Ukraine war, two years

WITH the fall of the fortified Ukrainian city of Avdiivka, the third year of the Russia-Ukraine war is likely to be fiercer than the first two. Russia still needs to invest considerable military brawn to take four to five similarly fortified cities. The West is unlikely to meekly accept the inevitability of the Russian advance and may inject more viciousness into the battle. This is President Vladimir Putin’s moment after the death of Alexei Navalny, the last flicker of dissent in Russia, and the resilience shown by the Russian economy despite Western sanctions. Yet, there is no diminishing Western appetite to arm Ukraine, and the conflict is set to endure.

As the war drags on, there are increasing suggestions from the West for India to act as a mediator. As Foreign Minister S Jaishankar said, India will be happy to mediate but won’t take any initiative on its own. Very early on in the conflict, India had seen through the moral posturing that masked the West’s strategic designs against Russia. New Delhi has asserted from the very beginning that war could not be a solution; priority should instead be given to dialogue and diplomacy. In essence, rather than see one side suffer a defeat, India will be happy with a solution that addresses Ukrainian insecurities, Russian expectations and European anxieties.

However, contrary to the Western perception, India has been proactively neutral instead of being a fence-sitter. It has robustly shepherded its national interests, especially in oil, defence and fertilisers. New Delhi mediated successfully in the imbroglio over the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant. India has also been keen that the conflict remains confined to the European theatre so that it doesn’t spill over to the Indian Ocean or derail its Act East policy, especially with regard to China.