25 years after Kargil

Vijay Mohan

On April 7, 1999, just a month before the Pakistani intrusions in the Kargil sector were officially acknowledged, a wargame was held by 15 Corps of the Indian Army. A Brigade Commander, playing the role of Force Commander Northern Area (FCNA) — the enemy formation opposite the Line of Control (LoC) in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK) — presented a war-like scenario that was uncannily similar to the situation that unfolded in the coming days.

Among those present at the wargame were Lt Gen SK Khanna, the then GOC-in-C, Northern Command; Lt Gen Krishan Pal, the then GOC of 15 Corps, and Maj Gen VS Budhwar, the then GOC, 3 Infantry Division. Maj Gen (later Lt Gen) Mohinder Puri, then GOC, 8 Mountain Division, was the ‘enemy commander’.

Those familiar with the wargame say the prevailing mindset of the military top brass at the time was focused on counter-insurgency, which prevented a holistic review of the situation and led to incorrect assessments. The Corps Commander himself, at the beginning of the Kargil conflict, was of the opinion that there were just 35-40 terrorists, who would likely infiltrate further down into the Valley.

Similar wargames had been held at various levels for years where the probability of intrusions by Pakistan across the LoC was discussed. Yet, Pakistan managed to surreptitiously occupy heights dominating the Srinagar-Leh National Highway in what was termed an intelligence failure, or by some as a failure to interpret the available information or act appropriately on the inputs that had filtered in.

This led to a three-month-long tedious and costly conflict on the remote and icy heights along a 170-km stretch of the LoC in the sector, which is now overshadowed by the growing Chinese belligerence on the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in eastern Ladakh.

The Kargil sector, lying east of the Zoji La and comprising Mushkoh, Drass, Batalik and Turtuk sub-sectors, was not new to conflict, having witnessed battles since 1948, when some areas were captured by Indian troops.

When India occupied the Siachen Glacier in 1984, the Army had raised 28 Infantry Division to be deployed in the Kargil sector, along with the existing 3 Infantry Division on the eastern flank. However, with terrorism erupting in the Kashmir valley, 28 Division was moved to the west of Zoji La on counter-insurgency deployment.

The stretch that was guarded by an entire division, consisting of three brigades, was left to a single brigade — the 121 (Independent) — at Kargil, leaving huge gaps. These gaps were exploited by the then Pakistan army chief, Pervez Musharraf, who had kept the flow of information about his operations extremely limited within his force. Since there were no indications of any impending military operation from the Pakistani establishment at large, this was also at odds with reports of intrusion filtering in from the northern sector.

When the conflict started, there were operational setbacks, with inadequate intelligence and equipment. Some field commanders complained of piecemeal availability of troops and a heterogeneous mix of frontline units, dependence on man packs and mule loads for supplies, restricted deployment of artillery guns in some areas due to terrain limitations, disconnected sub-sectors and inadequate radio communications.

“We were moved up from the Valley and pushed into operations,” Brig Khushal Thakur (retd), who as a Colonel commanded 18 Grenadiers during the conflict, said. “We were initially told there were just a few militants on the hilltops and in the initial phases, there was no information or intelligence, no recce had been done, whereas the enemy was at a height and had the advantage. The troops were not acclimatised, proper clothing was not available and casualty evacuation was a problem,” he added.

The then Chief of Army Staff, Gen VP Malik, is on record saying that the Kargil conflict was fought in the face of great challenges, with serious shortages of ammunition and equipment.

A four-member high-powered committee headed by strategic analyst K Subrahmanyam (the father of Minister of External Affairs S Jaishankar), that was set up to review the conflict, observed that Pakistan’s aggression came as a total surprise. Infiltration by armed irregulars was considered to be feasible in the area, but not an intrusion and occupation of territory by Pakistani troops.

The committee pinpointed several inadequacies in the Indian intelligence setup and recommended significant structural changes in the security establishment. It said that though there were no specific indicators of a likely major attack in the Kargil sector — such as significant improvements in logistics and communications or substantial force build-up or forward deployment of forces — there were many bits and pieces of information about activities within the FCNA region. Most of these tended to indicate that Kargil was becoming a growing focus of Pakistani attention, which had been clearly demonstrated by the marked increase in cross-LoC shelling in 1998.

