India must warn Bhutan of Chinese designs
THE recent interview by Bhutan Prime Minister Lotay Tshering to a Belgian newspaper created a storm in New Delhi. King Jigme Khesar Namgyel Wangchuck rushed to meet Prime Minister Narendra Modi to defuse tensions, while Foreign Secretary Vinay Mohan Kwatra gave a firm response to Bhutanese overtures to China over settling its border dispute. Thimphu was testing India’s reaction to its 2020 three-step mechanism to settle its border dispute, even at the risk of trading Doklam for territorial gains in the north and other unstated benefits. The autonomy displayed by Bhutan had a short shelf life.
It is an old habit, though, as there was never any doubt about the indivisibility and entwined nature of the only two border disputes China has not resolved peacefully — India-China and Bhutan-China. As a senior staff officer in 1985 at the Headquarters of the 33 Corps near Siliguri, responsible for the security of Bhutan, I recall that the Chinese side was nibbling away at the territory in Doklam. No border talks between Bhutan and China were conceivable without the consultation of Indian officials, according to the 1949 Treaty of Peace and Friendship.
Bhutan was quite uncomfortable with the presence of Indian troops in Ha and Thimphu, though it had been a British protectorate since 1910, but like Nepal, never colonised. Indian troops were urged to maintain a light footprint and mask their training activities. Both the large training team in Ha to train the Royal Bhutan Army (RBA) and Palace Guards as well as units earmarked for operational tasks that came for training represented foreign troops on Bhutanese soil. The first signs of change in Bhutan were discerned when King Jigme Singye Wangchuck wished in 2007 to rewrite the 1949 treaty in which Bhutan enjoyed internal autonomy for accepting Indian ‘guidance’ on defence and foreign affairs.
The 1949 treaty was written under the then PM Jawaharlal Nehru’s watch; its 2007 draft was overseen by the then Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and the then Foreign Minister Pranab Mukherjee. Interestingly, the present King was in attendance. Notably, Article 2 was incorporated in the new treaty which qualified defence cooperation and read: “Shall cooperate closely with each other on issues relating to national interest. Neither government shall allow the use of its territory for activities harmful to national security and interests of the other.” It was this clause that enabled Indian troops to enter Bhutanese territory at Doklam in 2017. The then Finance and Defence Minister Arun Jaitley mentioned this point at a media conclave in 2018.
Doklam marked the turning point in Bhutan’s behavioural change in its approach to China and the border dispute. The Bhutanese had to be persuaded to issue two press statements in accordance with their 1988 agreement on ‘guiding principles on settlement of border issue’ and the 1998 MoU on maintenance of peace and tranquility along the border with China.
When Indian soldiers confronted the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) at Doklam, the RBA troops at the Jampheri ridge in Bhutan did not join the Indians to form a human chain. Not wishing to annoy China, they let Indian soldiers do the heavy lifting. The Chinese were livid over Indian intervention, even though preventing the PLA from constructing the road to the disputed tri-junction was legitimate, as decreed in the 2012 agreement that the tri-junction issue was to be resolved by India, China and Bhutan.
When I visited Bhutan in 2019, public feeling about Indian interference on a bilateral issue was mixed. For the first time, stirrings of anti-India sentiment were vocal and visible. Chinese scholars have stated that one of the reasons for PLA’s aggression in Ladakh was India’s move to confront the PLA at Doklam. While India celebrated its success at Doklam, the PLA constructed a network of fighting bunkers, command posts, helipads and allied infrastructure. Not just that, satellite imagery from multiple sources over 2019-20 revealed systematic construction of 1,000 dual-use dwellings built inside Bhutan.
The Bhutanese Ambassador and former RBA chief Major Gen Vetsop Namgyel has denied any encroachment into Bhutan. When China began constructing an alternative road southwards, 8 km east of Doklam, along the Bhutanese border, Article 2 of the 2007 treaty was not invoked by India. When I pointed out in 2019 to a former Indian ambassador to Bhutan that the Chinese had built civilian barracks inside the Bhutanese territory, he said: “These are civilian constructions, not military.”
Maxar Technologies, a US-based space technology company, now shows that the PLA has built a bridge across Amo Chu which would open an axis to the Ha valley. Further, the road is being constructed towards the Jampheri ridge and earthmoving equipment has been seen on the west bank of Amo Chu. Crossing the Doklam nullah is an Indian red line, but it seems Bhutan (and India) has given free passage to the PLA to exploit India’s vulnerability in the Yatung (Chumbi) valley.
The Bhutanese have watched in dismay PLA’s wanton intrusions into Ladakh and seem convinced that India cannot and will not be able to defend Bhutan. So, the thinking is: striking a border deal with China will not be a bad idea. In the interview, Tshering said, “Doklam is a junction point between India, China and Bhutan. It is not up to Bhutan alone to fix the problem. There are three of us. There is no big or small country; all are three equal countries, each counting for one-third.” But which is the tri-junction — Batang La or Gyemochen? Tshering said that the border could be demarcated after one or two meetings. This created a furore in the Indian media, forcing Tshering to issue a clarification — “no policy change as nothing new was said.” He also denied any Chinese intrusion into Bhutan.
The misgivings created by his interview were sufficient for the Bhutan King to scramble to New Delhi and reassure India that its security interests would not be harmed. Thimphu needs to be gently warned that a PLA fait accompli in the Chumbi valley must be pre-empted.
