‘Crosswinds’ by Vijay Gokhale: As wheel turns full circle on China

Sandeep Dikshit

At a time when the British are re-entering the Indian Ocean with the AUKUS nuclear submarine project, former Foreign Secretary Vijay Gokhale examines the early years of post World War-II China when a similar interjection of London’s interests in the Indo-US discourse on the Communist regime had cost India dearly.

Gokhale’s oeuvre of three books till the present one was squarely set in China. The first, ‘Tiananmen Square: The Making of a Protest’, was a unique non-western spotlight on the events of April 15 to June 4, 1989, which he had also seen as a young diplomat. ‘The Long Game’ was a mostly first-hand account of how the Chinese negotiate with India. And the third, ‘After Tiananmen: The Rise of China’, established how today’s China was built by 20 years of faceless leaders at the top who followed the tumultuous Mao years.

In his fourth work, Gokhale casts the net wider. The action flits between metropolises strung around the world, grappling with four crises that followed in succession east of India — the rise of Communist China, conflict in Vietnam-Laos-Cambodia zone and two bouts of Taiwan Straits tensions.

A fledgling India sought to navigate the complex geopolitical landscape in its neighbourhood at a time when the declining British Empire was desperate to maintain its commercial interests and the emerging superpower, the US, sought complete hegemony over the Pacific while looking for a suitable partner in the Indian Ocean. Both through their ambassadors, envoys, Foreign Ministers and President/PMs strived for New Delhi’s ears so that it follows a foreign policy that suited either of them.

Larger-than-life personalities, who may be legends or villains of today, flit across the pages as they seek to read each other’s intentions. The fast whirl of diplomatic life was as hectic as it is today; and crosswinds managed to catch each tempest east of India while the Nehru-dominated foreign policy sought to steer its own strategic direction.

The policies of India, the US and the UK were in sync till the Nationalist Government-ruled China. Crosswinds started in earnest on the issue of international recognition of China after Mao Tse-tung displaced the Nationalists. The US wanted to contain China; the British did not want its commercial interests and trading rights to be impacted, while India wanted China as an indispensable partner in post-colonial Asia. At stake was the recognition of Communist China. India was the second non-socialist state to do so. The British followed soon after but during the talks that preceded recognition, Whitehall constantly undermined India with the US while giving a different impression to the South Block.

Gokhale examines three more episodes where the interests of India, China, the US and Great Britain again collided as well as overlapped. As action moves across the diplomatic chequerboard, Nehru’s steps that successfully interjected India in confabulations on all three — Indo-China, the first Taiwan Straits crisis and the second Taiwan Straits crisis — speaks of his sharp political perspicacity.

But Indian interests were impacted by its limitations in framing foreign policy — VK Krishna Menon went for the Geneva conference on Indo-China without even a brief. Reports of his participation are available only in reports filed by The Hindu’s then London correspondent and the archives of other participant countries. The main actors in all the four incidents were Nehru, his close political associates and a handful of civil servants who tended to associate with British reasoning than the American or Chinese. The cumulative effect was the souring of ties with the US on the one hand and India losing out on securing its interests vis-a-vis China.

The wheel has now turned full circle. Crosswinds are rising because of the re-emergence of Great Power competition in the same theatre. As Gokhale points out, the past is becoming relevant for the future. Britain has quietly expanded its military presence in the Indian Ocean to six naval bases. AUKUS provides geopolitical justification for an enhanced presence in the Indo-Pacific. While India is already shaping a clear-eyed policy towards China, the former Foreign Secretary advises direct dialogue with the US. Because when the British again come courting India since it is a principal littoral state in the region, Gokhale warns, “It would be wise to bear Virgil’s words: Beware of Greeks bearing gifts.”