Long haul ahead for the Army in Ladakh

China’s moves in eastern Ladakh point to a definite purpose and are part of its penchant for long-term planning, more so for this vital region. The road linking Tibet with Xinjiang runs through Aksai Chin for 167 km and the road recently built by India, connecting Leh with Daulat Beg Oldie (DBO), can facilitate a quick build-up of forces in this part of Ladakh and consequently, gives India the capability to take back Aksai Chin. Such an action by India can terminate China’s link with Xinjiang. China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) are initially linked to this road to Xinjiang. CPEC later passes through PoK as well. Such an apprehension by China was perhaps heightened by the Indian Home Minister stating in Parliament that India will take back Aksai Chin and Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (PoK).

It would be reasonable to assume that China’s moves in the Pangong Tso, Galwan Valley, Hot Spring and Depsang plain, and more recently, south of Pangong Tso are consequent to this apprehension that India may at some future date make an attempt to capture Aksai Chin with all its drastic consequences for China. These moves by China in the Galwan sector etc give it the ability to intercept the Leh-DBO road and stall such an action by India. Therefore, the ongoing stand-off in the region may continue indefinitely.

Considering China’s possible hope, that at some future date, the state of J&K may fall into the lap of Pakistan, it will then be possible to run CPEC through it and that would substantially reduce the distance for the economic corridor between the two countries. Else, China, at some point, may attempt to take the Karakoram Pass, and run both the BRI and CPEC across it and beyond through the Shaksgam Valley; essentially to shorten the distance for BRI and CPEC, but more so for the latter.

Here onwards, what is likely to happen in Ladakh is going to be somewhat similar to what happened at Doklam, where China has constructed a road up to almost where they had come. China has also put up permanent structures and continues to occupy this Bhutanese territory. China is currently putting added pressure on Bhutan to occupy more of its territory.

In Ladakh, at best, China may follow the policy of two steps forwards and one step back. Equally, we may not have adequately deciphered China’s long-term plans for the Ladakh region.

While we need not dwell on a military solution to this intrusion into Indian territory, the possibility of China pulling back to pre-May 2020 positions through diplomatic efforts appear bleak. Efforts to delineate and mark the India-Tibet border through diplomatic parleys has made little headway all these years. India needs to consider where we are at a tactical advantage, to occupy areas across the LAC to later act as quid pro quo to make China vacate its ingresses in Ladakh.

In all probability, it is going to be a long haul, which seems to suit China.

The current state of deployment and maintaining these troops in this far-off region, over a long period, imposes a heavy financial burden on India, though it gives India the confidence that its supposedly strong leadership and the present state of its military is enough to stare China down and as such there is no immediate need to upgrade it. This is precisely what China would want India to continue believing.

With Ladakh being designated as union territory and a Chinese move into this area, there is a need to relook at the infrastructure required for better connectivity with this region. The main connectivity with Ladakh, instead of through the Kashmir valley, should now be through Himachal Pradesh. To that end, the existing road via Kullu-Manali needs to be double- laned and work on tunnels across all the three passes along this route should be fast-tracked.

The extension of the railway line from Joginder Nagar to Leh should be expedited and the railway line from Shimla be extended to Keylong to join the one from Joginder Nagar. The existing Kalka-Shimla road should be extended from Lasar to Demchok and then on to Upshi.

With this threat developing from China in the Ladakh region, and reports of a new set of roads being built opposite Himachal Pradesh and Uttarakhand, and recent news of Chinese soldiers’ cellphone signals emanating from within a few kilometres of the Indian territory in Himachal Pradesh, there is perhaps a compelling requirement to rework the military infrastructure, particularly along the border with Tibet. When we had built the road to Lipulekh Pass, we should have occupied this pass. Equally, there is a need to reorganise the overall defence along this border, with capability for limited offensive at a number of places.

Considering the extent of border with Tibet and the type of terrain along it and the fact that it is not marked on the ground and does not have similar markings on the maps of both countries, it is possible that China’s ingress into Indian territory might have taken place at some other places as well. Therefore, there is the need to thoroughly check the ground situation along this long border. There is also the requirement to deploy additional surveillance resources and improve manning of this border.

For the present, China seems to be quite satisfied in having achieved its aim in letting India believe that its supposedly strong leadership and existing military capabilities are enough to deter China from taking any offensive against India and as such there is little requirement to upgrade these. This is what eminently suits China, as part of its long-term plans. At the other end, it carries the risk of India falling into this trap and continuing to neglect the imperatives of upgrading military capabilities.