Syrian crisis and risks for India
ANY political turmoil and violence in the Gulf and West Asia directly and significantly impact India’s security interests.
One, the welfare and safety of nine million Indians living and working in this swathe of territory on our western flank are a huge preoccupation.
Two, this region is critical to India’s energy security as it supplies a significant part of our oil and gas requirements.
Three, of late, the Gulf countries have become major economic and commercial partners, with rising trade and investment flows.
And, four, India has become much more deeply engaged with Israel, which is now a significant defence and technology partner and this adds a complex dimension to our West Asia policy.
Both on Syria and Iran, Indian interests may be at odds with Israel. India has maintained a friendly relationship with the Assad (both Hafez and Bashar) regime in Damascus over the past six decades. Iran is the most proximate power to India in the Gulf region and lies on the western flank of Pakistan, a perennial adversary. It impinges directly on India’s maritime security. It provides access to Central Asia through the Chabahar port and the “northern corridor” of rail and roads connecting Afghanistan and beyond. The longstanding and deep civilisational ties which bind India and Iran are important in themselves.
If, encouraged by the serious weakening of Iran by the decimation of Hezbollah in southern Lebanon and now the fall of Assad in Syria, Israel and the US launch an attack to cripple Iran’s nuclear and oil facilities, as some are loudly advocating both in Tel Aviv and Washington, the entire western flank of India is likely to go up in flames. All vital interests of India listed above will be damaged severely and over the long term.
The Arab states are also deeply worried about the risks of such a war. They may have been wary of Iran, but not to the extent of risking a regional war. On this critical issue, their interests should be closely aligned with India’s. Should India be prepared to confront Israel and the US to safeguard its interests? Should it mobilise friendly Arab states to prevent a destructive and dangerous dynamic taking hold? It should.
The events in Syria leave several questions unanswered. Assad would have known that the fall of Aleppo would leave Damascus dangerously exposed. This was probably the most fiercely fought-over city when Assad began to regain the territory lost in the initial phase of the civil war post 2012. And yet, Aleppo fell to the Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) militant group, led by Mohammad al-Jolani, after half-hearted resistance from the Syrian military. From Aleppo to Damascus, there were virtually no Syrian military forces to deter the advancing rebel army, which literally walked into Damascus unopposed. There was time for Assad and his family to take a flight out to Russia, while his Prime Minister stayed behind to announce that he would stay in office to help with the “transition” of power.
Jolani announced that there would not be any reprisals against those who had worked in Assad’s government and that only the intelligence agencies which had oppressed and tortured Syrian people would be brought to justice. These are reassuring words.
The Iranians evacuated from Damascus in advance of the advancing rebels, making no attempt to fight along with Syrian soldiers. The Russians, too, kept a low profile and were assured that their naval base in Tartus on the Mediterranean coast and military facilities and personnel in the Latakia province would not be targeted.
There is no word about the 900 US military personnel who are based in the area controlled by the Syrian Kurds, who have maintained an autonomous swathe of territory, supported by the US.
Turkey controls the adjacent area as a buffer and has reportedly backed the HTS and associated militant groups in carrying out the operations against the Assad regime.
The HTS is proscribed as a terrorist organisation and the US has a bounty of $10 million on head of its leader Jolani. Will that be pursued or quietly dropped? Was this a deal put together behind the scenes by the key stakeholders, including the US, Russia, Turkey and, perhaps, even Iran? With Hezbollah neutralised, the Iranians would have been reluctant to enter the fray themselves. The Turks may have seen a chance to expand their presence and influence in Syria not only to begin the repatriation of the large Syrian refugee population in Turkey, but also, most importantly, to keep a check on the activities of the Kurds who are considered a major security threat to Turkey.
This would suggest that the likelihood of Syria emerging as an independent, sovereign state with control over all the territories within its formal borders is minimal. It will continue to be the playground of proxies that it has been for several decades now, though the nature of play may be different.
The HTS has criticised Iran, declaring that Syria would no longer be a playground for Iranian ambitions. But there have also been video clips of HTS fighters declaring their intent to advance into Gaza and to occupy Jerusalem. If the HTS leadership reverts to a pro-Palestinian and anti-Israel posture, Israel would not hesitate to use coercive military measures against it. Israel has already carried out air raids against suspected missile and chemical weapon storage sites within Syria.
It is an irony of history that the only two secular and plural countries in the West Asian region — Iraq and Syria — were destabilised and subverted by the US and its allies. They proved to be an anachronism in the western strategy of sowing sectarian divisions and creating a so-called “Sunni crescent” to isolate Shia Iran after the Islamic revolution there in 1980. They may have been ruled by autocratic leaders, but their societies accommodated diverse ethnic and religious communities. A plural India shared a sense of affinity with them.
One should learn a lesson from our western neighbourhood. Succumbing to sectarian impulses can unravel nations, even those that have long histories of embracing diversity.