Decoding the strategic clash at Yangtse
THE face-off leading to a clash between the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and personnel of the Indian Army in the Yangtse area of Tawang in western Arunachal Pradesh on December 9 was a conflict waiting to happen, with a sense of unease prevailing along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) with China. An important marker as a run-up to this fight was the strong protests by the Chinese Government over the joint military exercises between Indian and US armies in the central sector of Uttarakhand, about 100 km from the LAC.
The clash at Yangtse has taken place over two years after the last bout of jostling in eastern Ladakh. This kind of violent pushing and shoving has been occurring since long, especially in disputed areas of Arunachal Pradesh and Sikkim.
However, in view of the fatalities in the Galwan valley clash of June 2020, any such confrontation draws immediate and heightened attention. The PLA seems to be perfecting its street-gang style of fighting along the LAC and has equipped its border troops with spiked clubs and tasers to pulverise the opponent in a conflict which precludes the use of firearms.
The Galwan clash and the resultant casualties highlighted the lethality of such improvisations for physical fights. However, this time the Indian troops were well prepared both in terms of pre-empting the enemy build-up by reinforcing their own threatened position and being armed with the right type of equipment. The efficacy of tasers against enemy personnel in moisture-affected winter clothing at these heights can be fatal. While the focus is on harnessing technology for indigenisation of big-ticket defence equipment and weapon systems, efforts also have to be made for equipping the soldiers on these icy heights with riot-control gear. This kind of inventory becomes important when faced with an adversary who will unscrupulously attempt bullying tactics and fisticuffs in scuffles for seizing control of areas.
It may appear incongruous that the military of a nuclear wannabe superpower indulges in such scuffles on its borders. However, these brawls are, in fact, a ‘strategic’ signalling of intent! They are a clear pointer to a more aggressive and assertive communist leadership of China. The 20th Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in October saw not only the emergence and endorsement of the paramount leader, but also was a clear pointer to how China will conduct its business on the global stage. Chinese President Xi Jinping’s strident stance at the G20 summit in Indonesia was not only a reflection on his perceived dominance as a powerful leader, but also how China now views the world.
At the CCP Congress, the official line was very clear about the approach to local (neighbourhood) conflicts and how China intends dealing with them. These are mainly regarding Taiwan, disputes in the South China Sea, island territories with Japan and the trans-Himalayan conflict on the LAC with India.
While Taiwan and other maritime disputes can well be managed by a combination of deft brinkmanship, coercion and economic influence, a major concern will remain the plethora of issues with India. The unsettled land border, stretching for 3,488 km along the LAC, has well-identified disputed and sensitive areas. This border, which is contested all along due to the ambitiously manufactured Chinese claim lines, has become live or rather lively due to their testing the waters in eastern Ladakh with indifferent results. The presence of the Dalai Lama and the Central Tibetan Administration-in-exile on Indian soil has always been a sore point in bilateral relations. Besides, China sees India as the sole challenger to its regional domination in Asia, which it aspires for as a prelude to global superpower status. Resolving these irritants with India on its terms would therefore gain priority for the CCP leadership in the days ahead.
The border standoff in eastern Ladakh with the PLA, which began in mid-2020, has entered a stalemate phase, with the latest round of talks achieving little progress and the Indian Army formations committed in the bleak and hostile terrain for the long haul. The only time these talks were followed up in right earnest was when Indian troops occupied the important features on the Kailash range, south of Pangong Tso, which effectively dominated forward posts of the PLA. The Chinese were quick to concede on a quid-pro-quo basis and even dismantled habitations and other structures while pulling back along the north bank of Pangong Tso. This was a clear indicator that China respects and listens when spoken to from a position of strength. The rapid PLA withdrawal after the clash at Yangtse appears to be in the same vein.
The fact of the matter is this unease will continue along the LAC and we have to live with it as the PLA will endeavour for a more aggressive approach in gaining positions of advantage anywhere along our northern borders. At the same time, China will continue to stress on delinking border scuffles from overall bilateral relations, while India will emphasise on a holistic approach with peace on the borders as a prerequisite. The on-ground implication for the Indian Army is increased year-round deployment in hostile terrain and weather.
China, apart from maintaining a belligerent military posture, would amply harness the media and look for every opportunity to keep India in a reactive mode, while dragging on with dispute resolution mechanisms. Being prepared on all counts, be it militarily or diplomatically and which includes pre-emption when required, is the only way to tackle this threat to national security. We need a proactive mindset to deter China for the Chinese communists are firmly committed to maximising their power in the world and we happen to be their formidable neighbours, with a turbulent relationship between us.
