Taliban at the helm but situation fluid in Kabul
August 15 was declared as holiday in the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (IEA), to mark one year of Taliban rule. There was little cause for celebration as the Taliban, which promised to transform to 2.0 avatar, has at best crawled to 1.1. The country continues to languish as pariah state with recognition from only China, Pakistan and Russia. Humanitarian crisis in the form of refugees and famine has reduced it to a basket case. Aid is being pumped in by UN agencies and NGOs. India made considerable contributions in disaster relief during the recent earthquake and famine with wheat shipments. India has even restored the presence of officials in its embassy. Similar ad-hoc set-ups have been instituted by many other countries, primarily to coordinate relief and retain contact with a larger populace. To be fair to the new regime, the overall level of violence has indeed diminished, though it is because the prime perpetrators are now in seat of power.
In order to attempt an objective appraisal, it is important to start with the Doha process and its major thrust areas. Even the Taliban regime, after a drone attack on Ayman al-Zawahiri, accused the USA of violating it. Doha accord had sought zero-tolerance on terrorism, specially providing sanctuary to the Al-Qaeda and ISIS. It also expected inclusiveness in society, with fair representation to non-Pashtun ethnic groups. There was optimism about basic human rights — particularly women’s education and employment, coupled with fair justice, without reprisals.
The elimination of Zawahiri, so-called Emir of the Al-Qaeda in Kabul and in a safe-house provided by the Haqqani clan, exposes the hollowness of the Taliban regime, on the most critical parameter. This apart, recent frequent terrorist attacks in the capital, traced to ISIS-KP, validate the presumption that the Taliban is either complicit or not in full control. As per some experts, it may even be orchestrating calibrated attacks by fringe groups. Most terrorist elements have shifting allegiance, driven less by ideology and more by egos, petty personal rivalries and the urge to control revenue generating sources like narco-terrorism and protection money for transit. How else can a sudden resurgence of ISIS-KP faction be explained?
It is important to reiterate that the Taliban has many factions and Shuras, depending on tribal affinities. Mawlawi Haibatullah Akhundzada, the Emir is confined to spiritual capital Kandahar like Mullah Mohammed Omar. He is the temporal head only, with writ limited to the interpretation and enforcement of Sharia. In tussle between Shuras, the Haqqani clan, headed by Sirajuddin Haqqani has cornered most spoils and portfolios. Mullah Hassan Akhund, PM, remains in outer orbit. Kabul capital territory, scene of Zawahiri elimination and dastardly Gurdwara attacks, is controlled by the Haqqanis, indicating serious failure in governance. The state of security situation is so tenuous that even the Haqqanis rushed to their cave shelters in Paktika, after the drone attack.
The other Shuras and their leaders like two Deputy PMs, Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar and Mawlawi Abdul Salami Hanafi, Uzbek (most significant non-Pashtun face), are all nationally represented. The alternate power centre in Rehbari Shura is Defence Minister Mawalawi Yaqoob (Mullah Omar’s son). From the Indian and global perspective, the Doha group, anchored by Mullah Baradar and moderates like the IMA-trained Sher Mohammad Stanikzai remain on margins.
In the Afghan game of thrones, the ultimate arbiter Peshawar Shura (based in HQ 11 Corps) has seen a major shake-up. The master manipulator and Imran acolyte, Lt Gen Faiz Hameed, ex-ISI chief, has been consigned to defensive formation, 33 Corps, at Bahawalpur. He has been replaced by Bajwa loyalist Lt Gen Sardar Hassan. Pakistan despite protracted talks and mediations by a group of clerics led by Muhammad Taqi Usmani has failed to work out an acceptable deal with the TTP. There are frequent clashes on the Iran-Afghan border and on Durand Line. Despite fencing, the TTP continues to operate on both sides. The situation is likely to get vitiated in the run-up to polls in October.
The National Resistance Front, which had been hibernating in Panjshir Valley and waiting for an operationally conducive summer has not found much traction. Consequently, Tajiks, Uzbeks, Hazaras and Ismailis remain largely unrepresented. The only hope for inclusiveness simmers in continued presence in Kabul, of former President Hamid Karzai and Abdullah Abdullah, but that is subject to the Taliban hierarchy paying some heed to them. The human rights record remains abysmal with women pushed out of education and employment into veil and mandatory male escorts. Notwithstanding window dressing, flogging and reprisals are back in Taliban Kangaroo courts.
Acting Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi has been shuttling to Gulf capitals to push for recognition of the IEA. India with investments of US $2 billion is under pressure to restart work on development projects like Shahtoot (Salma) dam. The situation has become more complex with China seeking to include India in the Afghan resolution process, notwithstanding the fact that the China-Pak-Russia troika spared no effort to keep India out of the Doha process, Quadrilateral Coordination Group (QCG), Ankara dialogue and even regional initiatives. Viewing from the Indian perspective, from total abhorrence to reopening of informal contacts with the Taliban is a major and welcome step. India has opportunities due to a groundswell of popular acceptance, yet we can proceed only with caution and after due diligence.