Twenty-five years later, there is not only a sea change in the strategic environment and threat perception in the northern sector, but also important developments within the armed forces that have resulted in structural reorganisation at the highest level, capability build-up and force redeployments.

As in all wars and operations, a plethora of lessons were thrown up, some of which have been implemented and some are still embroiled in bureaucratic tussles and lip service. It was as a fallout of the conflict that the Integrated Defence Staff Headquarters was set up to deal with inter-services matters and the long-pending appointment of a Chief of Defence Staff finally came through in January 2020. Intelligence collection was ramped up with the creation of organisations like the Defence Intelligence Agency and the National Technical Research Organisation, and formations like the Strategic Forces Command and Andaman and Nicobar Command, both having elements from all three Services, were set up.

“A lot has happened in the past two decades. The 170-km stretch that was then held by just a brigade and had wide gaps is now guarded by a division, with 8 Mountain Division that was moved to Kargil during the conflict being permanently deployed there,” says Lt Gen YK Joshi (retd), who commanded a battalion during the conflict and then served as the GOC-in-C, Northern Command.

“The area is now strongly held and I do not visualise another Kargil-type incident happening. Moreover, with its internal situation and a floundering economy, Pakistan is not in a position to carry out such activity,” he adds, while pointing out that new technology and force multipliers like drones, UAV optical devices and surveillance equipment that provides a constant flow of information have since been inducted. Infrastructure has also been developed and all forward posts are now connected by tracks, with a strong logistics network.

As the nation commemorates the conflict’s ‘Rajat Jayanti’, several issues linger on. Among them is whether the war could have been fought differently, with the same results being achieved with lesser casualties, declassifying documents for greater transparency and an incisive analysis and debate on the role of senior commanders.

Wars are fought at three levels — tactical, involving sub-units and battalions; operational, at the level of brigades, division and corps; and at the strategic level that encompasses the political leadership and other government establishments. “During Kargil, the young officers and soldiers delivered and their achievements and sacrifices have been celebrated, but little has been said on the role of the Generals and the higher defence management,” says a senior serving officer.

While agreeing that intrusions at the level that took place in 1999 may not happen now, Lt Gen DS Hooda (retd), former GOC-in-C, Northern Command, says that among the recommendations put forth after the conflict was the publication of a national security doctrine, which is still not in place.

“The much-needed integration or jointness amongst the Services and the Ministry of Defence is still unsettled. The level of integration required between the ministry and Service headquarters, of ministry officials and military officers functioning together, is not there. The tri-service theatre commands are still in the process of being set up,” he says. “Even the recommendation of ‘one border, one force’ has not been fully implemented. We have the Army and the Indo-Tibetan Border Police deployed operationally on the Line of Actual Control, but both report to different ministries,” he adds. This is unlike the LoC, where the Border Security Force is co-deployed, but comes under the operational command of the Army.

Kargil, the experts look back, was Pakistan’s attempt to even out the loss it suffered in Siachen, as also a part of its larger game-plan in Kashmir. An active LAC post the 2020 standoff with China, along with Siachen, is now a worry for India. Immediately north of Siachen lies Shaksgam valley, ceded to China by Pakistan, where heavy infrastructure development has been reported, and to its east is Depsang Plains — a hot area.

The reported presence of Chinese troops in PoK is another worry. Any China-Pakistan collusion on the northern borders would have serious implications. As Lt Gen Hooda puts it, “We have to be careful of that challenge.”

In 2020, troops deployed in the counter-insurgency grid in Jammu and Kashmir and elsewhere were pulled out and deployed on the LAC, with the post-Kargil enhanced posture on the LoC remaining as it was. The emphasis of the Northern Command is now on the LAC.

During the Kargil conflict, China had remained silent as it lacked infrastructure on its side along the LAC, which has since seen exponential development. Earlier, the premise was that if there is a war with China, Pakistan will help it, while if there is a war with Pakistan, China may not step in. Now, a question mark lurks over the possibility of China stepping in.