Critical security dilemma for Central Asian states
The recently held India-Central Asia Security Meeting at the NSA level is a timely engagement to take place against the war in Ukraine that has triggered a critical security dilemma for the Central Asian states since the Soviet collapse. Sanctions have blocked all Eurasian outlets, disrupted the logistics chain, and crippled Central Asian economies that are tied with Russia. Kazakhstan’s oil exports through Russian ports have been badly affected. The economic costs have been heavy. Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan sent 7.8 million workers to Russia in 2021. Remittances from Moscow accounted for 30% of their GDP. The fall of the rouble has caused the faltering of their national currencies impacting everyday life. They walked a diplomatic tightrope in their response to the Ukraine conflict. Ironically, Central Asians have endorsed the Taliban coming to power next door but have rejected Russia’s actions in Ukraine.
Russia is a security guarantor and a major economic partner, but despite Putin’s assurance that the Ukraine case is an exception, the Central Asians are wary that Russia would be emboldened to reclaim Central Asia.
Instead, some Central Asian states initially pinned their hopes on the Taliban in a ‘pragmatic way’ to assuage problems, though not all are on the same page. Tajikistan supports the Panjshiris. The Taliban’s seeming inability to govern northern Afghanistan and the fierce fighting among terrorist groups comes as a risk for the region. Numerous outfits like Jamaat Ansarullah (Tajik wing of IMU) and other homegrown outfits, lying dormant since 9/11, are waiting in the wings to infiltrate the region. The ISIS has been bombing cities in north Afghanistan bordering Central Asia.
The Taliban takeover and the Ukraine crisis have also increased drug trafficking. The UNDOC noted the highest levels of opium production in Afghanistan — a 37% increase in 2020. As such, the region is becoming vulnerable. Russian troops reached Kazakhstan early this year to quell violent protests that rocked the country, killing 225 people. Moscow also had to support Tajikistan to deal with the Afghanistan border in August 2021, following the US withdrawal.
Russia’s crisis means an opportunity for China. Russia is being displaced by China in trade. Beijing’s China Plus Central Asia grouping launched in January this year vowed to increase the trade target to $70 billion by 2030. Besides, China’s BRI strategy is linked to Asian security issues, especially Afghanistan. BRI projects have traction in Central Asia but they also result in more security concessions to China in exchange for debt relief. Beijing holds over 40% of Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan’s national debts.
Beijing uses its economic presence to seek influence in security areas. With its outside contacts no longer under Russian observance, China is rapidly emerging as a major arms supplier and security partner in the region, though Russia still has a large military presence in the region. The Russians do resent China exploiting their economic Achilles’ heel and stealing projects in Central Asia. Central Asians, too, privately consider China as a threat.
Clearly, the regional fallout of the Ukraine war could be serious without precedent. So far, Central Asian security arrangements are tied to Russia-led CSTO. They are also aligned with China’s formulation of fighting against the ‘Three Evils’. The Tashkent-based SCO-RATS, of which India is a member, gathers and shares intelligence, though it is hard to believe how they share intelligence as mutual suspicion persists among members.
India’s security ties with Central Asian states are nothing new. They predate the Soviet collapse, when India and Central Asian states supported the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan in 2001. India had set up a field hospital near the Tajik-Afghan border and established an air base in Tajikistan in 2002.
The scale of India’s security cooperation is limited to sharing of intelligence, training, assistance, servicing, and upgrading of military and naval hardware. New Delhi has a Strategic Partnership Agreement with most of the states. Joint Working Group on Counter-Terrorism is held regularly.
Central Asia is a new frontier where potentials are plenty but practical benefits are unlikely to be dramatic in the near term. In the long run, the regional integration process would benefit India. New Delhi’s aspirations are to benefit in trade, connectivity, and counter-terrorism cooperation.
On the downside, the Pakistan factor puts a spanner in India’s goals. Russia, China, and Central Asian states recognise Pakistan’s role in counter-terrorism, which makes India’s positions at odds with that of others. So far, no country in Central Asia has taken a tough stance on Pakistan and the Taliban to have implications for India. For economic reasons, they are closer to Beijing.
Therefore, visualising a common security format is unlikely, but the region could address some of India’s security concerns. LeT is listed as a banned terrorist organisation. Hafiz Saeed-backed Tehreek-e-Azaadi Jammu and Kashmir, a front for Jamaat-ud-Dawa (JuD), was put on the list of ‘proscribed organisations’ a day before Pakistan joined the SCO in 2017.
India’s aspiration in Central Asia would depend mostly on how India-China would weigh ties on security and economic calculations — Pakistan would play a spoiler role. China sees India’s keenness to strengthen counter-terror measures serving its interest. SCO Secretary General Zhang Ming said in Samarkand that India’s efforts will be supported when New Delhi will host the SCO Summit in 2023.
Eurasia is a contested region. The countries maintain a multi-vector foreign policy to balance the interests of major players. To be sure, Central Asians also carry a lot of expectations and compare India with China in terms of receiving assistance. They tend to forge security ties with stronger powers to gain maximum assistance in return. As long as Central Asian regional thinking is not evolved fully, India will have to function through a bilateral ambit.
