Countering terror, the India and US ways

Tara Kartha
Counter-terror analyst

General Bipin Rawat, thefirst Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) of the country and a widely quoted voice even when he was the Army Chief, never fails to surprise. At the recent iteration of the Raisina Dialogue, he called for the isolation of radical elements, pointed out that de-radicalisation camps existed inside India, and further observed, “We have to bring an end to terrorism and that can only happen the way the Americans started after the 9/11. Let’s go on a spree on global war on terror and let the nations join and fight terrorism together.”

Setting aside the ‘going on a spree’ aspect, it’s an interesting observation and merits some close examination, particularly since not all aspects of US counter-terrorism will be appreciated by the Indian public, liberal, right or left wing, or any of the other miscellaneous shades of opinion that have sprung up in recent years. Other aspects would give the Ministry of External Affairs apoplexy.

First, the most obvious aspect of US counter-terrorism is the overwhelming use of force. That includes 168 air strikes in Yemen (2017-19), 113 in Somalia in the same time period, and some 6,823 in Afghanistan, not to mention the use of air power in other locations, such as Syria where the Tokhar attack of 2016 remains the most controversial.

These strikes have caused massive civilian casualties in target countries, with the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan noting that the US was responsible for some 80 per cent of the casualties, which rose three-fold in 2019. That’s a lot of people dead in each of these ‘theatres’ of conflict, not to mention the questionable value of large-scale devastation.

That kind of so-called ‘collateral damage’ is simply not the way India operates. One reason that Balakot was preferred over several other camps in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir is that it was located far from civilian areas. Does General Rawat see India changing this policy to bombard the entire swathes of PoK to eliminate terrorists? That requires not just a change of strategy, but also a change of mindset that is completely at odds with our ethos of fighting.

Inside Kashmir, that ethos ensures the use of minimum force in terms of pellet guns instead of bombs or artillery. In addition, the overwhelming use of force requires just that, a massive superiority that deters retaliation. Apart from the fact that Pakistan has a more than capable air force, it must be remembered that unlike the US, our enemy lies just next door, and not an ocean away. That reality leads directly to that annoying policy of ‘restraint’, that General Rawat would presumably like to throw out.

The second is the US policy of decapitation of terrorist heads or even military leaders, as seen most recently in the case of General Qassem Suleimani. That at one level requires three things. The most crucial is the availability of precise intelligence. In Iran, the US is able to get that due to a multiplicity of allies, among them Israel and Saudi Arabia. A second aspect is the certain knowledge that Iran, in its sanctioned state, simply doesn’t have the resources to hit back at the US. Teheran has since shown that it feels prudence is the better part of valour. Third, is the availability of the all-important technology. The

MQ-9 Reaper with a 66-foot wingspan and flying higher than commercial aircraft is the key arrow in the quiver of counter-terrorism platforms.

General Rawat was probably thinking of the pending import of armed drones from the US, together with their missilery. That’s tempting in the extreme. A drone attack that kills a Hafeez Saeed or a Mohammad Azhar would be a sure-fire election winner for any government in Delhi.

But Pakistan is not Iran. It can and will retaliate. Indeed, Prime Minister Khan has to hit back to survive. As for targeting a Pakistani military leader, it is technically possible, given that the army chief can hardly limit his movements to his headquarters and home. But the same limitations apply, with the MEA required to do battle on the diplomatic front. A war will cripple Pakistan, but it has been there before. It will also set India back by a couple of decades. That’s the cost that a

sitting government has to do some candid thinking on.

The third aspect that the CDS seemed to emphasise, and which is entirely desirable, is that of isolating the terrorist-sponsoring states. The power of the US financial system has led to Iran being effectively cut off from much of the world in terms of its ability to sustain itself. However, even here, Europe is straining at the leash to get itself a little leg room, with disunity most apparent after the Soleimani assassination.

Certainly, India can prioritise such an objective in the burgeoning Indo-Pacific dialogues which include the US, Japan and Australia. But there is, at present, simply not enough motivation in any of these countries to announce crippling sanctions on Pakistan. Creating that motivation will require India to announce, for instance, that it will prioritise cooperating countries in terms of valuable contracts. Given that investors are not actually queuing up to invest in a slowing Indian economy, that’s not a strategy that is likely to get off the ground. A policy of isolation, therefore, depends on the heft that a country can bring to the global economy. In our case, that’s not much.

In the final analysis, any strategy of compellence — which is essentially what General Rawat is calling for — has to sit well with the overall policy. It’s an odd Catch-22 situation. To become a country that is able to pull its weight in the global stage, the priority is to rev up the economy.

But to get the economy going, the underlying priority is external and internal stability. Simply put, your ability at compellence is only as good as your purse. The alternative is to bandwagon with the big powers, and hope for the best. That’s what Pakistan did. And look where it got them.