Diplomacy best bet for disengagement
Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s initial statement about facts on the ground and the clumsy PMO clarification — what is Indian territory is clear from the map of India — have stirred a hornets’ nest. It is music to the Chinese ears. They have translated the original statement in Mandarin and circulated it in the Chinese media. But it has upset the community of veterans. A Lieutenant General tweeted: “China is changing the status of LAC in eastern Ladakh. Thank my three stars, I am retired and my son not in the Army.” The government has fielded the former Army Chief and Union Minister of State for Road Transport and Highways, General VK Singh, retired Generals, intelligence officials and the National Security Advisory Board to defend the statement.
Clearly, Modi was communicating to his core electoral constituency his three noes: No incursion; No post lost; No territory lost. After all, his macho image, post Uri and Balakot, must not be sullied. But Modi need not worry. His credibility is so high that his version will hold. The clarification is for you and I.
China has unilaterally changed the status over six weeks of aggression across seven intrusions, stretching from Naku La in north Sikkim to Depsang in Ladakh, threatening India’s strategic assets. Never before has the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) constructed fortifications so swiftly and encroached on territory at such scale as now due to monumental missteps on the part of the government and military establishment. Home Minister Amit Shah’s challenge to China over re-taking Aksai Chin in the same breath as retaking PoK was taken as an affront by Beijing who called the internal reorganisation of J&K and the creation of Ladakh as unacceptable. The security establishment failed to read the tea leaves as military and diplomatic dialogue was misread to believe that PLA will play ball when its intention was otherwise.
What India clearly read as agreement to de-escalate and disengage, the PLA depicted only as ‘military action to ease the situation’ — no disengagement or de-escalation. The Army Chief, General MM Naravane, informed reporters at Dehradun that the outcome of military dialogue was being implemented and disengagement would take place across the entire front starting with the Galwan river valley (GRV), from where ‘lots of disengagement had taken place’.
It is in Galwan that the PLA sprung the ambush that took 20 lives, including that of a Commanding Officer, injured 76 soldiers, with another 10 missing in action that lost their way and were captured by the PLA and released on June 18 after Foreign Minister S Jaishankar spoke to his counterpart Wang Yi in Beijing. That more than 100 soldiers made up for casualties without a shot being fired is an amazing feat of unarmed combat.
Rubbing salt into the wounds, the Western Theatre Command spokesperson declared for the third time that the entire GRV is sovereign Chinese territory. Chinese experts cited historical rights going back to the Qing dynasty (1644-1911) to claim the GRV. The PLA virtually issued a fiat to the Indian troops to desist from using the Galwan estuary, stop patrolling and building defences. Galwan is not among the 23 disputed areas and the region has not been contested since 1962. Long-range patrols that I have known of were sent in 1975 to GRV and the Indian Air Force used to fly over Galwan routinely. The heightened threat to Aksai Chin from the strategic highway, Darbuk to DBO, is sought to be negated by holding this strategic enclave. Why with improved infrastructure did the military establishment not visualise the domination of Galwan heights rather than leave it to the ITBP patrols to cover the area?
At least 60 km of the Indian strategic real estate has been occupied by China through PLA intrusions from Depsang to Galwan in Ladakh and at Naku La in Sikkim, 1,500 km away, where the PLA and Indian troops are in a standoff 2 km inside a settled border. Multiple intrusions may eventually be traded in China’s policy of two steps forward, one step back, to retain the possession of GRV. Current incursions are land grab for keeps to articulate the LAC claim line with land.
Missing against China has been a conventional deterrent. This will take time to develop due to the power differential. In the meantime, the creative use of proxy forces of Ladakhi and Tibetans has to be considered. Ladakh requires the equivalent of the erstwhile Indian Foreign Administrative Service with dedicated officers and staff. The Army’s Ladakh Scouts formations should be bolstered to augment border security and the likes of late Ladakhi Ahmad Rasool Galwan, the terrain expert who discovered the GRV route to Aksai Chin, drafted.
Till a common LAC is defined and the RoE (Rules of Engagement) altered, infantry soldiers must be skilled in “killin’ unarmed combat”. The lesson from Galwan is that when in doubt, open fire, including the artillery, even if it is red over red. India taught China a lesson in 1967 at Nathu La through decisive leadership in a Galwan-like incident that has kept peace in the east. Even as India is strengthening launch pads in operational readiness after the Galwan skirmish, India should avoid taking China’s bait of dislodging intrusions and instead attempt utilising effective trade-offs in the Indian Ocean region. The IAF, which enjoys geographical and operational advantage over the PLAAF, has never war-gamed providing direct air support to the infantry in battle along the LAC. Further, the Army is scrambling to make up for key ammunition deficiencies in its inventory which were reported by General VK Singh in 2013.
Do not be misled again by the disengagement agreed to on June 22 to cool off. So, between evicting intrusions, say in Galwan — which is electorally attractive — occupying real estate across the Chinese LAC — which is past expiry date — and negotiating from a position of strength, Modi’s option must be the last: diplomacy as the better part of valour. And keeping the chin up and the powder dry!
