Erdogan's re-election could herald better ties with India

There was a sense of deja vu as Turkiye’s extended election ended with the victory of President Recep Tayyip Erdogan.

There was the ubiquitous, carefully burnished image of Erdogan as a strong, nationalist leader up against an Opposition that was accused of kowtowing to the West and being soft on the (Kurdish) terrorists. There was a carefully crafted appeal to religious conservatives, accompanied by disdain for the liberal and secular followers of Kemal Ataturk and disparaging attacks on the LGBTQ community, besides the conscious amplification of the glories of the Ottoman Empire, with ‘Sultan’ Erdogan heralding the dawn of a new ‘Turkish century’ 100 years after Ataturk established the secular Turkish republic in 1923. Other elements included the ability to use high-profile diplomatic events to draw attention away from pressing bread-and-butter issues; the relentlessly efficient, grassroots-driven party machinery against a fractured Opposition; the control of the media; the advantage in financial resources; and questionable use of enforcement agencies against Opposition leaders.

The aggregate of these elements combined to deliver the fifth consecutive electoral victory for Erdogan and his Justice and Development Party (AK Party). The first three wins made him the country’s PM until the constitution was amended in 2017, abolishing the parliamentary system and the office of the PM to create an executive presidency where the President becomes both the head of the state and the government. Erdogan was elected President in 2018 and this election gives him a second five-year term with around 52 per cent of the popular vote a figure that has remained almost constant over the six election cycles, including the constitutional referendum of 2017.

The Opposition had hoped for a different outcome this time. After all, the country has seen the lira’s value drop by 90 per cent over the last 10 years of Erdogan’s rule and many economists blamed the 44 per cent inflation and a near-empty foreign exchange kitty on his unorthodox economic policies and, particularly, his arm-twisting of the central bank to prevent an increase in interest rates.

The dire economic situation was expected to trigger an anti-incumbency wave and yet, the AK Party has demonstrated the rock-solid support of its base by retaining its 52 per cent share of the vote. Analysis shows that much of Erdogan’s vote comes from the relatively less affluent hinterland where the conservative Sunni Islam still has a substantial influence.

His rival Kilicdaroglu’s promise to restore the more liberal parliamentary system, return to economic orthodoxy and reduce strains in ties with the West resonated well in the metropolitan areas of Istanbul and Ankara and in the affluent and more westernised coastal areas, but in the end, it was the high voter turnout in the heartland that carried the day for Erdogan.

As he starts his third decade in power, Erdogan must bring the economy back on an even keel. The faltering economy, to an extent, has already led Erdogan to temper some of his more ideologically driven foreign policy postures in the region with a healthy dose of pragmatism. He has ended Turkiye’s proxy wars with Saudi Arabia and the UAE and restored normal ties with both. They have responded by placing $5 billion each with the Central Bank of Turkiye to bolster its foreign exchange reserves. The UAE has also pledged to invest $10 billion and moved quickly after Erdogan’s re-election to announce the ratification of their Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement with the aim of raising non-oil bilateral trade to $40 billion in five years.

Qatar remains a strong partner and potential source of investments. Full diplomatic relations have been restored with Israel and a change in attitude towards the Bashar al-Assad regime in Syria could be in the offing.

Erdogan has also leveraged the Ukraine conflict to reposition Turkiye as a pivotal player in the region. Although a NATO member since 1952, Turkiye has maintained close ties with Russia and Erdogan has often claimed a special relationship with President Putin. And yet, his government has supplied significant numbers of its Bayraktar TB2 armed drones to Ukraine. It was also at the heart of the Black Sea Grain Initiative, allowing safe transport of foodgrains from Ukrainian ports.

Meanwhile, Turkiye held back its assent on Finland’s inclusion as the 31st member of NATO until March 2023 on the grounds that the country was providing a haven to what Erdogan called Kurdish ‘terrorists’. And it continues to exercise a veto on Sweden’s inclusion for the same reason.

By maintaining a strongly independent foreign policy stance on ties with Russia and China even as it remains a key member of NATO, Turkiye under Erdogan is asserting its intent to reclaim the centrality that it enjoyed during the five centuries of Ottoman rule.

Despite a fair amount of goodwill at the popular level, India’s ties with Turkiye have failed to take off because Ankara has tended to view Jammu and Kashmir through the prism of religious fraternity with Pakistan. Sporadic attempts to give some momentum to the relationship have often been torpedoed by intemperate statements by Turkish leaders that betrayed a complete lack of sensitivity over India’s position. The most recent case was the manner in which Erdogan attacked India’s decision to revoke Article 370 in August 2019.

And yet, there might be some grounds for optimism. The economic crisis in Turkiye has coincided with the rise of India on the global stage and it is in the interest of both sides to expand their economic engagement. A breakthrough of sorts came about when Prime Minister Modi met President Erdogan on the sidelines of the SCO summit in Samarkand in September 2022. The request came from the Turkish side and the meeting turned out to be unexpectedly cordial. India also responded with a prompt and substantive humanitarian assistance package following the devastating earthquake that struck Turkiye in February.

The G20 summit being hosted by New Delhi in September will provide another opportunity for a Modi-Erdogan meeting. It remains to be seen if the pragmatism shown by Erdogan in reshaping Turkiye’s foreign policy over the past two years extends to its ties with India. Or will he remain wedded to his Islamist credentials and continue to side with an imploding Pakistan?