Why crop diversification has eluded Punjab

A CURSE necessarily hangs over all partisan electoral politics: good intentions are repeated ad nauseam, turning clichés before becoming policy. Crop diversification is exactly that. Pragmatic economics demands it, and the state wants it, but the interests of a politically dominant landowning class lie elsewhere, and the Centre isn't helping.

It's been on the table for more than 40 years, first appearing in the Johl Committee Report of 1986, and then in 2002, followed by 2013, 2018, and, now, the 2023 policy initiatives.

Agriculture is one subject that brooks no delay when it comes to policy since factors involved include even God —otherwise spelt as rainfall, drought, heatwaves, cold spells, frost, snow, storms, floods, cyclones, pests, fungal/bacterial action and climate change. Still, our political leadership and bureaucracy have dilly-dallied on crop diversification files, often marked 'Urgent'. That 'urgency' cannot be overemphasised as we have reached a 'do-or-die' situation.

Punjab sensed fairly early that an effective way to mitigate some negative outcomes of wheat-paddy monocultures was crop diversification. Monoculture was not an autonomous choice; India needed food security. The input-responsive dwarf varieties ushered the Green Revolution and Punjab rose to the occasion with the consolidation of landholdings; infrastructure like tubewells, link roads and mandis; and institutions for credit, inputs, marketing and research and development.

Punjab's farmers worked hard. India's rice production, a mere 23.54 million tonnes (mt) in 1949-50, jumped to 64.15 mt by 1985-86, while the wheat output during the same period recorded a seven times increase: from 6.39 mt. The country's total foodgrain production tripled, from 54.92 mt.

By the early 1980s, we became self-reliant in food and even exported wheat for the first time in 1985. By this time, the FCI's procurement was declining, farm incomes had begun to slide as production costs kept rising. Consequent protests by farmers led to the constitution of a committee under Dr SS Johl to look into the foodgrain price and procurement policy. Its 1986 report recommended shifting 20% of the area under paddy/wheat to fruits, vegetables, pulses, oilseeds, green fodder for sustaining Punjab's resources.

But in 1987, the monsoon in India failed. Rice production fell by 5.07 mt, wheat by 5.9 mt and total foodgrain production, expected at 154 mt, stopped at 138.97 mt. Foodgrain stocks, a reassuring 28.28 mt on July 1, 1986, had nosedived to 11.90 mt on July 1, 1988.

That India had been able to feed its burgeoning population despite the drought ruining the kharif crop in 21 states was a matter of pride. But it also revived concerns about depleted stocks. Neither politicians nor policy formulators cared anymore for the Johl Committee's wisdom. Instead, Punjab focussed even more on paddy, again not an autonomous choice; India needed it.

The neoliberal agricultural policy regime of the 1990s meant greater deregulation of input prices. Also, since PDS became a target scheme as part of larger structural adjustment reforms, buffer stocks of foodgrain affected procurement levels. Add to it the near-freeze on the MSP for five years from 2000-01 to 2005-06 - Rs 610 to Rs 650 per quintal for wheat; Rs 540 to Rs 600 for paddy. We had a full-blown crisis on our hands. The high cost of production and the resultant squeeze in income led to farmers' indebtedness and the rise in farmer suicides. The only coping mechanism was the open-ended procurement of paddy and wheat at MSP. Politics responded with free power for agriculture in 1997, giving impetus to paddy cultivation.

It was time for a new committee to look into the crisis. Dr SS Johl headed it again in 2002. Its report recommended shifting a million hectares under wheat and paddy to less water-guzzling, soil- and ecology-friendly crops like oilseeds and pulses.

This involved cost. Farmers opting for diversification were to be compensated Rs 12,500 per hectare. The 12th Finance Commission sanctioned Rs 96 crore for four years with a 'no direct cash compensation' rider. A pilot programme started for contract farming failed due to the supply of seeds of unsuitable varieties, poor yields and reluctance to procure produce at the promised prices. The pilot was never scaled up due to a lack of regulation and the Centre's apathy. We seemed to be working to a script: formulate policy, tweak it for failure, do not back it with resources, declare disaster, repeat.

Yet another committee in 2013 under Dr GS Kalkat drafted the State Agricultural Policy recommending crop diversification. It prepared a Rs-8,700 crore Action Plan. In 2014, Punjab prepared a Crop Diversification Plan (CDP) for Green Revolution Areas which was approved under the RKVY as a special programme. Rs 500 crore was allocated to implement it, with Punjab's share at Rs 224 crore. But it was marred by a top-down approach and left little manoeuvring room for states to tweak as per the local needs. The CDP is continuing with meagre allocations.

In 2017, the rechristened Punjab State Farmers' & Farm Workers' Commission, under Ajai Vir Jakhar, drafted another policy. Its report suggested reducing area under paddy and some curbs on free power. A ministerial panel was tasked to study the report but free power was an issue too politically sensitive for action.

Currently, the air is again rife with talk of the Draft Agriculture Policy 2023. It proposes crop diversification, talks of comparing return patterns while fixing MSP for alternative crops and moots a legal guarantee for procurement at MSP. It proposes banning paddy cultivation in 15 dark blocks and subsequently in other over-exploited blocks.

Concomitant recommendations include other water-saving technologies like alternate wetting and drying, direct seeding of rice, bed-planting and micro-irrigation. But this needs a political will to make bold decisions. It is science versus fear of electoral setbacks.

Also, protein-rich diets are becoming popular, reducing the demand for rice and wheat. Other states are reporting better crop yields. The market and the Centre decide the cost of agricultural inputs and purchase prices for produce. Much of related policy formulation, including export/import, has shifted to the Centre's domain, including tariffs and duties and negotiations under the WTO.

India wants productivity, including that of water, and farmers want better income. The answer lies in crop diversification. And it can only come through the Centre by conceding the states' right to have a say in policy formulation, giving them room to implement regionally suitable policies and providing resources by putting the money where your mouth is — literally.