Winter Olympics more about power politics

The 2022 Winter Olympics began in Beijing on February 4 with a spectacular ceremony which its organisers claimed had used 200 technologies, including 5G, AI, high-speed rail and new energy with space management to portray China’s progress from an assembly line of manufactured goods to “intelligent manufacturing”. The organisers were all praise for the facilities provided for the games, though some participants from Russia, Sweden, Finland and other countries had a different story to tell about the “quality of food and quarantine conditions” as many of them tested Covid-positive upon arriving at the Beijing airport, according to reports.

The excitement was further marred as the US, UK, Canada and other countries observed a diplomatic boycott of the games to protest against China’s human rights violations. While 105 Heads of State had witnessed the 2008 games, the number dropped to about 32 this time with most being authoritarian leaders. If Beijing had a grouse that the West had politicised the games for its “groundless accusations”, it was not far behind as it chose Qi Fabao, a PLA regiment commander who was involved in the Galwan clash, as the torch-bearer and a Xinjiang athlete, Dinigeer Yilamujiang, to light the Olympic flame. These shenanigans evoked widespread protests, including boycott of the opening and closing ceremonies by India’s Charge d’affaires in Beijing.

The cynosure of all eyes at the opening ceremony was Russian President Vladimir Putin, who flew to Beijing after speaking of his confrontation with the US over Ukraine and the eastward expansion of NATO. In their joint statement, China and Russia talked of a new era of global governance underpinned by the UN-based international architecture (wherein they have matching influence due to their Permanent Membership of the UN Security Council) instead of a US-dominated international order. They have traded reciprocal support with China opposing further enlargement of NATO, supporting Russia’s proposals to create “long-term binding security guarantees in Europe” and Russia confirming that “Taiwan is an alienable part of China and opposes any forms of its independence”.

Though China and Russia have agreed to support each other for “protection of their core interests”, important differences remain between them as China would not like to alienate the East European countries which are its important economic partners in establishment of any Russian sphere of influence there. Several countries such as the US, Japan and others are opposed to forced annexation of Taiwan by China. Also, many countries like Japan, Germany, Brazil, India and others have strong reservations on the post-Second World War UN architecture, which does not reflect the present realities of comprehensive global power.

A major highlight of Putin’s visit was the agreement on setting up the Power of Siberia 2 gas pipeline to be built by Gazprom, which would supply an additional 50 billion cubic metres of natural gas annually to northern China. As China is phasing out its coal-fired power plants, it wants to increase the ratio of natural gas in its energy mix to 15% by 2030 from 10% now and reduce its reliance on ship-based supplies from Australia and others. Being unsure of sanctions on its gas supply to Europe in wake of its confrontation with the US, Russia was also looking for a secure long-term partner for its gas purchase.

Putin said Russia was now supplying advanced technology weapons to China; these have included SU-35 fighter jets (4.5 generation), S-400 air defence system, M-171 transport helicopters and Kilo class submarines. With the threat of CAATSA sanctions by the US, the buyers for the Russian arms have dried up and China has emerged as a steady customer. Russia has avoided the sale of ground combat systems, strategic bombers and land attack missiles over the fear of arming a potential future adversary. There are also concerns about China adapting these weapons to capture the foreign markets (for example, Yuan class submarines sold to Pakistan by China are partly based on Russia’s Kilo class).

The presence of Pakistan PM Imran Khan at the Beijing Olympics provided yet another confirmation that while maintaining the pretence of not joining any bloc, Pakistan has aproned itself closely to Beijing. Imran began his tour by supporting China on the human rights of Uighur Muslims, but his commercial motives were soon transparent as the media reported that he had gone there seeking several favours from Beijing, i.e. another deposit of $3.14 billion from China to stabilise Pakistan’s foreign exchange situation, a rollover of $4 billion loans and $4.5 billion in trade finance facility.

He also wanted more investment and relocation of the Chinese industries in the Special Economic Zones (SEZs) established in Pakistan. To curry favour with the Chinese government, Islamabad agreed to provide $11 million in compensation to the families of 10 Chinese personnel who were killed in an attack by the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) at Dasu in Pakhtunkhwa province on July 14, 2021. Imran met the Chinese PM, Li Keqiang and signed a framework agreement on industrial cooperation seeking greater investment from the Chinese companies; he also met President Xi Jinping but there was no information if he had agreed to Pakistan’s requests for additional financial assistance. Given that attacks by the TTP and other groups against Pakistan’s security forces and the Chinese personnel have escalated in recent days, the Chinese companies would be cautious in taking up new projects in Pakistan.

The main objective of the Winter Olympics was projection of China’s soft power, to tell the world how it had achieved economic prosperity and rivalled the only superpower, the US now. China’s relations with its neighbours and major powers have soured due to the aggressive and expansionist policies of its rulers. It is an open question how much soft power China would gain by hosting such cultural extravaganzas in the absence of change of its above policies.