The government is dodging a discussion on East Ladakh
ON June 19, upping the ante on the government’s refusal to discuss the Chinese incursions in East Ladakh, the Congress, continuing its needling, demanded a White Paper on border security along the LAC and a discussion during the Monsoon session of Parliament. Eyeing the 2024 General Election, the Opposition is preparing for a showdown in Parliament.
In the government’s report card on national security, there is one question mark: China. It does not want to get bracketed with the Congress, which it has consistently criticised over its failed China policy Tibet fiasco, 1962 debacle and loss of Aksai Chin.
Foreign Minister S Jaishankar has made strenuous efforts to portray the slippages of May 2020 in East Ladakh as ‘Chinese attempts to unilaterally alter status quo which were prevented by government’s swift deployment’ of forces.
The government’s stress is on Chinese ‘attempts’. While relations with China are described as abnormal, diplomacy continues in restoring complete peace and tranquillity, a euphemism for the restoration of status quo ante. Ab initio intelligence and operational failures are masked by creative lexicon.
What have the Chinese done? Under the cover of Covid, routine military training and euphoria of the Wuhan spirit, China has, in most parts of East Ladakh, promulgated its 1959 claim line from the south of the Karakoram range through the bottleneck/Y junction in the Depsang plains to the south of Jiwan Nala to Demchok. The PLA has ingressed 18 to 20 km into the Indian side of the LAC and prevented the ITBP from patrolling to PP 10, 11, 11A, 12 and 13. The PLA has intruded in five other areas, called the friction points, where disengagement has taken place with buffer zones, mainly on the Indian territory, separating the PLA and Indian forces, which are to remain till the disengagement is completed at all friction points. Cleverly, the PLA has refused to budge from Depsang on the pretext that it is a legacy issue, bringing the Daulat Beg Oldie garrison and its landing strip within artillery range.
The Chinese took offensive action after Union Home Minister Amit Shah revoked Article 370 from J&K in 2019 and vowed to reclaim Aksai Chin. The Chinese were also upset with India for confronting the PLA at Doklam.
Over three years now, the government and its votaries have been consistent in their lexicon on the Chinese ‘trying to change status quo’, being thwarted but disturbing peace and tranquillity in border areas. The government has almost never demanded status quo ante May 2020, which successive Army chiefs have insisted on. The government has, instead, sought ‘complete disengagement’ followed by de-escalation and de-induction. None of the three demands is realistic and, therefore, unlikely to be accepted.
On June 8, briefing the media on the achievements of the BJP’s nine years in government, responding to a question on China, Jaishankar said: “The issue is not of land grab but of forward deployment. In 2020, China consciously chose to break agreements to move forces to border area to coerce us. The channels of communication were open but were at minimum level. We were talking to the Chinese before Galwan and told them we can see movement of your forces.”
These remarks were made for the very first time. They reinforce the government stand that there were no intrusions but it was PLA force deployment in the breach of the existing agreements. Further, the fact that India was talking to China before Galwan seeks to establish that we were conscious of the troop movements to expunge intelligence shortfall. Earlier, in his conversations with Chinese Foreign Minister Qin Gang on the sidelines of G20 Foreign Ministers’ meet, Jaishankar told Qin that the relationship with China could not be normalised till the Chinese moved back from the territory they had entered and occupied in Ladakh.
For the Chinese taking more than three years in partially disengaging, and delaying, former Ambassador to China, Ashok Kantha, who was involved in crafting the confidence-building measures (CBMs) with China in 1993 and 1996, said, at a strategic seminar in Kasauli this month, something no one had articulated that the aim of the Chinese incursions was to keep India tied down to land borders, diluting its focus in the maritime domain.
The PLA Navy is the world’s largest in terms of combat ships, numbering 351 vessels, estimated to increase to 400 by 2028. The Indian Navy has 132 ships and the number is intended to grow to 200 by 2030. India has been fixated on continental strategy over maritime strategy. Though the Navy is considered to be the sword arm, China’s coercive behaviour along the LAC has diverted considerable resources to the Army at the cost of the other two services. Over the last decade, the land-vs-sea power debate has veered in favour of the Navy exploiting China’s Malacca dilemma in the Indian Ocean Region.
A former Army Chief, Gen MM Naravane, has said land/territory is what the armies fight for. The Chief of the General Staff, UK, Gen Patrick Sanders, observed last year at the Royal United Services Institute, London, that “land is the decisive domain as it takes an army to hold and regain territory and defend people.”
But ingrained in the Indian psyche is defending every inch of territory and reclaiming territory lost to China. After Ukraine, land lovers have prevailed.
The Congress also recalled on June 19, 2023, what Modi told an all-party meeting on June 19, 2019, that “neither has anyone entered our border, nor any post is in the possession of others.” This contradicted what the MEA had said the previous day: that the Galwan incident took place because Chinese soldiers tried to intrude and set up tents on the Indian side of the border. The Congress also noted that according to a police official in Ladakh, Indian forces have lost control over 26 of the 65 patrolling points on the LAC. It sought answers to its questions.
Dodging a discussion on East Ladakh may prove counterproductive for the government.
