Shaky Dhaka needs a helping hand

EVER since a popular revolt overthrew the government of Sheikh Hasina in Bangladesh, the country has been rocked by violence and disorder. The minority Hindu community there has been targeted. New Delhi has expressed strong concerns about these incidents to Dhaka, saying that the primary responsibility for the safety and security of “all citizens of Bangladesh, including minorities, rests with the Government of Bangladesh”.

Developments in the country can be seen in two ways. First, after the iron hand of Hasina’s Awami League government has been lifted, the country is reverting to a situation of semi-anarchy, with the Islamists and Pakistan’s ISI (Inter-Services Intelligence) holding sway and the Hindu minority being persecuted. The second approach would be to consider that Bangladesh is going through a temporary phase in which the country, which did not have real democracy for the past decade, is trying to find its feet under the aegis of an interim government.

Bangladesh is perhaps the most consequential neighbour of India in South Asia, being ‘India-locked’ — of its 4,367-km land boundary, just 271 km is with Myanmar and the remaining 4,096 with India. It borders Tripura, Mizoram, Assam, Meghalaya and West Bengal and holds the key to the economic development as well as security of our northeastern region.

Given the nature of the Bangladesh border, it is difficult to completely seal it; as a result, the policies of various governments of the country have had a vital bearing on our security. India’s relations with Bangladesh have seen ups and downs. Beginning with India’s role in helping Bangladesh emerge as an independent nation, it has been a rollercoaster ride for bilateral ties as dictators Ziaur Rahman and HM Ershad encouraged the Islamicisation of the country in a bid to maintain their control. As in Pakistan, the Jamaat-e-Islami (JeI) has played a significant role and grown in the process, despite the fact that it fought against the freedom movement of the country.

But what happens in Bangladesh is not just about India but the wider region, including China, Myanmar and South-East Asia. The creeping radicalisation of its large Muslim population could have wider global consequences. Besides the JeI, there are other radical groups, like the Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami and the Jamaat-ul-Mujahideen Bangladesh, as well as elements of the al-Qaeda and the Islamic State. A network of madarsa leaders, Hefazat-e-Islam, too, wants Sharia rule in the country and is opposed to the establishment of a secular polity there.

The JeI’s alliance with the Bangladesh National Party (BNP), headed by Begum Khaleda Zia, has been a major problem. As a result, her tenures as Prime Minister in 1991-96 and 2001-06 have been marked by problems arising out of the virtually free rein given to the ISI and the sanctuary provided to an assortment of insurgent groups active against India in the North-East.

The India-Bangladesh relationship stabilised with the establishment of Hasina’s government in 2009. Most importantly, it helped check the use of Bangladeshi territory by anti-India elements, be it the ISI or various north-eastern insurgent groups. This led to the reopening of land routes connecting the two nations and signing of the Motor Vehicles Agreement by BBIN (Bangladesh, Bhutan, India and Nepal) to promote regional movement of traffic.

China has developed significant interest in Bangladesh both as part of its larger policy of containing India as well as exploiting the country’s location at the head of the Bay of Bengal, next to the Rakhine state of Myanmar, where it has important investments and from where a pipeline carries oil from the port of Kyaukpyu to Yunnan in China, bypassing the Malacca Strait. Beijing has invested large amounts of money in constructing bridges, roads and power plants in Bangladesh and has also emerged as the biggest military supplier to the country.

For many of the reasons cited above, New Delhi needs to handle things with care in Bangladesh. It is true that the situation is extremely volatile and can go out of control, resulting in negative consequences for India. The situation is compounded by the fact that the ISI is likely to be working overtime to impose an anti-India narrative on the popular movement there.

India needs to draw lessons from its successful handling of strained ties with neighbours recently. By providing financial succour to Sri Lanka during its economic crisis, it has bought considerable goodwill, which is paying dividends with the government of Anura Kumara Dissanayake. Likewise, by calmly dealing with President Muizzu of Maldives, New Delhi has managed to blunt his “India out” strategy.

Similar dividends are visible in Nepal — the nominally anti-India Prime Minister KP Sharma Oli, who is on an official visit to China, had made it clear beforehand that his country would not sign any new loan agreement with Beijing under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Indeed, the Nepalese want to sign a new agreement with China that will narrow the scope of BRI in their country.

With Bangladesh, too, India needs to adopt a policy of strategic patience. Bangladesh is a country in transition. New Delhi needs to support the process of restoring democracy there. There has been a tendency to exaggerate the attacks on Hindus. After an initial upsurge, such attacks have come down. We also must understand that our one-sided support to Hasina has resulted in suspicion about our motives and there is need to provide a corrective to our Bangladesh policy.