Indianise certainly, but also demystify defence

THREE weeks in London were invigorating. I visited Royal United Services Institute, the International Institute of Strategic Studies, Chatham House and Policy Exchange, among several think tanks, and the Royal College of Defence Studies, where I studied — to simply imbibe the new flavours of the land.

Each new prime minister or government orders a strategic defence review (SDR), the last being done in 2015. It is updated periodically with an integrated review, which was done in 2021, followed by a defence, development and foreign policy review in 2023. Capability and spending reviews are interspersed, ensuring targets are met and there are no surprises.

In July, the new Labour government ordered a root and branch review of the SDR, which will deliver its report before July 2025. The spending review has found a hole of GBP 3.9 billion, which the government has pledged to meet by raising taxes in the budget due on October 30. Whether Labour or Tory, defence spending enjoys rare consistency, with a target of 2.5 per cent of the GDP, which, at present, is 2.3 per cent.

Lord Karan Bilimoria, whom I met, has advocated in Parliament since 2019 that the UK should spend 3 per cent of the GDP on defence. He told the Peers that the term Indo-Pacific, for which there is a minister now, was coined by Policy Exchange, of which he is a trustee. Our Navy’s Capt Vijay Sakhuja, with the Kalinga International Foundation, had claimed to have invented it.

Bilimoria told Parliament that Britain must upgrade relations with India, the emerging power centre, and apologise for its ‘monstrous act’ in Jallianwala Bagh. Britain has a small-sized military, but it fields state-of-the-art equipment. Robust debates on defence are held in both Houses of Parliament and the media.

Its Strategic Nuclear Force, operational since 1962, is reliant solely on Continuous at Sea Deterrence (CASD). The debate in the UK is over a backup second delivery system of the other two legs of the Triad — aircraft or land-based — and maintaining 180-200 nuclear ballistic missiles of its Credible Minimum Deterrent.

India’s military is rapidly modernising. But it is also focused on dismantling the colonial legacy, as directed by PM Modi in 2021, and replacing it with Indian political strategic culture and indigenisation.

So, the Vivekanand Foundation begins its programmes by invoking Hindu gods. The Indian Navy has introduced kurta pajama as its mess kit. The Army is engaged in collating pearls of ancient Indian wisdom from the Gita, Panchatantra, Arthashastra, Chanakya Neeti and Thirukkural.

But absent are modern defence planning and budgetary fiscal and defence allocation as a percentage of the GDP, like 3 per cent recommended by several Standing Committees on Defence. The annual defence budgets are, predictably, the previous year’s budget allocation plus inflation and, sometimes, less than the Revised Estimates.

An SDR has never been done nor have capability and spending reviews been done. Still, often, defence forces are unable to spend the meagre moneys allotted for modernisation. There is no documented National Security Strategy (NSS), which the CDS, Anil Chauhan, says is not needed, making India the only democracy with no NSS.

No parliamentary debate has been permitted on the China threat despite intrusions and loss of territory over the past five years and two books by former Army Chiefs have been blocked as they are critical of the government.

With the fifth largest economy (it just surpassed that of the UK) and the third biggest standing military, India’s defence spending was less than 2 per cent in 2024-25 despite multiple and collusive threats. The UK, with the 11th largest military, will spend nearly 2.5 per cent of the GDP with comparably less substantial threats.

While the UK will not let its deterrent blunt, Indian political leaders believe there will be no war: “Not an era of war; we are the land of Buddha, not yuddh.”

So, the Agniveer scheme was imposed to reduce manpower and pension costs in the guise of having a youthful Army, which former Army and Navy Chiefs have decried. So was ‘atmanirbharata’, about which the late CDS, Gen Bipin Rawat, had said: “We will fight with second best equipment.”

Another Army Chief, Gen Ved Malik, had, during Kargil, famously said: “We will fight with what we have.” The new CAS, Air Chief Marshal Amar Preet Singh, said recently: “Atmanirbharata; but not at the cost of defence.”

There is, consequently, a limited conventional deterrent against China.

But India has the ultimate deterrent — a stable nuclear force arsenal of 180 warheads, and it will shortly acquire the effective third leg of its Minimum Credible Deterrent, with undersea deterrent.

Its nuclear doctrine 2003 remains sound and unaltered despite calls for abandoning the No-First-Use and Adopting-First-Use policies due to Pakistan and China’s disruptive behaviour. The nuclear doctrine is a robust retaliation for any full-spectrum nuclear use by Pakistan.

On October 1, the COAS, Gen Dwivedi, said: “The CDS is ready to present the theatrisation plan once government asks for it.”

Some wrinkles remain, though. In the UK, the CDS system was introduced in 1984 and theatrisation has flourished. But it happened top-down. Not the way we have gone about it. Indianise, certainly, but also demystify defence.