War needs integrated command for tactical edge
The military conflict in Ukraine is in its fourth month. After the initial contact battles in the north with Russian forces bearing down upon the capital Kyiv and Kharkiv, with indifferent success and heavy losses, the weight of operations shifted to the Donbas region and along the south-eastern coastline with an attrition war going the full course at the port city of Mariupol. With the capture and destruction of the Azovstal steel plant, a key objective has been achieved with Mariupol now in Russian hands. However, the way this war or special operations, as named by Russia, has progressed makes it a most unusual conflict.
Various dimensions of warfare have come into play. The thrust from the north was a direct attack, though the Russian troops avoided getting embroiled in city fighting and large-scale destruction. The southern offensive from Crimea aimed at capturing the Black Sea coastline, to cut off Ukraine from any maritime access or support while in the east the objective was to consolidate the separatist regions of Donetsk and Luhansk. The information and psychological warfare are in full display as well. It was being speculated that the war will enter its final phase once Putin’s political aims are within reach but these remain undefined at present. Initially, it appeared that the USA and other NATO countries were little more than disapproving spectators though the sanctions against Russia have reached unprecedented levels. However, the steady flow of arms and equipment through its western borders into Ukraine has made this a proxy war for the US and its European allies. The pre-war presence of NATO personnel and war waging equipment provided the platform on which the Western powers could further build up.
Even as graphic images of a destructive war continue to be beamed by primarily the Western visual media, there are some very unusual happenings at play. A stream of heads of state, prime ministers, defence and foreign ministers, US senators and parliamentary delegations, mainly from NATO nations, have continued to visit Ukraine while it wages war with Russia. The President of Ukraine has been in constant communication with major world leaders. Safe corridors have been provided through mutual agreements between the belligerents. Many a strategic analyst has had to constantly rethink the character and prognosis of this conflict. It is indeed a war like none other!
While a clearer understanding of this war is hampered by information voids, what is of relevance is some important military and strategic lessons which have emerged so far. At the outset, Russia emphasised on appealing to the Ukrainian soldiers to surrender or put down their arms. As events unfolded, it was clear that the intelligence assessment about the Ukraine forces was either lacking or erroneous. At the commencement of the special operations by Russian forces, the leadership spelt out its aims very clearly — demilitarisation and deradicalisation of Ukraine. It appears now that the military commanders failed in securing the operational objectives which would fulfil these aims. While the Russian offensive has taken place in three distinct geographical areas, apparently there was a lack of unified planning at the theatre level and poor coordination between the air and ground campaigns in the conduct of operations. Resultantly, the tactical level air defence systems of Ukrainian forces including drones, remain more than effective. Russia took out Ukrainian air bases and large chunks of air assets, but has not been able to achieve air superiority. The impact of the ‘Stinger’ anti-aircraft systems and ‘Switchblade’ drones supplied by the US has been significant. What emerges is that operational integration should begin with management of air space from the ground up, controlled and coordinated by the Air Force and that can only happen once the integrated theatre command model is adopted.
Degradation of the adversary and shaping of operations include both hard kinetic power and soft kill through electronic warfare. These require to be coordinated at the theatre level and the Russians were found lacking in this. Surprisingly, while the Ukrainian systems at tactical and operational level have remained functional exhibiting robustness and redundancy, even at the strategic level, the external communication links could not be interfered with by the Russians. Another area of grave concern was that logistic inadequacy slowed down the Russian offensive, pointing towards lack of theatre specific planning. A single point of contact, coordinating logistics for all three services at the theatre level, is definitely required to ensure optimisation in provisioning and procurement.
The importance of information operations continues to be abundantly evident though Russia is again impeded by restricted reach in this while Ukraine has ample support and wherewithal of the NATO. Another interesting issue is the importance of consolidation in captured areas to ensure further operations. Maybe Russia did not focus much on this as its political intentions were different but then its forces repeatedly paid the price. Reportedly, a large number of Russian commanders at fairly senior level have been casualties to pinpoint strikes during this war. While the intelligence and target coordinates may have been fed by NATO electronic surveillance systems, what clearly emerges is the need for separation of communication hubs from command locations.
Ukrainians used Javelin missiles supplied from the West and stopped Russian tanks. In an earlier conflict, Azerbaijan used drones and neutralised Armenian tanks. While mechanised forces are the main instruments of battle in open and desert terrain, the manoeuvre space in developed areas is shrinking every day. More potent and stronger anti-tank measures for defensive battles will impede and stymie tank formations.
Considering the disparity of forces and resources, despite western help, Russia may emerge victorious in some form, with Ukraine literally cut to size and devastated by the ravages of war. However, the Russian military mistakes and failures emphatically emphasise the need for fully synergised organisational structures under integrated and unified command systems, for any conflict in the world today.
