Opacity continues to afflict India-China relationship

The positive tenor in the post-Galwan India-China relationship was enabled by a brief meeting between Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Chinese President Xi Jinping on the sidelines of the BRICS Summit in Kazan, Russia, in late October. It received considerable official comment and caused parliamentary discord in early December.

External Affairs Minister (EAM) S Jaishankar made a detailed statement in Parliament on December 3. He traced the history of the unresolved territorial-cum-border issue from 1958 right up to the most recent thaw in the relationship at Kazan in a lucid, albeit selective, manner. He unequivocally stated: “We are clear that the maintenance of peace and tranquillity in border areas is a prerequisite for the development of our ties. In the coming days, we will be discussing both de-escalation as well as effective management of our activities in the border areas.”

Regrettably, the EAM’s statement resulted in the Opposition members staging a walkout, since a discussion was not allowed. This legislative discord was avoidable.

The EAM’s statement was followed by the 32nd meeting of the Working Mechanism for Consultation and Coordination (WMCC) on India-China Border Affairs in Delhi on December 5 between officials from both countries.

The Ministry of External Affairs’ (MEA) readout regarding the outcome of the WMCC meeting was brief and intriguing. The most significant assertion is the line that reads: “The two sides positively affirmed the implementation of the most recent disengagement agreement which completed the resolution of the issues that emerged in 2020.”

Does this imply that the disengagement process is complete and that the seemingly intractable issues, which emerged in 2020 (the Galwan setback), have reached satisfactory resolution? The second question is whether the use of the word ‘agreement’ has been accepted by the Chinese side and if this is a reference to a written document or is the agreement an oral understanding?

After the initial fumble and obfuscation that took place in the immediate aftermath of the Galwan clash in June 2020 (the statement by PM Modi that there was no intrusion) — the Indian position gradually crystallised with two major objectives. One, that there has to be a return to the April 2020 status quo as regards the patrolling protocols along the Line of Actual Control (LAC); and two, that all agreements signed between India and China regarding the unresolved territorial/border issue would be respected.

An objective review of the tactical situation after the Galwan incident revealed that India had forfeited certain patrolling rights along the LAC in Ladakh. Furthermore, concerns were voiced that buffer zones were being created along the LAC, which would inhibit both Indian patrolling and grazing rights that existed in April 2020. Was this a case of China imposing a ‘new normal’ along the LAC?

The most recent official statements do not shed any light on these issues. One presumes that they will be addressed by the Special Representatives at their next meeting later this month. Dissonance in the MEA statements was highlighted by Ashok Kantha, former Ambassador to China, in a series of tweets on social media. He added: “The MEA statement that ‘all issues that emerged in 2020’ have been resolved is baffling to someone who was a border negotiator with China for nearly a decade.” This is a welcome intervention in the public domain by an astute China expert.

Hopefully, the statements from the MEA will be harmonised with the final military objective that was reiterated by Army Chief Gen Upendra Dwivedi, who noted (on October 23) that both armies need to restore trust and “go back to the status quo of April 2020”.

The MEA statement after the WMCC talks also noted: “Both sides reviewed the situation in border areas, and reflected on the lessons learnt from the events of 2020 in order to prevent their recurrence.”

The reference to ‘reflecting’ on lessons learnt warrants a zoom out for Delhi, which has been grappling with this unresolved border problem for well over 65 years. India was surprised by the October 1962 Chinese attack and the limited border war that ensued; and much the same pattern unspooled in June 2020 at Galwan.

India’s first Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru was at the helm in October 1962. There were many defence policy blunders and omissions on his part. Yet, Nehru did not prevent the debacle from being discussed in Parliament. A few Opposition MPs, including a young Atal Bihari Vajpayee, sought a special session of Parliament. This was held on November 8 — when the war was still being prosecuted and India was on the defensive. And when it was suggested that this be a ‘secret session’, Nehru rejected the proposal, stating that the issues before the House were of “high interest to the whole country”.

On December 10, 1962, a full session was devoted to the Chinese invasion in the Lok Sabha; the comprehensive proceedings have been recorded in 145 pages.

Yet, even Nehru was reluctant to let the Henderson Brooks report (which was tasked with reviewing the military lapses of the October 1962 war) from being placed in the public domain. This opacity continues to plague the post-Galwan period of the troubled India-China relationship.

Tensions between the two Asian giants have been festering for decades. Complex geopolitical factors and domestic political compulsions on both sides have further exacerbated the situation. Sunlight is often the best disinfectant, and ensuring transparency about what has transpired would be highly desirable. Democratic India would be better served by allowing this vital national security issue to be discussed both in Parliament and the media. A comprehensive White Paper on the India-China relationship that builds on the EAM’s detailed statement in Parliament would be a much-needed first step.