Though Maoism is on its last legs, the threat persists
After months of lull, the recent attack in which 10 personnel of the District Reserve Guard (DRG) and a civilian driver were killed in Chhattisgarh’s Dantewada district was a desperate attempt by Maoists to show to the world that they were still alive and kicking. The security forces were caught off guard as they considered the area to be safe. The Aranpur police did not send the usual road-opening party (ROP) as they felt that the operation being a covert one, the Maoists would not get wind of the movement of security forces, even as a narrative was being built that normalcy had returned to the state plagued by extremism for decades.
On the basis of intelligence inputs, a massive operation was launched in Darbha division, with over 200 security personnel combing the area for apprehending the Maoists. Two suspects were held and were being brought to the district headquarters in a convoy when it was attacked. Nearly 50 kg of an improvised explosive device (IED) is believed to have been used to trigger the explosion which resulted in a huge crater across the road. The explosion was followed by firing on the personnel, after which the Maoists escaped. The men in the vehicle that was following the vehicle which came under attack are reported to have returned fire, but casualties on the Maoist side, if any, are not known.
Although there were intelligence reports of the movement of Maoists in the area on the basis of which the operations were launched, there was apparently some laxity, which resulted in the loss of lives of security personnel. It is not something unusual, considering the fact that there were a few major Maoist-related incidents in the past two years in the region.
When there is a massive movement of security forces, the secrecy is almost lost. Having come to know of the movement of the forces, the Maoists planned their strategy and struck at a vulnerable point from where they could easily make good their escape.
It is common knowledge among the security forces that the Maoists attempt to plant IEDs when the roads are under construction. Every attempt is made by them to prevent the authorities from constructing roads in left wing extremism-affected areas. There are reasons galore for such a stance. The construction of roads not only contributes towards development of the region, which would go a long way to enlighten the populace, but it would also enhance accessibility to the security forces and enable them to rush to places within minutes. Education and employment to the villagers would improve their standard of living. Poverty and illiteracy help the Maoists exploit them to their advantage, making them subservient to their diktats.
It is conjectured that the explosives may have been planted a few months back. For obvious reasons, the stretch of the road under construction should have been under constant surveillance either through the physical deployment of forces or CCTV cameras.
Though the standard operating procedures (SOPs) state that the route taken to reach the area of operation should not be taken for the return, it becomes practically impossible at certain times to take any other route either due to the prohibitively longer distance or bad road conditions. If there are fairly usable alternative roads for return, they could be used. But the necessity of deploying ROPs can in no way be done away with. The ROPs, coupled with sniffer dogs and surveillance of the area by drones, can deter Maoists from attacking the security forces.
In his book The Naxalite Movement in India, Prakash Singh, former UP DGP and Director General of the Border Security Force, states that the erstwhile People’s War Group, presently known as the Maoists, “have mastered the art of landmine explosions with the training imparted by the LTTE and have been blowing up police and paramilitary forces’ vehicles with abandon.” They have continued to maintain this strategy, causing heavy losses to the security forces. Not much has been done to contain this menace, though, to a limited extent, the use of sniffer dogs has proved very effective in detecting explosives.
According to the National Bomb Data Centre, the only one of its kind in Asia, which carries out extensive studies of all blasts in the country, Maoists resorted to the use of explosives in 49 incidents in 2020. In 2021, 55 of the 132 incidents involving IEDs were attributed to Maoists.
The use of IEDs helps the Maoists escape soon after attacking the security forces. Just a handful of their cadres can trigger the explosives and flee into the nearby jungles. By the time the security forces come to their senses after being stunned by the explosion, the Maoists cause more casualties by firing on them and quickly retreat.
The Tactical Counter-Offensive Campaign (TCOC), which they carry out in the period between March and July, should have spurred the forces to be more vigilant during these months. But the commanders of the forces seem to have ignored this need and allowed the men to travel in vehicles, and that too without the ROPs.
A lesson should have been learnt from past incidents that the security forces are usually attacked by the Maoists while returning to their bases. With their energy sapped after a long operation, the security personnel tend to get lax while returning and the Maoists exploit this factor to hit them hard. While the ambush may briefly put a damper on the efforts of the security forces, it could serve as a morale-booster for the Maoists. They have suffered a series of reversals in recent years, with several of their leaders being killed in operations or dying of old age or various ailments.
The security forces need to hit back with extensive use of sniffer dogs and drones. The drones need to be effectively used to detect the movements of Maoists and launch operations against them. Constant monitoring of the route followed by the security personnel during major operations can help in course correction.
