Realism, strategic interests should dictate India-China ties
A realistic assessment of the current state of India-China relations is necessary amid the apparent orchestrated pleas urging India to ease travel and import restrictions on Chinese personnel and goods. Since its military adventure in Ladakh in April 2020, Beijing has consistently sought normalisation of relations, especially economic, setting aside the situation on the border. Over the past couple of months, various business sectors, reinforced by arguments advanced by some economists and media reports, have echoed China’s demands.
There is a negligible prospect of an improvement in India-China relations in the near future. The absence of communication for over four years at the highest level and China’s recent protest against economic assistance to projects in Arunachal Pradesh and other border regions -- on the specious pretext that they are disputed -- are brazen examples. On the contrary, they point to China expanding the areas of pressure on India.
The bilateral relationship has been subjected to considerable strain ever since Beijing decided that it will attempt to forcibly take the territories it claims and compel India to acquiesce to China being the leading power in the region. China has simultaneously redoubled efforts to establish dominance over Asia. These developments have coincided with the view in the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leadership that India has drawn uncomfortably close to the US. Additionally, Beijing sees India as adopting a tougher, unyielding stance, which includes building defences along the border as well as initiating steps to close off the burgeoning Indian market to China. Beijing views these as unwelcome steps, but considers that India does not yet pose a serious challenge.
The situation on the border has also not changed; 60,000-70,000 troops remain deployed on the front lines. The Chinese have built additional accommodation to billet reinforcements and new advanced weaponry and military units continue to be inducted. Border defence infrastructure is being built at a frenetic pace with plans to build 35 military or dual-use airports and major arterial railways and roads along the border in Tibet. Chinese President Xi Jinping’s attitude towards India, signalled on the opening day of the 20th Party Congress in October 2022, with the screening of a video of the fateful Galwan clash of June 2020, has not altered.
In a cosmetic attempt to show that China wants to improve ties but it’s India that is playing spoilsport, Beijing claimed that it had sent Ambassador Xu Feihong, who arrived in India almost 20 months after his predecessor Sun Weidong departed, to enhance communication and improve bilateral ties. This has been echoed by many Indian journalists, academics and others. Since his arrival, Xu Feihong has virtually been holding court, meeting Indian politicians, former diplomats, businessmen and others. China is keen on maintaining commercial and economic access to India’s market but has no intention of taking substantive steps to ease tensions on the border. At the same time, it is determined to keep India under protracted and sustained pressure.
There are other signs of China's attitude and intentions. Xi has not initiated direct contact or meeting with Prime Minister Modi since April 2020, or even observed basic diplomatic niceties and congratulated him on his re-election. Chinese Premier Li Qiang did send a routine message of congratulations, but only after Modi’s swearing-in. China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs explained that it would have been ‘premature’ to convey greetings prior to the swearing-in. There was, however, no such hesitation in inviting Indonesia’s President-elect on an official visit prior to his swearing-in! Whether this presages an effort to restrict China-India interaction at the level of the Chinese Premier is to be seen.
Xi also skipped the G-20 Summit and Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) meetings. A senior CCP cadre had divulged a couple of months prior to the G20 Summit that Xi would not attend the event and it would, therefore, be a failure. However, Xi’s absence ensured there would be no distractions, the G20 communique was unanimously approved, and, importantly, India brought the Global South within the G20 fold.
Another instance was China's prickly objection to Taiwan President Lai Ching-te’s congratulations to Prime Minister Modi.
China’s real attitude towards India is now more clear. The Chinese foreign ministry’s remark on July 10 that “South Tibet is China’s territory,” and India’s development activities in the area are “illegal and invalid” underscore its approach on border issues. The same day, Foreign Minister Wang Yi, who is also China’s Special Representative for border talks, congratulated Ajit Doval on his reappointment as National Security Adviser and Special Representative observing he is ready to “properly handle” issues related to the situation on the ground in border areas. The use of the phrase “properly handle” indicates that discussions would be in accordance with China’s stated position on the border since April 2020.
Beijing’s attitude towards India will undoubtedly colour its position on border and other negotiations. It will explore additional avenues for applying pressure on India, including through international financial organisations. India needs to take cognisance of this while examining proposals by Beijing and also consider whether to give China a free pass on issues like human rights, Tibet, Xinjiang, etc. Beijing will, meanwhile, continue to activate Indian businessmen and others to exert pressure on the government to facilitate the inflow of Chinese personnel and goods. Any travel and trade concessions would be at the cost of the public exchequer, further increasing the galloping trade deficit and with long-term deleterious effects severely undermining the ‘Make in India’ initiative.
