India and the US are indispensable partners

THE India-US Comprehensive Global Strategic Partnership seems to be playing out on two parallel tracks concurrently. Considering the effusive interaction between Prime Minister Narendra Modi and US President Joe Biden

at Hiroshima in May, the June 4-5 India visit of US Secretary of Defence Lloyd Austin the second since he assumed office in 2021 and the PM’s forthcoming state visit to Washington later this month, the bilateral relationship is on the right track. There are prospects of some high-level defence and technology cooperation-related announcements being made during the PM’s visit.

However, a narrative emanating from the US strategic community suggests some weakening of the underpinnings of this partnership. A recent article published in the Foreign Affairs suggests that the US expectations of India being an active partner in collective defence against Chinese aggression are misplaced and that India will never involve itself in any US confrontation with China that does not threaten its own security. The article surmises that for the US, India seems a ‘bad bet’ (for strategic and technology cooperation).

Another piece, appearing on its heels in the Financial Times, suggests that while India does not want a China- or US-dominated world order, in the short term, it will tolerate the latter as the lesser evil. Earlier, another article in the Foreign Affairs had suggested, in the context of the Ukraine war, that for India, choosing the West over Russia could make it a great power, while also “cautioning” that this was “India’s last best chance” before the US started viewing it as an unreliable partner.

This counter-narrative comes amidst an upswing in India-US joint military exercises (six in the last eight months) and the inaugural meeting of the ‘Initiative on Critical and Emerging Technologies (iCET)’ between the two countries’ National Security Advisers (NSAs) in Washington on January 31, 2023. Even earlier, India and the US have been able to put several building blocks of defence and security partnership in place. Surely, they are not looking at reversing the positive trend or basing future strategic cooperation on shaky pillars. That this crucial relationship needs a reality check and a mid-course correction is understandable.

In considering India a ‘bad bet’ for the US, the Foreign Affairs article misses making a distinction between India being a ‘partner’ and not an ‘ally’ with distinct obligations and expectations. This is at the root of the mismatch in perceptions. While acknowledging the valuable support received from the US in times of crises, which serves as a substantial force multiplier, India places no burden of responsibility on the US for its basic national defence. Also, despite the capability differential with China, India has demonstrated its resolve and capacity to safeguard its sovereignty.

To a (US) academic mind, India’s commitment to the US in the region lies in Indian assets being deployed in the East/South China Sea, augmenting deployments in the Western Pacific. To a military mind, however, strong Indian deployments along the Line of Actual Control (LAC), even for its own security, would well contain sufficient Chinese assets, preventing their re-deployment eastwards. This ability will increase as the Indian power increases. Likewise, the Indian Navy, with the support of the US and partners, can provide the nucleus for the maritime security architecture in the Indian Ocean, relieving the burden of deployment of scarce US military assets in the region.

Notwithstanding the creeping return to the ‘hesitation of history’ (among the analysts), the militaries must continue their current level of engagement with vigour. Commendable progress has been made in developing interoperability, coordinating domain awareness and information exchange, honing asymmetric warfare capabilities and in the fields of defence technology and trade. With mission-ready forces in place, the leaders would have better options in times of real crises, and an assurance of arresting the drift in another direction.

As technology cooperation captures the imagination of both countries, bilaterally as well as in QUAD, and as we embark on selecting specific areas of working together under iCET be it investments in semiconductor facilities or shifting aero-engine production to India it would be prudent to reconcile our perceptions on this critical initiative.

It is a mistake to assume that iCET has been conceived to ‘reverse the failure of the DTTI.’ Far from it the DTTI (Defence Technology and Trade Initiative) has been a silent enabler, which has helped the two sides assimilate the nuances of working together. Also, the assumption that the “US government, which controls the release of licences for the joint ventures, can make or break this initiative” (Ashley Tellis, America’s Bad Bet on India) is self-defeating to start with. We need technology cooperation to achieve strategic stability in the Indo-Pacific by bridging the technology gap with the common adversary in telescoped timelines.

Finally, regarding the US concerns over the challenge to its arms majors accessing the Indian defence market, the suggestion made by Austin during his last visit to New Delhi (March 2021) seems pragmatic. He said, “It would be prudent on the part of the US to let the Indian armed forces get used to the operational benefits and ease of use of US-origin systems till these become acquisitions of choice, rather than being forced on India by US pressure, which in any case would be most counterproductive.”

Austin, who arrived in India on June 4 for a two-day visit, met Defence Minister Rajnath Singh on June 5 and firmed up an ambitious roadmap for defence industrial cooperation. He also held talks with NSA Ajit Doval.

India and the US are indispensable partners. The realisation of the need for mutual dependence, a distinction between reciprocity and transactional approach, and consideration of each other’s national interests will help strengthen this relationship, nurtured to the present level by assiduous efforts on both sides.

The coming months present opportunities for operationalising the mechanisms already put in place and for ironing out perceptions and expectations.