Why NATO is enhancing engagement with Indo-Pacific allies

THE recent NATO summit in Vilnius (Lithuania) aimed to enhance multilateral engagement in the Indo-Pacific. Australia, Japan, the Republic of Korea and New Zealand, the four US allies in the east, participated for the second time after last year’s Madrid summit.

NATO has gained strength in the context of the Ukraine war. This has diminished European aspirations for strategic autonomy and brought Europe behind the US and its NATO arrangements. NATO members are increasing their defence expenditure. Japan, South Korea and Australia are also doing so.

The strengthening of the Quad and the emergence of AUKUS have brought Japan and Australia closer to the US. Korea, a US ally, is improving its relationship with Japan. New Zealand has been the odd one out: a member of the dormant ANZUS alliance of 1951, it is unenthusiastic about regional strategic competition vis-a-vis China.

The enhancement of NATO’s engagement with its Indo-Pacific partners has several aspects.

First, the US has stamped its leadership over Europe by revitalising NATO amid the Ukraine war; it wants to do the same in the Indo-Pacific. The dynamic situation in the Indo-Pacific is related to countering Chinese assertiveness. That is on a slow burner because the US has been making overtures to China to restore orderliness among them.

The US prefers to delink China from Russia and isolate Russia in the context of the Ukraine crisis. To this end, its Indo-Pacific allies are being encouraged to confront Russia more and mute the criticism of China.

Second, the original intent of Quad and the AUKUS was to deal with cross-cutting strategic issues and common challenges bringing the Indo-Pacific and Europe together. Some challenges are global, but does that imply that NATO must expand beyond Europe and the Atlantic towards the Indo-Pacific? The common goals that some countries in the Indo-Pacific may have with some NATO nation is not justification enough.

The trigger for NATO’s engagement with Indo-Pacific allies is the Ukraine crisis and not the Chinese threat to the region. Is the US trying to marshal its Indo-Pacific allies to coerce Russia or will it use the might of NATO for dealing with China are unanswered questions.

Besides the participation of the leaders of Australia, Japan, South Korea and New Zealand in NATO summits, their foreign ministers have been attending NATO ministerial meetings since 2020. Since the Ukraine war began, the NATO Military Committee meetings have also seen their participation. The purpose cited is the exchange of information on the situation pertaining to security developments, since Russia is projected both as a European and an Asian power, which is not entirely true.

Third, more than these situational issues are the collaborations that NATO seeks on the technological challenges of cyber defence, the strategic impact of climate change, maritime security, new technologies and hybrid defence. In April 2022, NATO and its partners concurred on an agenda for tackling shared security concerns.

When NATO adopted the Strategic Concept at the 2022 summit, it mentioned the salience of the Indo-Pacific. The aim is to enhance dialogue and cooperation with new and existing partners in the Indo-Pacific to address cross-regional challenges and shared security interests. Australia, New Zealand and Japan have individual partnership programmes with NATO.

NATO countries are increasing their interface with the Indo-Pacific bilaterally and multilaterally. France is moving ahead rapidly through its Indo-Pacific policy by coordinating with India, as seen during the recent visit of PM Modi to Paris.

Germany, too, intends to play a larger role, for which it has guidelines in place; its new strategy for China tries to separately deal with the Chinese challenge. The EU, the Netherlands, and even Lithuania, which hosted the NATO summit, now have Indo-Pacific strategies. The UK is the most vigorous of the European nations in the Indo-Pacific.

Jens Stoltenberg, NATO Secretary General, was perhaps overenthusiastic in announcing that NATO would open an office in Tokyo, which would be its first in Asia. France is reportedly not keen in this regard. Some European members of NATO believe that a formal association of the organisation in the Indo-Pacific is out of its regional context and ambit. Perhaps, the NATO Secretary General is moving faster than the NATO members are ready to go.

India has gently nudged the Quad into a functional engagement rather than military collaboration alone. The Quad offers the ASEAN the recognition of its centrality and wants to engage with the ASEAN and the Pacific Islands for wider cooperation. Military assertiveness through NATO undermines this achievement of Quad, which is slowly making a Quad-ASEAN engagement feasible.

The Philippines, for instance, has restarted military engagement with Japan and the US. India, Australia and Indonesia revived their trilateral meetings on the sidelines of the ASEAN meeting earlier in July. The ASEAN countries do not want to become a part of the big power rivalry, in which NATO is involved. They do not mind bilateral or trilateral arrangements even with Quad partners, but are perturbed over the possibility of NATO entering the region. They prefer avoiding to make choices about Russia, China and others.

India is watching this NATO effort, but there is no tangible encouragement. Modi’s hugely successful visit to Washington in June took the India-US relations to the next level. The recent flurry of visits of Japanese business and political delegations shows the vibrancy of the bilateral relationship. Modi’s visit to Australia after the G7 summit in Hiroshima was another landmark. These Quad relationships are working well. Suggestions that India should be associated with NATO in any perceptible manner do not find acceptance. India intends to retain its strategic autonomy and engage with partners at will.

For the good of the Indo-Pacific, the further evolution of Quad and engaging with countries of the region, particularly the ASEAN and the Pacific Islands, there is no requirement to bring in an entity about whose presence Europe is unenthusiastic.

There is enough happening in the Indo-Pacific among friends and allies. We do not need to make Europe’s problems our own.