area into darkness, and fled before they could be dealt with by the police.
Last week, a police constable and a Naxal were killed in an encounter in Chhattisgarh’s Kanker district. The operation involved the DRG, the Bastar Fighters and the Border Security Force (BSF). Recently, Inspector Tijau Ram Bhuvarya of the Chhattisgarh Armed Force was hacked to death when he and two others went to a weekly market to purchase vegetables near Jaigur village in Bijapur district. This is yet another strategy adopted by the Maoists to carry out attacks on security forces. They merge into the crowd and escape after carrying out the task. Such attacks are well planned. A group of Maoists visits the weekly market and does a recce of the area before launching the attack. They watch the movement of security forces in the area for a few days and then plan their strategy. Not infrequently, the security personnel tend to get lax over a period of time and throw caution to the wind. It is at such moments, when their guard is down, that the Maoists strike.
In the aforementioned incidents, there was a complete failure on the part of the intelligence agencies. When hundreds of Maoists gather from different villages to attack the security forces, it is hard to believe that the intelligence agencies failed to get wind of it. Evidently, it is much easier for the Maoists to get information about the movements of forces than for the agencies to get to know about the movements of hordes of Maoists. The need for our intelligence agencies to be proactive in the Left-wing extremist-affected districts cannot be overemphasised.
Union Home Minister Amit Shah recently stated in various forums that the menace of Maoists will see its end within the next three years. This will be possible only when actionable intelligence input is fed to the security forces in time. At the same time, the onus is on the security forces to take all precautions so as not to be vulnerable to such attacks. Strict adherence to the standard operating procedures in these areas will at least minimise, if not avert, casualties among the forces. The denial of information about the movement of security forces to the Maoists could avert ugly incidents. Utmost secrecy ought to be maintained by every member of the forces operating in the area.
Persistent efforts made by the CRPF, CoBRA, the BSF and the Indo-Tibetan Border Police over the years have yielded rich dividends. Commending these forces for spearheading the battle against the Maoists, Shah stated at the 59th Raising Day of the BSF in Hazaribagh on December 1 last year that the Maoist menace was now confined to just 45 districts, as against the 96 districts about a decade ago. Incidents of violence declined by 52 per cent from 14,862 to 7,130 and the number of deaths reduced by 69 per cent from 6,035 to 1,868 in the same period.
With 199 camps set up by security forces in recent years in the areas where hitherto the Maoists’ writ ran, their presence is being strangulated, which is good for the forces and the nation.
