Purge in China’s military exposes systemic flaws
CHINA’s rubber-stamp parliament, known as the National People’s Congress (NPC), recently decided to remove nine PLA Generals — Zhang Zhenshong, Zhang Yulin, Rao Wenmin, Ju Xinchun, Ding Laihong, Lu Hong, Li Yuchao, Li Chuanguang and Zhou Yaning — from the national legislature on corruption charges. They included five former commanders or vice commanders of the PLA Rocket Force, a former air force chief and a navy commander responsible for the South China Sea region. Wu Yansheng, Chairman of the China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation, and Liu Shiquan, Chairman of the Norinco Group, a major manufacturer of military equipment, were also shown the door.
Those terminated from the rocket force were reportedly linked to dismissed Defence Minister Gen Li Shangfu, who was sacked in October 2023 on corruption charges. Wei Fenghe, a former Defence Minister who used to head the force, was removed in August, again for alleged corruption. Foreign Minister Qin Gang was fired in July for allegedly passing on sensitive information though his mistress to foreign intelligence agencies. Gen Dong Jun, a close confidant of Chinese President Xi Jinping, was appointed the new Defence Minister by the NPC.
Many of these sacked Generals had worked in the defence procurement department. While corruption in the Chinese military is not new, the sacking of so many ‘tainted’ senior officers exposes systemic deficiencies in their selection and the equipment procurement process. Given that many of these officers worked in the Rocket Force, which oversees the delivery of China’s nuclear weapons, it shows that the vetting procedure for top jobs was deficient. Since the selection of the Generals is done by the Central Military Commission (CMC) headed by President Xi, it has also revealed glaring weaknesses in the appointment process. Since some of these Generals were appointed on the basis of their work or acquaintance with Xi himself, he is also partially responsible for the selection of unsuitable persons for top-level jobs.
After Xi came to power in 2012, he launched a vigorous campaign to target the corrupt elements in the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the military. Some of the arrested persons included his political opponents, who posed a threat to him. As per a report, 120 high-ranking officials, including 58 Generals, had been prosecuted till 2023. At the 20th Party Congress in October 2022, Xi said: “Corruption is the biggest cancer that harms the vitality and combat effectiveness of the party and anti-corruption is the most thorough self-revolution.” The Chinese government has not commented on the purge of senior officials in the military, though in July 2023, Xi called for “deepening reforms in the armed forces and improving the strategic management of the military”.
The Chinese military suffers from a lack of institutional control and oversight as there is no legislative check on the procurement of military equipment. Since there are party members in the judiciary and the media, there is no independent scrutiny of the purchase procedure or system. As Xi has insisted that the military should be fully answerable to the CCP and to him personally, there is no independent party supervision on the military’s functioning which used to exist during the tenure of Xi’s predecessors. Even other members of the Politburo Standing Committee do not have any oversight over military affairs now as Xi is keen on taking full control of the military. He has installed his trusted lieutenants in the CMC to ensure that his instructions on the functioning of the military are duly carried out.
The widespread corruption in the ranks of the Chinese military and the sacking of several Generals have undermined some of the aura being built assiduously by Xi about raising a “world-class military” by pumping billions of dollars into such unprecedented militarisation in peacetime. The vast corruption casts doubts about the fighting prowess of the military and its effectiveness to prevail in any serious conflict with the US over Taiwan. Some analysts have expressed similar doubts about the quality and working of the weapon systems inducted by these Generals.
The sackings could also damage the morale in the lower ranks. Since these Generals are being replaced by commanders from other units, loyalty is being given preference over domain expertise, thus weakening the professional capabilities of the military. The corruption scandals would also heighten domestic scepticism over the credibility of the top leadership, including Xi himself, and could affect his control over the security forces and the people at large. His administrative acumen, knowledge and leadership skills would be challenged more as the Chinese economy is also not performing well — the realty sector (with large-scale investments by the middle class) is ailing, there is a decline in foreign and domestic private investment, domestic consumption is low and there is large-scale unemployment, particularly among the youth.
Xi is aware that he needs to control the military before he can control everything else. His immediate focus is on obtaining the absolute loyalty of the military rather than boosting its combat capabilities or winning wars with foreign countries. Given the considerable disaffection against his policies among former party leaders, certain ranks of the party, military, business, industry and professionals, he cannot afford to loosen his hold on on the military. Given the political nature of the Chinese armed forces, its one-man control and organisational structure, the corruption in its ranks can’t be entirely eliminated. It can at best be reduced. Understanding his vulnerabilities, Xi has diminished his hubris against the US and agreed to a dialogue on various contentious issues to bide this difficult time and tend to his domestic problems.
