First day of 1971 War

December 3, 1971, marked the beginning of the all-out India-Pakistan war that culminated 14 days later in the birth of Bangladesh. During evening hours of this day, Pakistan launched pre-emptive strikes on 11 Indian airfields along the western front.

Under Operation Chengiz Khan, Pakistan's aircraft struck Amritsar, Ambala, Agra, Awantipur, Bikaner, Halwara, Jodhpur, Jaisalmer, Pathankot, Bhuj, Srinagar and Uttarlai. Some Indian positions in Kashmir also came under artillery shelling.

Despite the large number of targets, the Pakistani strikes could not inflict any material damage to the IAF airfields, damaging only runways at some places and destroying a radar station. Pakistan, on the other hand, lost four aircraft during the raid.

Though some military operations had been going along for the past sometime in the eastern sector, with forays inside erstwhile East Pakistan, December 3 is considered the day hostilities were formally initiated.

The then PM, Indira Gandhi, addressed the nation in the evening and termed the air strikes to be a declaration of war against India. The IAF responded with air strikes the same night, which were expanded to massive retaliatory strikes the next morning.

In March 1971, East Pakistan declared independence from Pakistan, starting the Bangladesh Liberation War. This led to political unrest, large-scale riots and genocide, followed by brutal repression by the West Pakistan-dominated regime and exodus of refugees into India.

As the situation worsened, with serious socio-economic implications for India, Indira asked the then Chief of Army Staff, Gen (later Field Marshal) Sam Manekshaw, in April 1971 to go to war with Pakistan. He sought time to prepare for the campaign.

By mid-July, battle plans were drawn up for a post-monsoon winter war, when the ground in the East would be drier, making offensive manoeuvres easier and limiting the possibility of Chinese intervention because of heavy snow over the Himalayas.

From mid-October to mid-November, the Indian Army conducted multiple incursions into East Pakistan, but withdrew into India after completing their missions. Psychological operations and information war against the Pakistani regime were also carried out.

From November 21, Indian forces supported by the Bangladeshi Mukti Bahini that it had trained, entered East Pakistan and remained there in preparation for a war, which by then seemed inevitable.

Things began heating up in West Pakistan also, with anti-India marches being staged and motivational material appearing in the media. On November 23, Pakistan President Yahya Khan declared a state of emergency and told the country to prepare for war.

Pakistan army’s 106 Infantry Brigade advanced towards the village of Hussainiwala in Punjab with 2,000 troops and artillery support. The Indian Army had deployed one battalion, 15 Punjab, with about 900 soldiers with support from the IAF. The battalion could not hold the area and had to retreat the next day. Simultaneously, Pakistan’s 23 Armoured Division launched an offensive in the Chhamb sector to the north.

The Pakistani strikes were based on the strategy of pre-emptive neutralisation of enemy air capability used by the Israeli air force against Egyptian and Arab air forces during the six-day Third Arab-Israeli War of 1967. The decision for the pre-emptive strikes was taken on November 30, 1971, during a meeting between Yahya Khan, Pakistan Chief of Army Staff Gen Abdul Hamid Khan and Chief of General Staff Lt Gen Gul Hassan Khan.

According to historical excerpts, the final orders for the strike were issued at 5.30 pm on December 3. The first formations were in flight and heading for their targets by 5.40 pm and Pathankot was the first base to be attacked.

The IAF struck back the same day. By 9 pm, Canberra bombers were armed for attacks deep inside West Pakistan. Pakistani bases at Murid, Mianwali, Sargodha, Chandhar, Risalewala, Rafiqui and Masroor were hit.

That first night itself, 23 combat sorties were flown, inflicting heavy damage on Sargodha and Masroor bases. Pakistani units stationed at these airfields had to operate from taxiways for the following two days.

Through the night, the IAF also struck the major East Pakistani airfields of Tejgaon, and Kurmitola. At the same time, the IAF deployed additional aircraft at forward airfields for conducting strikes the following morning. Within a few days, the IAF achieved air superiority over Pakistan.

Various analysis of the war point out that of its stated objectives, the Pakistan air force was unable to neutralise the IAF in the west. “Trying to catch the Indian Air Force napping, Yahya Khan launched a Pakistani version of Israel's 1967 air blitz in hopes that one rapid attack would cripple India's far superior air power. But India was alert, Pakistani pilots were inept, and Yahya's strategy of scattering his thin air force over a dozen air fields was a bust,” the 'Newsweek' wrote in 1971.