Pakistan’s National Security Policy a sham

Prime Minister Imran Khan recently unveiled his country’s first-ever National Security Policy, which is touted to articulate a ‘citizen-centric’ framework as compared to the military-focused one hitherto. While launching the public version of the document, the PM kept blaming the earlier governments for his country’s economic woes. The 100-page document had been endorsed by the National Security Committee and the Cabinet earlier.

The NSA, Moeed Yusuf, claimed that the new policy put people and economy at its core, leading to a Comprehensive National Security Framework. They are all big words, no doubt, and clearly orchestrated by the country’s military establishment, which has ruled the roost for over half of the beleaguered country’s over 70 years of existence.

Interestingly, the new document statedly mentions ‘Hindutva’, aggression for political gains and disinformation as the prevalent threats from India. Yusuf further puts Jammu and Kashmir as the “core of the bilateral relationship” and implores India to benefit from regional connectivity to garner peace and stability in the region.

The original version of the document is stated to be classified, clearly shielding the perennial “terror-for-geopolitics” national ethos. With the FATF continuing to retain the country on its Grey List (with the addition of bosom pal Turkey into that dubious fold, for good measure) and its economies in a shambles, it cannot just be a coincidence that both these Sunni Islamist bedfellows rue their dire straits predicament, with inflation, dollar parity and national reserves declining abysmally each day.

Having had the opportunity to study the Pakistani military mind, thanks to a diplomatic tenure in Islamabad at the turn of the last millennium, I find it difficult to visualise a military dispensation now amenable to academic or doctrinal moorings.

I still recall one of my early tête-à-têtes with the PAF’s late Air Chief Mushaf Ali Mir, wherein he categorically stated that his air force was essentially a “tactical” entity and had no use for any high-fangled service doctrine manuals (this when the IAF had just articulated its first air power doctrine).

At another interaction with senior PAF officers during a reception for a visiting US War College team, in reply to a question from a student officer as to what he would suggest as a suitable topic for a course dissertation, the then PAF Deputy Chief nonchalantly replied, “Why not the Talibanisation of Pakistan?”

It was the standard briefing during those days among the Defence Attaché community to count the numbers of bearded cadets and officers during the passing-out parades at the PMA Kakul, the Risalpur PAF Academy and elsewhere.

So, what about this well-known Islamised orientation in the new National Security Policy?

Clearly, those aspects, including the nuclear priorities and shady relations with fringe elements in Afghanistan and Kashmir, must have been reserved for the classified portion of the document. That itself makes the entire exercise a fallacy, as the nation’s “Military Incorporated” just cannot afford to compromise its self-interests. So also this sham of a National Security Policy, surely built around larger-than-life portrayals of its military machismo, devoid of any nuanced articulation of doctrines, conducive civil-military relations and the like.

Notwithstanding all this, the status of Pakistani military in its social fabric, in an otherwise dishevelled polity, is bound to sustain.

Another aspect that comes to mind is the military’s obsession with religion and the indoctrinations and fervour thereof. During an official tour on board a Pak navy destroyer off the Karachi harbour, once during an ongoing “jack stay” exercise, all sailors vanished to do their prayers in response to the azan call from the on-board muezzin! The navy officers then tended to make light of it, no doubt, but to a trained eye, the priorities of a religion-inspired fighting force was amply clear.

So, the long and short of the issue is that some things like feral feline stripes just cannot change, and Pakistan military’s terror and jihadi orientation will stay forever.

The absolute disdain (as witnessed) with which the Pak military holds its civilian counterparts is another straw to break the camel’s back. In a nation already in a precarious economic condition, the military has to ensure that it gets its share of the limited national exchequer pie, and the bogey of threats from India cannot be underplayed even for a moment. And the anointment of Imran Khan as a convenient stooge for these machinations will play out in the days to come.

The tenure of Army Chief Bajwa ending later this year, and frustration amongst junior aspirants who would have been overlooked for promotions, thanks to his inordinate extensions, are bound to take a toll on the civil-military applecart. When the considerable international pressure post the ascent of the Afghan Taliban is added to this, no amount of gameplaying, such as the new National Security Policy paper, would help prevent the inevitable crisis-to-crisis security management in Pakistan.

China, of course, will continue to fish in troubled waters, be it through the ambitiously troublesome CPEC or through opportune military sales, such as the supposedly ensuing 25 J10C deal. Any viable security architecture needs a national security strategy as a starting point, no doubt. But that has to be buttressed by sound professional military education and a democratic value system where the civil authority calls the shots.

As long as that doesn’t obtain, Pakistan will overspend militarily in panic, till, of course, the disgruntled common man pays the ultimate price. Opportunistic hangers-on, including the incumbent Prime Minister and his cortege of clueless, sycophantic cronies, would only serve to expedite the downslide. Egged on by the army/intelligence establishment and other power-mongers to compete militarily with India, a replay of a familiar cold war fiasco appears slated.